UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________ ) JOEY D. GONZALEZ RAMOS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 21-cv-00592 (APM) ) ADR VANTAGE, INC. et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Before the court is a motion for sanctions filed against Plaintiff Joey D. Gonzalez Ramos
by Defendants ADR Vantage, Inc. (“ADR Vantage”); its counsel, John Murphy; and his law firm,
Walker, Murphy, and Nelson, LLP (collectively, “Defendants”). Defs.’ Mot. for Rule 11
Sanctions, ECF No. 7. The motion arises out of a complaint filed by Plaintiff against Defendants
for allegedly defamatory statements made in court filings in another case, Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR
Vantage, Inc. (Gonzalez Ramos I), No. 18-cv-1690 (APM), 2021 WL 4462611 (D.D.C. Sept. 29,
2021). In Gonzalez Ramos I, Plaintiff sued ADR Vantage for allegedly defaming him and
committing a number of other torts in publishing a climate-assessment report his employer, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (“USDA”), hired it to create. See id. at *1. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of ADR Vantage in Gonzalez Ramos I but denied a motion
for sanctions filed by the defendant in that case. Gonzalez Ramos I, 2021 WL 4462611, at *9;
Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR Vantage, Inc., No. 18-cv-01690 (APM), 2021 WL 4462411 (D.D.C. Sept.
29, 2021). The court has now dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint in this follow-up action, Mem. Op., ECF No. 17 [hereinafter MTD Mem. Op.]; Order, ECF No. 18 [hereinafter MTD Order], and for
the reasons that follow, it will also deny the motion for sanctions.
II.
“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper,” an attorney or
unrepresented party “certifies that” the filing “is not being presented for any improper purpose,”
and that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
“If . . . the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction” for the violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter
baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Courts do not
impose Rule 11 sanctions lightly; such sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings
that frustrate judicial proceedings, or that are filed to harass another party.” In re Carvalho, 598
B.R. 356, 363 (D.D.C. 2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Defendants advance two arguments for sanctions. Defs.’ Mot. at 6. Neither is particularly
well developed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “knew before instituting the instant litigation
that it was devoid of any good faith factual or legal basis.” Id. (capitalization omitted). They
assert that Marsh v. Hollander, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004), squarely forecloses Plaintiff’s
claims and any good-faith basis for the litigation. Def.’s Mot. at 6. In that case, a court in this
District concluded that allegedly defamatory statements made by defense counsel in a letter to the
plaintiff were absolutely immune under the judicial-proceedings privilege and dismissed the
plaintiff’s defamation claims. Id. at 6–7. It explained that, under the privilege, “[s]tatements made
in the course of judicial proceedings are protected by absolute immunity from defamation suits.”
Id. at 6. This court has concluded that the statements at issue in this case are subject to the same
2 privilege and has dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint accordingly. MTD Mem. Op.; MTD Order. But
the fact that claims in a complaint are not ultimately meritorious does not mean they are frivolous
or automatically sanctionable. Chandler v. Berlin, No. 18-cv-2136 (APM), 2020 WL 5593905, at
*3 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (“Simply prevailing in an action is no basis to impute improper motives
for the filing of a complaint.”). Marsh, the sole case relied upon by Defendants in their motion,
does not explicitly spell out the judicial-proceedings privilege’s two requirements: that the
statements were made in the course of a judicial proceeding and that they were related to that
proceeding. Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 1 Here, Plaintiff made an
unavailing but nonfrivolous argument that the second requirement was not met in this case. See
MTD Mem. Op. at 5–8.
Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff “knew” his lawsuit lacked any good-faith factual or legal
basis dovetails with their second argument for sanctions: that “Plaintiff’s pursuit of the instant
litigation was done in bad faith” (i.e., that his complaint was filed for an improper purpose, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (capitalization omitted). As evidence of bad faith, they
point to the “rash of grievances . . . and lawsuits” Plaintiff has filed against the USDA, ADR
Vantage, and now its counsel. Id. at 6. Of course, persistent litigiousness is not an automatic
trigger for sanctions. And as the court has recognized in this memorandum and on previous
occasions—including the last time ADR Vantage moved for sanctions against Plaintiff—he has
“advanced colorable arguments on at least some of his claims.” Gonzalez Ramos, 2021 WL
4462411, at *2. “The fact that Plaintiff’s Complaint raised nonfrivolous claims is strong evidence
that it was not filed for improper purposes.” Id.; see also Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 663
1 Marsh’s only reference to the relatedness requirement is in a parenthetical to a citation supporting the assertion that “[s]tatements made for the purpose of preparing for litigation, or . . . attempting to settle issues prior to commencing litigation[,] are covered.” Marsh, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 6. 3 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that “the presence of merit in a claim or defense may well
negate any notion of bad faith in its filing”); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d
1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (noting that “evidence bearing on frivolousness or non-
frivolousness will often be highly probative of purpose”); Chandler, 2020 WL 5593905, at *3. 2
The fact that Defendants sent Plaintiff a copy of the Marsh case to review before filing
their sanctions motion does not change the outcome. See Defs.’ Mot. at 6; id., Ex. 1, at 3.
Defendants suggest that this action supports their claims that Plaintiff filed this action in bad faith.
See Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (“The fact that Plaintiff did not even consider withdrawing said Complaint
after a copy of . . . Marsh . . . was sent to him for review is all this Court needs to see to find bad
faith.”). But, as Defendants acknowledge, Defendants sent Marsh to Plaintiff after he filed his
initial complaint; after Defendants sent the copy of Marsh, he filed an amended complaint that
incorporated new allegations that the allegedly defamatory statements had “no relation to”
Gonzalez Ramos I. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 10, ¶ 47.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________ ) JOEY D. GONZALEZ RAMOS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 21-cv-00592 (APM) ) ADR VANTAGE, INC. et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Before the court is a motion for sanctions filed against Plaintiff Joey D. Gonzalez Ramos
by Defendants ADR Vantage, Inc. (“ADR Vantage”); its counsel, John Murphy; and his law firm,
Walker, Murphy, and Nelson, LLP (collectively, “Defendants”). Defs.’ Mot. for Rule 11
Sanctions, ECF No. 7. The motion arises out of a complaint filed by Plaintiff against Defendants
for allegedly defamatory statements made in court filings in another case, Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR
Vantage, Inc. (Gonzalez Ramos I), No. 18-cv-1690 (APM), 2021 WL 4462611 (D.D.C. Sept. 29,
2021). In Gonzalez Ramos I, Plaintiff sued ADR Vantage for allegedly defaming him and
committing a number of other torts in publishing a climate-assessment report his employer, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (“USDA”), hired it to create. See id. at *1. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of ADR Vantage in Gonzalez Ramos I but denied a motion
for sanctions filed by the defendant in that case. Gonzalez Ramos I, 2021 WL 4462611, at *9;
Gonzalez Ramos v. ADR Vantage, Inc., No. 18-cv-01690 (APM), 2021 WL 4462411 (D.D.C. Sept.
29, 2021). The court has now dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint in this follow-up action, Mem. Op., ECF No. 17 [hereinafter MTD Mem. Op.]; Order, ECF No. 18 [hereinafter MTD Order], and for
the reasons that follow, it will also deny the motion for sanctions.
II.
“By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper,” an attorney or
unrepresented party “certifies that” the filing “is not being presented for any improper purpose,”
and that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
“If . . . the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction” for the violation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter
baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Courts do not
impose Rule 11 sanctions lightly; such sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings
that frustrate judicial proceedings, or that are filed to harass another party.” In re Carvalho, 598
B.R. 356, 363 (D.D.C. 2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Defendants advance two arguments for sanctions. Defs.’ Mot. at 6. Neither is particularly
well developed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “knew before instituting the instant litigation
that it was devoid of any good faith factual or legal basis.” Id. (capitalization omitted). They
assert that Marsh v. Hollander, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004), squarely forecloses Plaintiff’s
claims and any good-faith basis for the litigation. Def.’s Mot. at 6. In that case, a court in this
District concluded that allegedly defamatory statements made by defense counsel in a letter to the
plaintiff were absolutely immune under the judicial-proceedings privilege and dismissed the
plaintiff’s defamation claims. Id. at 6–7. It explained that, under the privilege, “[s]tatements made
in the course of judicial proceedings are protected by absolute immunity from defamation suits.”
Id. at 6. This court has concluded that the statements at issue in this case are subject to the same
2 privilege and has dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint accordingly. MTD Mem. Op.; MTD Order. But
the fact that claims in a complaint are not ultimately meritorious does not mean they are frivolous
or automatically sanctionable. Chandler v. Berlin, No. 18-cv-2136 (APM), 2020 WL 5593905, at
*3 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (“Simply prevailing in an action is no basis to impute improper motives
for the filing of a complaint.”). Marsh, the sole case relied upon by Defendants in their motion,
does not explicitly spell out the judicial-proceedings privilege’s two requirements: that the
statements were made in the course of a judicial proceeding and that they were related to that
proceeding. Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 1 Here, Plaintiff made an
unavailing but nonfrivolous argument that the second requirement was not met in this case. See
MTD Mem. Op. at 5–8.
Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff “knew” his lawsuit lacked any good-faith factual or legal
basis dovetails with their second argument for sanctions: that “Plaintiff’s pursuit of the instant
litigation was done in bad faith” (i.e., that his complaint was filed for an improper purpose, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)). Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (capitalization omitted). As evidence of bad faith, they
point to the “rash of grievances . . . and lawsuits” Plaintiff has filed against the USDA, ADR
Vantage, and now its counsel. Id. at 6. Of course, persistent litigiousness is not an automatic
trigger for sanctions. And as the court has recognized in this memorandum and on previous
occasions—including the last time ADR Vantage moved for sanctions against Plaintiff—he has
“advanced colorable arguments on at least some of his claims.” Gonzalez Ramos, 2021 WL
4462411, at *2. “The fact that Plaintiff’s Complaint raised nonfrivolous claims is strong evidence
that it was not filed for improper purposes.” Id.; see also Lipsig v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 663
1 Marsh’s only reference to the relatedness requirement is in a parenthetical to a citation supporting the assertion that “[s]tatements made for the purpose of preparing for litigation, or . . . attempting to settle issues prior to commencing litigation[,] are covered.” Marsh, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 6. 3 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that “the presence of merit in a claim or defense may well
negate any notion of bad faith in its filing”); Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d
1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (noting that “evidence bearing on frivolousness or non-
frivolousness will often be highly probative of purpose”); Chandler, 2020 WL 5593905, at *3. 2
The fact that Defendants sent Plaintiff a copy of the Marsh case to review before filing
their sanctions motion does not change the outcome. See Defs.’ Mot. at 6; id., Ex. 1, at 3.
Defendants suggest that this action supports their claims that Plaintiff filed this action in bad faith.
See Defs.’ Mot. at 6 (“The fact that Plaintiff did not even consider withdrawing said Complaint
after a copy of . . . Marsh . . . was sent to him for review is all this Court needs to see to find bad
faith.”). But, as Defendants acknowledge, Defendants sent Marsh to Plaintiff after he filed his
initial complaint; after Defendants sent the copy of Marsh, he filed an amended complaint that
incorporated new allegations that the allegedly defamatory statements had “no relation to”
Gonzalez Ramos I. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 10, ¶ 47. Such allegations, as the court has already
noted, supported a nonfrivolous, if unpersuasive, argument that the allegedly defamatory
statements were not subject to the judicial-proceedings privilege because they were not related to
Gonzalez Ramos I.
Defendants assert that “Plaintiff’s instant litigation against Defendants is . . . based solely
upon animus and hatred toward the Defendants,” Defs. Mot. at 7, but their four-page memorandum
provides little substantive argument and no citations to cases entering sanctions under similar
2 The court observes, as it did the last time it denied sanctions against Plaintiff, that “several circuits have interpreted Rule 11 to prohibit sanctioning a person for filing a complaint that raises non-frivolous claims, even if one of the plaintiff’s multiple purposes in seeking that relief may have been improper.” Gonzalez Ramos, 2021 WL 4462411, at *2 n.2 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995); Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362; Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps, Inc. v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 844 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1988); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988).
4 circumstances. Their conclusory statements that Marsh is “all this Court needs to see to find bad
faith” and that “Defendants are clearly entitled to sanctions” are unpersuasive. Id. at 6. Based on
the limited arguments Defendants have made, the court is disinclined to grant the “extraordinary”
remedy of Rule 11 sanctions. United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, No. 12-cv-1905 (RDM), 2018
WL 4623568, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2018).
IV.
In sum, Defendants have not shown that the Complaint was filed for an improper purpose
or without factual or legal merit. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for sanctions, Motion for Rule
11 Sanctions, ECF No. 7, is denied. This is a final, appealable order.
Dated: March 21, 2022 Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge