Gonzales v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 24, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-02411
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kristy Gonzales, No. CV-20-02411-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kristy Gonzales’s appeal from the 16 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of social security 17 disability benefits. The appeal is fully briefed, (Doc. 17, Doc. 21, Doc. 22), and the Court 18 now rules. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The issues presented in this appeal are whether substantial evidence supports the 21 Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) determination that Plaintiff was not disabled before 22 July 31, 2013, and after November 2, 2014, and whether the ALJ committed legal error in 23 her analysis. (Doc. 17 at 10). 24 A. Factual Overview 25 Plaintiff was 55 years old at the time of her application (AR 474–75) with a high 26 school education and has a history of work as a back-office bank teller (AR 474, 584, 27 586). Plaintiff filed her social security disability claim on December 14, 2013, alleging 28 disability due to fibromyalgia with pain in her neck and back, in addition to carpal tunnel 1 syndrome in both hands (AR 80–81). 2 The ALJ initially issued an unfavorable decision. (AR 217–38). The Appeals 3 Council reviewed the decision and remanded the matter to the ALJ for a new hearing. 4 (AR 239–44). After two hearings, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding 5 that Plaintiff was disabled from July 31, 2013, through November 2, 2014, but not 6 disabled before or after that date. (AR 30–52). The Appeals Council denied the request 7 for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. (AR 1–6). 8 B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process 9 To qualify for social security benefits, a claimant must show she “is under a 10 disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). A claimant is disabled if she suffers from a 11 medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging 12 “in any substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). The SSA has created a five-step 13 process for an ALJ to determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 14 404.1520(a)(1). Each step is potentially dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 15 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial 16 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. 17 Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both “substantial,” involving 18 “significant physical or mental activities,” and “gainful,” done “for pay or profit.” Id. § 19 404.1572(a)–(b). 20 At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant’s 21 impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have “a severe medically 22 determinable physical or mental impairment,” the claimant is not disabled. Id. A “severe 23 impairment” is one which “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability 24 to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities are “the abilities and 25 aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” Id. § 404.1522(b). 26 At the third step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment or 27 combination of impairments “meets or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 28 Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. 1 Id. If not, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s “residual 2 functional capacity” (RFC). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC represents the most a 3 claimant “can still do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing the 4 claimant’s RFC, the ALJ will consider the claimant’s “impairment(s), and any related 5 symptoms, such as pain, [that] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what 6 [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. 7 At the fourth step, the ALJ uses the RFC to determine whether the claimant can 8 still perform her “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ compares the 9 claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant 10 work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform her past relevant work, the ALJ 11 will find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 12 At the fifth and final step, the ALJ determines whether—considering the 13 claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience—she “can make an adjustment to 14 other work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ finds that the claimant can make an 15 adjustment to other work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the ALJ finds that the 16 claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the claimant is disabled. Id. 17 C. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 18 At the first step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial 19 gainful activity during the relevant period. (AR 39). At the second step, the ALJ 20 determined that Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, lumbar radiculopathy, lumbar spondylosis, 21 peripheral neuropathy, obesity, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical 22 spine, status post choroidal melanoma with retinal detachment OS, hypertension, 23 gastroesophageal reflex disease (“GERD”), hypothyroidism, status post cholecystectomy, 24 foot impairment, and chronic pain syndrome constituted severe impairments under 20 25 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (AR 542). 26 At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the 27 severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 28 (AR 42). After evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform 1 light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). (AR 51). At the fourth step, the ALJ 2 found that, beginning November 3, 2014, Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work 3 and was not disabled. (AR 51). 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 This Court may not overturn the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits absent legal 6 error or a lack of substantial evidence. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 7 2018). “Substantial evidence means ... such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 8 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th 9 Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 10 (9th Cir. 1988)). On review, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, 11 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] 12 conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 13 evidence.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014)). The 14 ALJ, not this Court, draws inferences, resolves conflicts in medical testimony, and 15 determines credibility. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); 16 Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court must affirm 17 even when “the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation.” Allen v. 18 Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court “review[s] only the reasons 19 provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a 20 ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 Plaintiff raises four potential errors in the ALJ’s analysis: (1) the ALJ did not 23 afford sufficient weight to two of Plaintiff’s doctors; (2) the ALJ improperly rejected 24 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony; (3) the ALJ improperly rejected the testimony 25 of lay witnesses; and (4) the ALJ’s vocational hypothetical was incomplete. (Doc. 17 at 26 1–2). The Court addresses each in turn. 27 A. Medical Opinions 28 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical evidence of two 1 of Plaintiff’s doctors: Shaunna Sukey Haley, Psy.D. and Madhavi Kurli, M.D. (Doc. 17 at 2 11). 3 1. Dr. Haley 4 The ALJ gave Dr. Haley’s opinion minimal weight because it was based on a one- 5 time examination of Plaintiff and was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records. (AR 6 41). The ALJ addressed Dr. Haley’s opinion as follows: In a consultative examination (mental) dated September 9, 2014, Shaunna 7 Sukey Haley, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist, examined the claimant. She 8 diagnosed the claimant with major depressive disorder, recurrent episode, moderate with anxiety distress, mild. She opined that the claimant had mild 9 to moderate limitations in her ability to maintain attention and 10 concentration. She determined that the claimant had moderate limitations in her ability to perform activities within a schedule. (Exhibit 14F) The 11 undersigned gives this opinion minimal weight as it is based on a one-time 12 examination of the claimant. Furthermore, the undersigned notes even if the limitations assessed by Dr. Haley were accepted: there is no reason to 13 believe the limitations persisted for 12 months. Treatment notes dated 14 January 28, 2015, indicate the claimant denied depression, mania or mood swings. (Exhibit 15F/2) 15 (AR 41). 16 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her analysis because Dr. Haley’s treatment 17 examination was not for mental health as the ALJ asserted; but rather, was to discuss 18 imaging results related to Plaintiff’s eye cancer. (Doc. 17 at 12). Additionally, Plaintiff 19 argues that Dr. Haley noted on the form that these limitations were expected to last for at 20 least 12 continuous months. (Doc. 17 at 12). Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 21 rejecting Dr. Haley’s opinion in part because it was based on a one-time examination is 22 erroneous given that the ALJ accepted the opinions of non-examining state agency 23 doctors who never saw the Plaintiff. (Doc. 17 at 12). 24 The ALJ correctly rejected Dr. Haley’s testimony because the objective medical 25 evidence did not corroborate her opined-to limitations. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s 26 symptoms—which Dr. Haley said were expected to last for at least 12 continuous 27 months—were gone less than five months later. (AR 41). This was a permissible basis for 28 discounting Dr. Haley’s opinions. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1 2012). Though Plaintiff argues that the ALJ mischaracterized the note arising from an eye 2 treatment, the Court is unpersuaded. The eye examination encompassed a review of 3 mental health symptoms and the ALJ was noting the mental health symptoms. (AR 981). 4 Further, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. The ALJ found 5 that the medical records demonstrate that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were “non- 6 severe.” (AR 41). These findings undermine Dr. Haley’s opinion because they weigh 7 upon symptoms and limitations she opined to. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 8 accepting the “opinions of the non-examining state agency doctors” while rejecting Dr. 9 Haley’s opinion “in part because it was based on a one-time examination.” (Doc. 17 at 10 13). But as Plaintiff notes, the ALJ rejected Dr. Haley’s opinion for other reasons beyond 11 her providing a one time-examination, (Doc. 17 at 13), and the ALJ provided additional 12 reasons supported by substantial evidence as to why she was rejecting Dr. Haley’s 13 opinion. (AR 41). Further, the ALJ noted that the state agency physician Dr. Yandell was 14 “consistent with the record as a whole.” (AR 41). The ALJ’s interpretation of the 15 evidence is entitled to deference because it is a reasonable interpretation. See Batson v. 16 Comm’r of the SSA, 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 17 2. Dr. Kurli 18 While the ALJ gave the 2014 Dr. Kurli opinion great weight as of the date of 19 treatment, the ALJ gave Dr. Kurli’s opinion minimal weight prior to July 31, 2013, since 20 he did not begin treatment with Plaintiff until this date. (AR 45). Regarding Dr. Kurli’s 21 opinion, the ALJ stated as follows: In a Vision Impairment Questionnaire dated February 18, 2014 Madhavi 22 Kurli, M.D. diagnosed the claimant with choroidal melanoma in the left 23 eye. He gave the claimant a guarded prognosis. He noted he sees the claimant for three-month follow up visits. He indicated that the claimant 24 cannot see peripherally in the left eye and has extremely limited vision in 25 the left eye. He opined that the claimant could rarely perform work involving near acuity, far acuity, and color vision and should never perform 26 work involving depth perception, accommodation, and field of vision. He 27 found that the claimant is not capable of avoiding ordinary hazards in the workplace and has difficulty walking up and down stairs. He determined 28 that the claimant could not work with small objects such as those involved 1 in doing sedentary work and could not work with large objects. He opined that the claimant should rarely lift and carry less than 10 pounds, 2 occasionally stoop and crouch, and would sometimes need unscheduled 3 breaks during an 8-hour working day, as often and as long as needed. In addition, he concluded that the claimant’s symptoms were severe enough to 4 constantly interfere with attention and concentration needed to perform 5 even simple work tasks. (Exhibit 2F/2-4)

6 Dr. Kurli is given great weight from July 31, 2013 to November 2, 2014 7 and minimal weight prior to July 31, 2013, as this doctor did not begin treatment with the claimant until this date and minimal weight to Dr. Kurli 8 after November 2, 2014, as the doctor reported in a subsequent statement 9 that the only restriction remaining was that the claimant should not perform work that required depth perception or with hazards. (Exhibit 88F) This is 10 consistent with the medical expert’s opinion and the conclusion reached in 11 this decision. (AR 44–45). 12 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for the time in between November 13 2014 and Dr. Kurli’s most recent statement in 2020. (Doc. 17 at 14). Specifically, 14 Plaintiff claims that Dr. Kurli’s 2017 indicated that Plaintiff still had “many significant 15 impairments in depth perception and field of vision.” (Doc. 17 at 14). Because Plaintiff 16 contends that Dr. Kurli’s opinions establish that disabling visual restrictions continued 17 through at least April 2017, the ALJ erroneous found that Plaintiff’s “visual disability 18 ended on November 3, 2014.” (Doc. 17 at 15). 19 The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting Dr. Kurli’s 20 opinion for the relevant time. But the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of State 21 Agency physician, Earnest Griffith, M.D. noted that Plaintiff’s left eye “does not retain 22 the visual fields to avoid hazards in the workplace,” (AR 45), and on reconsideration, to 23 Teresa Pavese, M.D. who made similar opinions. (AR 45). The ALJ then relied on 24 Plaintiff’s medical records and opinions from 2014 to 2020 to support her decision. (AR 25 50–51). The ALJ assigned great weight to medical expert Bernard Zuckerman, M.D., a 26 board-certified ophthalmologist who testified that Plaintiff’s vision in her left eye was 27 damaged. (AR 50). But he also testified that her vision in her right eye was normal and 28 that “there was no basis for claiming disability.” (AR 50). Finally, the ALJ cites to exams 1 and reports from 2014 through 2016 which indicated improvement in the Plaintiff’s 2 visual impairment. (AR 46–47). 3 The ALJ also addressed Dr. Kurli’s 2017 opinion and assigned great weight that 4 Plaintiff would be unable to perform work requiring depth perception. (AR 51). But 5 Plaintiff’s disability was a culmination of her symptoms of her visual impairment as well 6 as her other impairments. (AR 47–50). As noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s other 7 impairments were effectively managed during this time, leading to a finding that Plaintiff 8 was not disabled. The ALJ did not err by rejecting aspects of Dr. Kurli’s opinion. 9 B. Subjective Symptom Testimony 10 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 11 symptom testimony. (Doc. 17 at 15). Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not specify “which 12 testimony she found not credible and has not provided clear and convincing reasons 13 supported by evidence in the record to support her rejection” of Plaintiff’s testimony. 14 (Doc. 17 at 16). 15 The Ninth Circuit has established a two-step analysis for an ALJ to determine 16 whether to credit a Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. “First, the ALJ must 17 determine whether the Plaintiff has presented objective medical evidence of an 18 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 19 symptoms alleged.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 20 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). If the Plaintiff presents such 21 evidence, the ALJ then evaluates the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See id. “In 22 evaluating the credibility of pain testimony after a Plaintiff produces objective medical 23 evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a Plaintiff’s subjective 24 complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged 25 severity of pain.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Instead, an ALJ 26 must provide “specific, clear, and convincing reasons” for doing so. Burrell v. Colvin, 27 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). 28 At the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 1 impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some the alleged symptoms.” (AR 2 47). At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 3 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 4 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.). 5 After a considerable discussion of the record evidence in this case, the ALJ 6 concluded: The claimant has a history of spine disorders but the balance of diagnostic 7 studies do not support limitations beyond those assessed in the residual 8 functional capacities assessed herein.

9 Diagnostic imaging studies have not yielded findings which support the 10 claimant is more limited than found in this decision. X-rays of the lumbar spine dated March 6, 2014, revealed dextroscoliosis, lumbar spondylosis at 11 L5 on S1,”without evidence of instability”. (Exhibit 3F/16) Studies of the 12 cervical spine dated March 13, 2014 revealed degenerative disc disease at C5-C6 and C6-C7, “some” diffuse arthropathy and “minor” anterolisthesis 13 of C7 on T1 likely secondary to facet arthropathy with “no significant 14 instability” with flexion and extension (Exhibits 3F/17, 7F/6). An x-ray of the chest on May 6, 2014 revealed only mild abnormalities. (Exhibit 7F/10) 15 16 The claimant has a history of GERD, hypothyroidism and status-post cholecystectomy but an MRI of the abdomen dated May 6, 2014 shows 17 “stable” findings, mild patch hepatic steatosis, no focal lesion seen of the liver, spleen, pancreas, adrenal glands or kidneys, no new 18 lymphadenopathy and enlarged periportal lymph nodes as “unchanged”. 19 (Exhibit 7F/9). During a follow-up visit in July 2014, it was noted the claimant had an episode of abdominal pain. (Exhibit 9F/1) However, 20 overall, there is insufficient evidence to support that the claimant’s GERD, 21 hypothyroidism and status post cholecystectomy have resulted in limitations beyond those found in finding 16. 22

23 The record reflects that the claimant has been treated for essential hypertension. Treatment notes dated July 31, 2014 show the claimant was 24 diagnosed several years ago. The evidence indicates the claimant as 25 “tolerating the medication” without side effects. The record also shows the claimant’s compliance with treatment has been good (Exhibit 9F/1). On 26 September 23, 2015, it was once again noted the claimant has a history of 27 hypertension well controlled with medication. (Exhibit 20F/60). 28 (AR 48). 1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Plaintiff’s testimony as the ALJ 2 failed to “identify any specific records contrary” to Plaintiff’s statements. (Doc. 17 at 16). 3 Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to specify which “testimony she found not 4 credible.” (Doc. 17 at 16). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the “activities of daily living” the 5 ALJ relied on are not actually inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. (Doc. 17 at 16). 6 The Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for not 7 crediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Based on a thorough review of the medical and 8 testimonial evidence, the ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s allegations were 9 largely uncorroborated by the objective evidence. (AR 49). Though ALJs may not rely 10 solely on a lack of medical evidence as a basis to reject symptom testimony it is a 11 permissible consideration. Burch, 400 F.3d at 682. The ALJ cited to medical records that 12 indicate Plaintiff’s allegations did not correspond to objective findings. The ALJ cited to 13 Plaintiff’s eye exams which noted that visual impairment improved. (AR 47). 14 Additionally, the ALJ cited x-ray imaging which revealed minor or mild abnormalities. 15 (AR 48). The ALJ also reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s allegations were 16 inconsistent with her documented improvement with treatment. This was a sufficient 17 basis for the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s testimony and it was supported by substantial 18 evidence. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 The ALJ identifies several records that indicate 19 that Plaintiff responded well to treatment procedures and medications. (AR 47, 48, 49). 20 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to cite to specific records 21 contrary to specific statements. Further, these records and the ALJ’s analysis allow the 22 Court to clearly discern why the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were 23 inconsistent with her documented improvement. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 24 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (reiterating that ALJs may explain their decisions with unideal 25 clarity so long as their reasoning is reasonably discernible). And the Court also concludes 26 that the ALJ’s reasoning is supported by substantial evidence. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194. 27 Even if the ALJ could have identified every specific statement by Plaintiff that was 28 contradicted by every item of evidence, a failure to do so is not error since the Court can 1 reasonably follow the ALJ’s reasoning. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by discounting 2 the Plaintiff’s testimony. 3 C. Lay Witness Testimony 4 Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting lay witness testimony. 5 (Doc. 17 at 18). Plaintiff’s husband, Gregory Gonzales, completed a questionnaire 6 detailing Plaintiff’s “frequent falls, her inability to complete household chores without 7 help or breaks to rest, and her symptoms of depression and anxiety.” (Doc. 17 at 18). 8 The ALJ evaluated Gregory Gonzales’s testimony, writing that: The third party [sic] statements of the claimant’s spouse. Gregory 9 Gonzales, do not establish that the claimant is disabled or not disabled. 10 (Exhibit 4E) Since the claimant’s spouse makes no reference to being trained to make exacting observations as to dates, frequencies, types and 11 degrees of medical signs and symptoms, or of the frequency or intensity of 12 unusual moods or mannerisms, the accuracy of the third party [sic] statement is questionable. Moreover, by virtue of the relationship as a 13 spouse of the claimant, he cannot be considered a disinterested third party 14 whose statement would not tend to be colored by affection for the claimant and a natural tendency to agree with the symptoms and limitations the 15 claimant alleges. However, he, like the claimant, admitted the claimant is 16 able to do light household chores, feeds her cats and dogs, clean the cat boxes, occasionally walks the dogs, does laundry, prepares simple meals, 17 drives a car short distances and shops in stores. (Exhibit 4E) Thus, this 18 report is afforded partial weight, only to the extent it is consistent with the residual functional capacities assessed herein. 19 (AR 49–50). 20 “Competent lay witness testimony cannot be disregarded without comment, and in 21 order to discount competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ must give reasons that are 22 germane to each witness.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th 23 Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing Molina v. Astrue, 24 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)). The ALJ, however, need not “discuss every 25 witness’s testimony on a [sic] individualized, witness-by-witness basis. Rather, if the ALJ 26 gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point to 27 those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Molina, 674 F.3d 28 at 1114. 1 Plaintiff argues that the witness testimony is consistent with the objective medical 2 evidence and the opinions of the doctors. (Doc. 17 at 19). Additionally, Plaintiff contends 3 that the ALJ applied the wrong standard in noting that the lay witness did not have any 4 medical expertise. (Doc. 17 at 18). 5 In rejecting Mr. Gonzales’s testimony, the ALJ considered the close relationship 6 that he had with Plaintiff. (AR 49). The ALJ found that Mr. Gonzales’s testimony did not 7 establish that the Plaintiff was disabled because the Plaintiff could complete light 8 household chores. (AR 49). As Plaintiff notes, the limitations and disabilities contained in 9 Mr. Gonzales’s testimony are consistent with the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 10 providers. (Doc. 17 at 19). Yet as detailed above, the ALJ found these opinions 11 unpersuasive for reasons supported by substantial evidence. Because the lay witness 12 testimony merely corroborates the medical opinions that the ALJ properly discredited, the 13 Court finds that this evidence would not have changed the ALJ’s disability determination. 14 See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015) (“ALJ errors in social security 15 cases are harmless if they are ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 16 determination.’” (quoting Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th 17 Cir. 2006))). Even assuming the ALJ’s decision to consider but disregard Mr. Gonzales’s 18 statement was erroneous, the Court concludes that any error was harmless. See Marsh, 19 792 F.3d at 1173; Johnson v. Astrue, No. CV-11-8121-PHX-JAT, 2012 WL 3108838, at 20 *11 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2012) (applying harmless error review to an ALJ’s disregard of 21 competent lay witness testimony). 22 D. RFC Capacity and Step-Five Finding 23 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step-five finding is not supported because 24 the ALJ failed to pose a complete hypothetical. (Doc. 17 at 19). Plaintiff argues that the 25 ALJ erred in posing the hypothetical questions to the Vocational Expert (VE) by omitting 26 Plaintiff’s “credible allegations, the limitations described by the lay witness, and the 27 limitations assessed by Dr. Kurli and Dr. Sukey Haley.” (Doc. 17 at 19). 28 /// 1 An ALJ may rely on the testimony of a VE at step five. 20 C.F.R. 8§ 404.1566, 2|| 416.966. However, an ALJ may rely on a VE’s testimony only where such testimony is || based on a hypothetical that “contain[s] all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible 4|| and supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Where an ALJ’s hypothetical is based on a residual functional || capacity assessment that does not include some of the claimant’s limitations, the VE’s || testimony “has no evidentiary value.” Carmickle vy. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1166 (th Cir. 2008). 9 As discussed above, the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons to discount the || opinions of Dr. Kurli and Dr. Haley. Likewise, the ALJ properly discounted the opinions 11 || of the Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and the lay witness testimony. As a result, it was not 12 || necessary for the ALJ to include any additional limitations in the hypothetical to the 13 || vocational expert nor include them in the RFC. 14 IV. REMEDY 15 Plaintiff asks the Court to credit certain evidence as true and direct a finding of disability. The Court declines to do so because the Court is affirming the ALJ’s decision. 17 V. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, 19 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court shall 20 || enter judgment accordingly. 21 Dated this 24th day of March, 2022. 22 23 a 3 24 5 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 26 27 28

-13-