Gonzalez Hernandez v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 25-2806
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARINA DEL CARMEN GONZALEZ No. 25-2806 HERNANDEZ, Agency No. A209-428-894 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 22, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, BENNETT, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Marina Del Carmen Gonzalez Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own

reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision

upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir.

2019). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the

standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act.

Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). “[T]he REAL ID Act

requires that credibility determinations be made on the basis of the ‘totality of the

circumstances, and all relevant factors.’” Id. at 1040 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The Act “permits IJs to consider factors such as demeanor,

candor, responsiveness, plausibility, inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and falsehoods to

form the basis of an adverse credibility determination.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39

F.4th 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2022). And “only the most extraordinary

circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility determination.”

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2005)).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

The agency’s determination rests on two sets of inconsistencies. The first stems

from Gonzalez Hernandez’s testimony about an encounter with her former partner,

2 25-2806 Fernando. Gonzalez Hernandez’s application for asylum and withholding of

removal is based on her claim that Fernando abused her. Before the IJ, Gonzalez

Hernandez explained that she fled to her mother’s house to escape Fernando’s abuse,

but he came looking for her. Gonzalez Hernandez testified that her mother told

Fernando she was not there. In her sworn declaration, however, Gonzalez

Hernandez stated that her sister spoke to Fernando. When the IJ confronted

Gonzalez Hernandez with the declaration, she changed her testimony and claimed it

was her sister. But the letter her sister submitted to the agency does not mention the

encounter.

The second set of inconsistencies stems from information Gonzalez

Hernandez included on a visa application. On March 12, 2016, Gonzalez Hernandez

applied for a nonimmigrant visa to visit the United States. She listed Isaias Wilfredo

Vasquez Arevalo as her spouse and, at an interview on April 13, 2016, told the

official they were common law married. But at the hearing before the IJ, Gonzalez

Hernandez testified that she lived with Fernando from January 6, 2016 to August 15,

2016. When the IJ asked Gonzalez Hernandez why she claimed another man as her

spouse during this period, she stated that she had only been on two dates with Isaias

and they “didn’t really have anything serious.” In the same line of questioning,

Gonzalez Hernandez also provided conflicting explanations about why she had

applied for the visa.

3 25-2806 These inconsistencies and contradictions support the agency’s adverse

credibility finding. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“[A]ny inaccuracies, omissions of detail, or inconsistencies found by the IJ,

regardless of whether they go to the ‘heart’ of a petitioner’s claim, may support an

adverse credibility finding.”); Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.

2020).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Gonzalez

Hernandez’s documentary evidence did not independently establish eligibility for

asylum or withholding of removal. Gonzalez Hernandez submitted a sworn

declaration, a country conditions report, and a letter written by her sister. But the

agency reasonably determined that this evidence did not adequately corroborate her

claims. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen a

petitioner contends that the IJ’s findings are erroneous, the petitioner ‘must establish

that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.’” (quoting Singh

v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998))). Without credible testimony or sufficient

independent evidence, the agency properly concluded that Gonzalez Hernandez

failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See

Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927.

Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT protection. “An adverse

credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT protection.”

4 25-2806 Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048. For a petitioner to succeed when found not credible, the

remaining evidence alone must compel the conclusion that she is “more likely than

not” to be tortured upon removal. Id. at 1049 (quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457

F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006)). Gonzalez Hernandez contends that the record

shows violence against women is a serious problem in El Salvador. But the

documentary evidence does not meet the high threshold of establishing that it is more

likely than not she will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public

official. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2022)

(recognizing “the extremely high threshold of future torture required by statute” and

holding that petitioner failed to meet it). This is especially so because Gonzalez

Hernandez’s CAT claim is based on the same testimony “that the BIA determined

to be not credible in the asylum context.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003,

1009 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). No evidence in the record compels us to

conclude that Gonzalez Hernandez is entitled to CAT relief.

The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.

The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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