MAJORITY OPINION
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty before a jury to the offense of burglary of a habitation. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 1989).1 The jury found him guilty, and after finding two enhancement paragraphs true, assessed his punishment at eighty-seven years imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In four points of error, appellant contends his conviction should be reversed because the statement of facts is incomplete, the trial court proceeded with the trial even though a material witness failed to appear, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to summarize the pen packets before the jury, and the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
While the complainant was hospitalized, her home was twice burgled on successive days. Physical evidence indicated that the burglar enjoyed a snack during the second burglarious entry, and police recovered two Oscar Mayer meat wrappers, two empty Coke cans, a cigarette butt, and two cheese wrappers inside the house. Appellant’s thumbprint was found on one of the Oscar Mayer wrappers. A couple of weeks later, the police arrested appellant walking in a field near the complainant’s home. On the ground, within feet of where appellant had been walking, the police found three personal checks belonging to complainant and her driver’s license.
In his first point of error, appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial because State’s Exhibits Numbers Six through Twelve, which include the food wrappers, soft drink cans, and cigarette butt, have been lost or destroyed without his fault. In its proof, the State offered twenty-nine exhibits, all of which were lost by the court reporter. While some of the exhibits could probably be reconstructed, appellant focuses his complaint upon the exhibits which cannot be reproduced, namely, the food wrappers, soft drink cans, and cigarette butt.
To support his request for a new trial, appellant relies upon Rule 50(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The rule is composed of two sentences. The first provides that when any portion of the appellate record is lost or destroyed, it may be substituted by the trial court. The second sentence, however, states that if the appellant has made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court reporter’s notes and records have been lost or destroyed, the appellant is entitled to a new trial. Tex.R.App.P. 50(e).
Exhibits are part of the appellate record. Durrough v. State, 693 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). They are not, however, part of the court reporter’s notes. The disposition of appellant’s first point of error, therefore, depends upon whether ex-[738]*738Mbits are part of the court reporter’s “records” and, therefore, part of the statement of facts. If any portion of the statement of facts is lost or destroyed, the appellant is entitled to a new trial without a showing of harm. Emery v. State, 800 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (quoting Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), and Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)). We interpret the first sentence of Rule 50(e), however, to mean that if some portion of the record other than the statement of facts is lost or destroyed, the trial court may, if possible, reconstruct and substitute the missing portion without the appellant’s consent. Moreover, when reconstruction is not possible, as in this ease, the error is subject to a harm analysis.
The courts of appeals in tMs state, including tMs Court, have been less than uniform m their approach to lost or destroyed exMb-its. The Tenth Court of Appeals has specifically held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and may not be reconstructed without appellant’s consent. Hidalgo, Chambers & Co. v. FDIC, 790 S.W.2d 700, 702-03 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ demed); see also Shields v. State, 820 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991, no pet.) Moreover, the Hidalgo court found that when exMbits are lost, the appellant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment without demonstrating any harm and without giving any reason for Ms opposition to reconstruction and substitution of the exMbits. Hidalgo, 790 S.W.2d at 702-03. The Fifth Court of Appeals has also held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, but the court softened its holding by concluding that the loss of exMbits is subject to a harm analysis. See Adams v. Transportation Ins. Co., 845 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ).
The Ninth Court of Appeals has held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and that their loss may be the basis for reversal if the lower court first concludes the exMbits cannot be reconstructed. Sheffield v. State, 777 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no pet.). Two other appellate courts have held that exMbits may be reconstructed and substituted without the appellant’s consent. Hackney v. First State Bank, 866 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ); First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 617 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ demed). Curiously, the Twelfth Court of Appeals has concluded that lost exhibits are not a ground for reversal if the exMbits are merely photographs. Diaz v. Deavers, 574 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1978, writ dism’d).
TMs Court has likewise delivered conflicting opimons regarding lost or destroyed ex-Mbits. Recently, a panel of this Court held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and that the judgment of the lower court is subject to reversal without a harm analysis if the exMbits are lost or destroyed. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 722, 729 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], April 13, 1995, n.w.h.) (op. on reh’g). Another panel of tMs court, however, has held that exMbits are not part of the statement of facts. See Mader v. State, 807 S.W.2d 439, 440-41 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Two other panels of tMs court have held the loss of exhibits may be harmless in some instances. See Johnson v. State, 846 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), remanded on other grounds, 853 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds, 899 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.], 1995, no pet. h.); Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.)
The confusion as to whether exMbits are part of the statement of facts stems, in part, from Rule 50(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure wMch defines the content of the appellate record as consisting of a transcript and a statement of facts.
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MAJORITY OPINION
HUDSON, Justice.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty before a jury to the offense of burglary of a habitation. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 1989).1 The jury found him guilty, and after finding two enhancement paragraphs true, assessed his punishment at eighty-seven years imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In four points of error, appellant contends his conviction should be reversed because the statement of facts is incomplete, the trial court proceeded with the trial even though a material witness failed to appear, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to summarize the pen packets before the jury, and the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
While the complainant was hospitalized, her home was twice burgled on successive days. Physical evidence indicated that the burglar enjoyed a snack during the second burglarious entry, and police recovered two Oscar Mayer meat wrappers, two empty Coke cans, a cigarette butt, and two cheese wrappers inside the house. Appellant’s thumbprint was found on one of the Oscar Mayer wrappers. A couple of weeks later, the police arrested appellant walking in a field near the complainant’s home. On the ground, within feet of where appellant had been walking, the police found three personal checks belonging to complainant and her driver’s license.
In his first point of error, appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial because State’s Exhibits Numbers Six through Twelve, which include the food wrappers, soft drink cans, and cigarette butt, have been lost or destroyed without his fault. In its proof, the State offered twenty-nine exhibits, all of which were lost by the court reporter. While some of the exhibits could probably be reconstructed, appellant focuses his complaint upon the exhibits which cannot be reproduced, namely, the food wrappers, soft drink cans, and cigarette butt.
To support his request for a new trial, appellant relies upon Rule 50(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The rule is composed of two sentences. The first provides that when any portion of the appellate record is lost or destroyed, it may be substituted by the trial court. The second sentence, however, states that if the appellant has made a timely request for a statement of facts, but the court reporter’s notes and records have been lost or destroyed, the appellant is entitled to a new trial. Tex.R.App.P. 50(e).
Exhibits are part of the appellate record. Durrough v. State, 693 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). They are not, however, part of the court reporter’s notes. The disposition of appellant’s first point of error, therefore, depends upon whether ex-[738]*738Mbits are part of the court reporter’s “records” and, therefore, part of the statement of facts. If any portion of the statement of facts is lost or destroyed, the appellant is entitled to a new trial without a showing of harm. Emery v. State, 800 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (quoting Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), and Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)). We interpret the first sentence of Rule 50(e), however, to mean that if some portion of the record other than the statement of facts is lost or destroyed, the trial court may, if possible, reconstruct and substitute the missing portion without the appellant’s consent. Moreover, when reconstruction is not possible, as in this ease, the error is subject to a harm analysis.
The courts of appeals in tMs state, including tMs Court, have been less than uniform m their approach to lost or destroyed exMb-its. The Tenth Court of Appeals has specifically held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and may not be reconstructed without appellant’s consent. Hidalgo, Chambers & Co. v. FDIC, 790 S.W.2d 700, 702-03 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ demed); see also Shields v. State, 820 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991, no pet.) Moreover, the Hidalgo court found that when exMbits are lost, the appellant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment without demonstrating any harm and without giving any reason for Ms opposition to reconstruction and substitution of the exMbits. Hidalgo, 790 S.W.2d at 702-03. The Fifth Court of Appeals has also held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, but the court softened its holding by concluding that the loss of exMbits is subject to a harm analysis. See Adams v. Transportation Ins. Co., 845 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ).
The Ninth Court of Appeals has held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and that their loss may be the basis for reversal if the lower court first concludes the exMbits cannot be reconstructed. Sheffield v. State, 777 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no pet.). Two other appellate courts have held that exMbits may be reconstructed and substituted without the appellant’s consent. Hackney v. First State Bank, 866 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ); First Heights Bank, FSB v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 617 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ demed). Curiously, the Twelfth Court of Appeals has concluded that lost exhibits are not a ground for reversal if the exMbits are merely photographs. Diaz v. Deavers, 574 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1978, writ dism’d).
TMs Court has likewise delivered conflicting opimons regarding lost or destroyed ex-Mbits. Recently, a panel of this Court held that exMbits are part of the statement of facts, and that the judgment of the lower court is subject to reversal without a harm analysis if the exMbits are lost or destroyed. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 722, 729 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], April 13, 1995, n.w.h.) (op. on reh’g). Another panel of tMs court, however, has held that exMbits are not part of the statement of facts. See Mader v. State, 807 S.W.2d 439, 440-41 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). Two other panels of tMs court have held the loss of exhibits may be harmless in some instances. See Johnson v. State, 846 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), remanded on other grounds, 853 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), rev’d on other grounds, 899 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.], 1995, no pet. h.); Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.)
The confusion as to whether exMbits are part of the statement of facts stems, in part, from Rule 50(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure wMch defines the content of the appellate record as consisting of a transcript and a statement of facts. Reasoning that exMbits are not part of the transcript, two courts have concluded that exhibits must necessarily be part of the statement of facts. Shields, 820 S.W.2d at 833; Owens-Illinois, Inc., 899 S.W.2d at 729. TMs rationale is further bolstered in Owens-Illinois by the court’s conclusion that the statement of facts must encompass all of the evidence, and since exMbits are part of the evidence, they must necessarily be part of the statement of facts. While there can be no question that exMbits [739]*739are part of the appellate record,2 nothing in Rule 50(a) suggests that exhibits are exclusively a component of the statement of facts.3 The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure refer to exhibits both in the context of being part of the transcript4 and as part of the statement of facts.5
If we were to hold, as some have, that exhibits are part of the court reporter’s records, we would be obliged to reverse the trial court’s judgment in every instance where one or more of the exhibits have been lost. Some exhibits, however, such as computer-generated records, business records, photographs, and certified photocopies of original public records can be flawlessly reconstructed with the utmost confidence. In many cases, the exhibits are of no value to the appellate court and have no impact upon the resolution of the appellant’s points of error. It is a waste of judicial resources to hold that the loss of such exhibits must automatically result in a new trial.
We hold that exhibits are sui gen-eris, and may not be neatly “pegged” as being solely part of the transcript or the statement of facts. When designated for inclusion, exhibits form part of the appellate record, but they are not entirely subsumed under the statement of facts. We do not hold that the loss of an exhibit will never result in a new trial. Occasionally an exhibit may be relevant to the determination of a point of error. The loss of such an exhibit, accompanied by the inability to reconstruct the same, must necessarily result in a new trial. Nevertheless, where no possibility exists that the exhibit will be of assistance to the appellate court, its loss should not result in a reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Richards v. Suckle, 871 S.W.2d at 243. In this case, the latent fingerprints on the original food wrappers are of no assistance to us in resolving appellant’s points of error because we are not qualified to interpret and compare latent fingerprints. We reiterate and adopt the holding in Richards v. Suckle where Justice Cannon, writing for court said: “We simply do not read Rule 50(e) to mean that in every instance where a part of the record has been lost that the aggrieved party is entitled to a new trial. If the portion of the record which is lost cannot change the outcome of the case, to remand the cause for a new trial would not be judicially economical.”
Finally, appellant did not specifically designate the missing exhibits for inclusion in the record; consequently, he cannot complain of their absence on appeal. Appellant bears the burden to see that “a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal.” Rule 50(d). When a party files a written stipulation with the clerk of the trial court, he must stipulate “the parts of the record, proceedings and evidence to be included in the record on appeal.” Rule 50(b) (emphasis added). The appellant in this case did not specify in his written designation filed with the clerk that the exhibits should be included in the appellate record. Therefore, he has failed to preserve error on appeal. Because we find that exhibits are not part of the statement of facts, that their loss has not prejudiced his appeal, and that appellant did not preserve this issue for review, we overrule appellant’s first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred by proceeding with the trial when a potential witness failed to appear in court. Complainant’s former boyfriend gave conflicting statements to the Texas City police and to the trial court regarding appellant’s participation in the burglary. Because the ex-boyfriend failed to appear at trial as instructed by the trial court and when called by appellant, the trial court ordered a writ of attachment and recessed for three hours while the sheriff attempted to locate him. Trial proceedings [740]*740resumed approximately three hours later even though the -witness had not been located. At that time, the trial court heard testimony, outside the presence of the jury, about the ex-boyfriend’s written statement. Later, at the hearing on appellant’s Motion for New Trial, the ex-boyfriend testified that he had no personal knowledge regarding the burglary of complainant’s home.
Appellant contends the moment the trial court ordered the -writ of attachment, the State was required to exercise due diligence and good faith in attempting to secure the ex-boyfriend as a witness under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. Varela v. State, 561 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56,107 S.Ct. 989, 1000-01, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (stating at a minimum, criminal defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling attendance of favorable witnesses at trial). Without citing authority, appellant contends the trial court should have inquired whether the State had exercised due diligence and good faith in attempting to secure the witness before resuming trial proceedings. Because the trial court failed to make an express determination of due diligence and good faith, appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence regarding the witness’s statement over his objection.
We do not reach the merits of this point because appellant has failed to preserve error. To preserve error, an adverse ruling on an objection must be obtained in the trial court. Rule 52(a). The record does not reflect that appellant requested the trial court to make a determination of the State’s diligent or good faith attempt to locate the errant witness or that appellant voiced an objection to the trial court’s failure to do so. Furthermore, appellant concedes that evidence of the State’s lack of good faith and due diligence is outside the record before this Court. Mere assertions in appellant’s brief, unsupported by the record, present nothing for review. Beck v. State, 573 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Wyatt v. State, 836 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). Therefore, appellant’s second point of error is overruled.
In point of error three, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. In order to sustain appellant’s conviction, the evidence presented must establish all material elements of the offense. Alvarado v. State, 632 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), overruled by Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Draper v. State, 681 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). This Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found from that evidence every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Soto v. State, 864 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). This standard applies to eases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. Chambers, 711 S.W.2d at 245. The essential elements of burglary are as follows: (1) a person, (2) without the effective consent of the owner, (3) enters a habitation with the intent to commit a felony or theft. § 30.02 (Vernon 1989); Draper, 681 S.W.2d at 177.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in three respects. First, appellant alleges the evidence is insufficient to show that he entered complainant’s residence. Appellant contends the only evidence of his presence at complainant’s home was his thumbprint on the food wrapper, and the State failed to show the thumbprint was made at the time of the burglary. Fingerprints, without further evidence of identification, are sufficient to support a conviction if the evidence shows the fingerprints were necessarily made at the time of the burglary. Phelps v. State, 594 S.W.2d 434, 435 (Tex. Crim.App.1980); Servin v. State, 745 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.). Nevertheless, the mere possibility the fingerprints were made at some other time does not necessarily render the evidence insufficient. Id. at 436. In addition to appellant’s thumbprint on the food wrapper, [741]*741the record shows that appellant was arrested in close proximity to property taken from the complainant’s home. Where there is independent evidence of a burglary, recent unexplained possession of property taken in that burglary will support an inference of guilt sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary on appeal. Johnson v. State, 856 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.); Brown v. State, 792 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). A rational jury, taking this evidence together, could conclude that appellant left his thumbprint on a food wrapper when he enjoyed a snack while burglarizing complainant’s residence.
Next, appellant argues that the State failed to prove forced entry into complainant’s home because the record suggests that entry was made by someone with a key, such as complainant’s ex-boyfriend, who may have had her consent to enter the residence. However, complainant testified she had given consent only to her sister to enter her home while she was hospitalized. She also said her ex-boyfriend did not have consent to enter her home and had, in fact, returned his key to her. A marital relationship does not authorize a spouse to enter an estranged spouse’s residence. Stanley v. State, 631 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Likewise, a dating relationship does not impliedly authorize a boyfriend to enter his ex-girlfriend’s residence. Whether the entry was obtained by means of a key is irrelevant. An entry into a house through a door that was closed is an entry by force within the meaning of the Section 30.02. Mixon v. State, 401 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1966).
Finally, appellant contends that the evidence fails to show that he was inside the residence with the intent to commit theft. We disagree. Evidence in the record of appellant’s thumbprint on the food wrapper, the location of complainant’s driver’s license and personal checks at the time of his arrest clearly supports the jury’s conclusion that appellant entered complainant’s home with the intent to commit theft. Appellant’s third point of error is overruled.
In his fourth point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to summarize the pen packets before the jury. We do not reach the merits of this point of error because appellant failed to specifically object on the grounds now made the basis for his complaint on appeal. See Coffey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Appellant’s fourth point of error is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.