Gonzales v. Gittere

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 30, 2025
• Docket: 24-3288
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAUL GONZALES, No. 24-3288 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 2:21-cv-02055-GMN-DJA v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM GITTERE, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 9, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Raul Gonzales appeals the district court’s order denying his

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

conviction under the Nevada habitual criminal statute. We review de novo a

district court’s order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Catlin v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Broomfield, 124 F.4th 702, 721 (9th Cir. 2024). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, when a state court has adjudicated a

petitioner’s claim on the merits, we may grant relief only if “the decision was

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application’ of ‘clearly established

Federal law’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented.’” Avena v. Chappell, 932 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.

2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). If “the state court adjudication on the merits

does not withstand deferential scrutiny under § 2254(d),” we then “decide the

habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.” Amado v.

Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).

We affirm.

1. Both parties agree, and the district court found, that the state court

here made an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the record presented

when it determined that, pursuant to the plea agreement, the state prosecution

retained an unqualified right to argue for habitual criminal at sentencing. Even

assuming that the Nevada Court of Appeals’ decision was an unreasonable

determination of fact, the state prosecution did not breach the plea agreement.

The state prosecution did not breach the plea agreement because the Register

of Action in the state court record demonstrated that—as required by the Supreme

2 24-3288 Court and Nevada law—a magistrate judge reviewed the arrest documents and

Complaint when it made a 48-hour determination of probable cause for first-degree

murder in Gonzales’ warrantless arrest. See Cnty. Of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500

U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.106 as enacted by Laws

1971, p.830; Woerner v. Just. Ct. of Reno Twp. ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 116 Nev.

518, 524 (2000). By definition, a complaint in Nevada requires affidavits or

affidavit-equivalent documents, see Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.102, 171.106, 53.045,

and the Register shows that a Complaint and arrest documents were filed and a

determination of probable cause was made upon review of these documents. Since

federal habeas courts presume that “. . . state courts know and follow the law,” this

satisfies the probable cause by affidavit review condition in the plea agreement.

See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

It is Gonzales’ burden to affirmatively show that the 48-hour determination

of probable cause fails to satisfy the plea agreement and he has failed to do so. See

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is the petitioner’s

burden to prove his custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of

the United States.” (quoting Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Thus, the district court did not err in denying habeas relief.1

1 Gonzales argues that the district court improperly expanded the record under Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases. We need not address this issue since our decision is based entirely in the state-court record.

3 24-3288 2. The district court did not err in finding that the state court correctly

applied Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). In Dawson, the Supreme

Court held that the admission of defendant’s beliefs and associations at sentencing

violated the First Amendment where the evidence had “no relevance to the

sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 166. Gonzales’ claims that the Nevada Court of

Appeals determination comprised a “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application

of” Dawson are unavailing. Contrary to Gonzales’ arguments that this evidence

was unrelated to him and highly prejudicial, reasonable jurists could conclude that

it shows Gonzales’ connections to the 28th Street and the Nevada 13 gangs. Also,

reasonable jurists may conclude that the gangs’ objectives and their endorsement;

their actions against rival gang members; and the violence they inflict on rival gang

members and the community show a nexus between Gonzales’ gang associations

and his abstract beliefs which are relevant to his potential future harmful behavior.

See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 163–65 (holding that although the “First Amendment

protects an individual’s right to join groups associations with others holding

similar beliefs,” nevertheless, “the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to

the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing

simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First

Amendment.”). Lastly, reasonable jurists could conclude that this evidence is

relevant to the sentencing court to make its determination of future dangerousness

4 24-3288 to better assess the potential sentence options available to it in sentencing

Gonzales.

Thus, unlike Dawson, where the sole purpose of the evidence presented was

to show that the defendant’s beliefs were “morally reprehensible,” here, the

evidence was relevant to the court’s assessment of Gonzales’ future dangerousness.

Id. at 167.

AFFIRMED.

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