Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar

355 F. Supp. 491, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15539, 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,318
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJanuary 5, 1973
DocketCiv. A. 75-72-A
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 355 F. Supp. 491 (Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15539, 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,318 (E.D. Va. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Jr., District Judge.

This is a class action brought under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for injunctive relief and damages as allowed by 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. The agreement allegedly restraining trade or commerce is a minimum fee schedule adopted by the defendant Fairfax Bar Association, consistent violations of which may subject an attorney to disciplinary measures initiated by committees of the defendant Virginia State Bar. 1 .

' The matter came on for hearing, on the issue of liability only, on December 13, 1972.

The Court adopts as part of its findings of fact the Stipulation of Facts entered into by the parties and filed on December 11, 1972, 2 the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the plaintiff numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by tl|e defendant Virginia State Bar numbered 1 and 2, and Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the defendant Fairfax Bar Association numbered 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, *493 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 3 49 and 54, 4 copies of which are attached hereto.

Minimum fee schedules are a form of price fixing and therefore inconsistent with antitrust statutes prohibiting anti-competitve activities.

Price fixing is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade. It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings price-fixing serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve. United States v. Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489, 70 S.Ct. 711, 714, 94 L.Ed. 1007 (1950).

The scope of the statutory language in the Sherman Act is so expansive that courts have been reluctant to find exceptions. The language explicitly states that “every contract, combination or conspiracy which restrains commerce among several states is unlawful.” (Emphasis supplied.) Illustrative of this reluctance is the refusal to extend baseball’s exempt status to other professional sports. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 75 S.Ct. 259, 99 L.Ed. 290 (1955). The fact that specific exemptions are clearly delineated suggests that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of inclusion. This is especially true where price-fixing is involved since it has been declared both pernicious and lacking in any redeeming social value. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1957); United States v. National Ass’n. of Real Estate Boards, supra; see also United States v. Trenton Potteries Company, 273 U.S. 392, 397, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700 (1927):

[T]he aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of to-morrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints.

The minimum fee schedule actually proposes a floor upon which professional fees should be set. This type of price-fixing has been held under other circumstances to be repugnant to the philosophy of the Sherman Act. Plymouth Dealers Ass’n. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960). It is contrary to the spirit of competition which sustains a free enterprise system in that it prevents competitors from using their own judgment in determining the value of their own services. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram and Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213, 71 S.Ct. 259, 95 L.Ed. 219 (1951). Although attorneys can violate the proposed fee schedule (at the risk, of course, of being subjected to a charge of unethical conduct) a defendant’s liability under the Sherman Act depends not on actual adherence to the schedule but rather on the mere existence of an *494 agreement which restricts competition by price-fixing. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); Plymouth Dealers Ass’n. v. United States, supra.

There is no distinction between the benefits ascribed to the minimum fee schedule by its advocates and those existing in a minimum sales price if, for example, the latter were to be adopted by General Motors and Ford Motor Company as to suggested sales prices for comparable automobiles. In each instance, a new dealer and a new lawyer, both unfamiliar with the customary charges in the field, would find such a minimum fee or sales price schedule helpful in setting charges. In each instance an adequate fee or price would insure a margin of profit adequate to assure further research and development or continued legal education. In each instance the public would be assured, by an examination of such schedule, that what was being charged was in line with what was generally charged in the field. Yet in none of these instances would a member of the public have any better idea that the fee or price was reasonable after he had seen the schedule than he did before. The minimum fee schedule for real estate settlements, based as it is on a percentage of the purchase price, is particularly hard- to justify as having any relation to the labor involved. This is particularly so in view of the fact that the “responsibility” involved is assured by a separate charge for title insurance. The attorney’s ultimate “responsibility” is illusory. See Footnote 3, supra. Such an across-the-board rate, coupled with the testimony of both Goldfarb as to his efforts to obtain legal services, and Attorney F.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pontius v. Children's Hospital
552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1982)
People v. Roth
420 N.E.2d 929 (New York Court of Appeals, 1981)
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society
643 F.2d 553 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
People v. Roth
100 Misc. 2d 542 (New York County Courts, 1979)
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
421 U.S. 773 (Supreme Court, 1975)
United States v. Oregon State Bar
385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Oregon, 1974)
Opinion No. 74-137 (1974) Ag
Oklahoma Attorney General Reports, 1974
In re Feinstein
45 A.D.2d 440 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1974)
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
497 F.2d 1 (Fourth Circuit, 1974)
In re Accounting of Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.
311 N.E.2d 480 (New York Court of Appeals, 1974)
Barrows v. Grand Rapids Real Estate Board
214 N.W.2d 532 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1974)
Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Company
366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1973)
Stafford v. Brennan
498 S.W.2d 703 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
355 F. Supp. 491, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15539, 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goldfarb-v-virginia-state-bar-vaed-1973.