Golfin v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections

276 F. App'x 908
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedApril 25, 2008
Docket07-11049
StatusUnpublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 276 F. App'x 908 (Golfin v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Golfin v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 276 F. App'x 908 (11th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant William Golfín, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). We granted Golfín a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue only:

Whether the district court erred by dismissing appellant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred where appellant filed a petition for discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court but the district court found that 28 U.S.C. [§ 2244(d)’s] limitation period began to run 90 days after the District Court of Appeal affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence.

Golfín argues only that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time he filed for discretionary review with the Florida Supreme Court. The State responds that we should affirm the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition because Golfín did not address the issue raised in COA and therefore abandoned the issue.

Under our well-established procedural rules, we consider issues not clearly raised on appeal abandoned. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1303 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 619, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006). Under the AEDPA, “appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the COA.” Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998), see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se petitioner. Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir.2005). Nevertheless, we will not act as de facto counsel for a pro se litigant. GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.1998).

Golfín did not address the issue raised by the COA; rather he argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, he abandoned the issue on which we granted a COA. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

AFFIRMED.

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276 F. App'x 908, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/golfin-v-secretary-for-the-department-of-corrections-ca11-2008.