1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Golden Star Mine LLC, No. CV-24-02386-PHX-DGC
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Renegade Mining & Milling LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Golden Star Mine LLC asserts claims for trespass, quiet title, tortious 16 interference with contract, and declaratory judgment against Defendant Renegade Mining 17 & Milling LLC. Doc. 1. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Doc. 6. For 18 the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part. 19 I. Background. 20 On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff was deeded several unpatented lode mining claims 21 by Golden Wonder Mine, LLC. Docs. 1 ¶ 10; 1-1 at 2-3. The Bureau of Land Management 22 (“BLM”) recognized the transfers on July 21 and July 24, 2017. Doc. 1-2 at 3. Plaintiff 23 recorded the deeds with the Gila County Recorder on April 16, 2018. Doc. 1 ¶ 12. Plaintiff 24 asserts that it holds valid title to the claims because it or its predecessor in interest paid 25 BLM maintenance fees for the claims and have taken all legally required actions to 26 maintain them. Doc. 1¶¶ 13-14; see Doc. 1-1. 27 At some point prior to April 29, 2024, Plaintiff learned that Defendant was asserting 28 an interest in the mining claims and had placed fencing and signage on the land where the 1 claims are located. Id. at 18-21. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant requesting that it stop 2 claim jumping and remove the barriers. Doc. 1-2. When Defendant did not acknowledge 3 the request, Plaintiff filed this suit. Doc. 1 ¶ 22. 4 II. Federal Court Jurisdiction. 5 At the Court’s request (Doc. 12), the parties filed a joint memorandum setting forth 6 their views on whether federal question jurisdiction exists in this case. Doc. 13. After 7 reviewing the parties’ memorandum, the Court finds that there is federal question 8 jurisdiction. 9 Plaintiff asserts three state law claims related to the unpatented mining claims: 10 trespass, quiet title, and tortious interference with contract. As addressed in the Court’s 11 order on March 27, 2025, state courts have jurisdiction over controversies between 12 competing locators for possession of federal mining claims. 2 American Law of Mining § 13 33.01[4] (Found. for Nat. Res. and Energy L. ed., 2d ed. 2024). But federal courts have 14 federal question jurisdiction if the claims require resolution of a substantial question of 15 federal law, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 16 (1983), such as the construction of federal mining location law, 2 American Law of Mining 17 § 33.01[4]. 18 The parties disagree on whether Plaintiff’s payment of the claim maintenance fees 19 during the time before BLM recognized transfer of the claims to Plaintiff in 2017 satisfied 20 federal requirements to maintain valid unpatented mining claims. Docs. 6 at 4-5, 9 at 5-6. 21 Defendant argues that the claims were forfeited because Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, 22 not Plaintiff, was required to pay the maintenance fees in 2016, and did not do so. Doc. 6 23 at 5. Plaintiff argues that its payment of the fees at that time maintained the claims. Doc. 24 9 at 5. Significantly, Defendant cites no case suggesting the claimholder must be the one 25 to actually pay the fees. To resolve this issue, the Court must construe the relevant federal 26 statutes and regulations to determine whether Plaintiff’s payment of the fees was sufficient 27 to maintain the mining claims. In other words, the Court will be required to resolve a 28 substantial issue of federal law. 1 This issue is presented on the face of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff 2 or its predecessor in interest always paid or caused to be paid, the annual maintenance fees 3 to maintain the Mining Claims” and that “Plaintiff has always taken the legally required 4 action to maintain the Mining Claims.” Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff attaches BLM 5 documents to the complaint showing that the maintenance fees were paid during the years 6 in question. Doc. 1-1. Because the complaint raises a substantial federal question, the 7 Court concludes that it has federal question jurisdiction over this case. 8 III. Motion to Dismiss. 9 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the 10 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its 11 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint 12 that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains 13 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 14 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 15 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads “factual 16 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 17 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court treats all allegations of material fact in the 18 complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cousins 19 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 A. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations. 21 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a plausible claim 22 for relief. Doc. 6 at 3. But Defendant then proceeds to make arguments that are not really 23 based on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings, but instead try to develop legal 24 insufficiencies and factual contradictions with the allegations — arguments more properly 25 made at summary judgment. 26 Looking to attachments to the complaint, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff paid 27 maintenance fees for the mining claims before their transfer to Plaintiff was recognized by 28 BLM in 2017, that Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest should have paid the fees during that 1 time, and that the predecessor’s failure to make the payments resulted in a forfeiture of the 2 claims. Doc. 6 at 5. Defendant also relies on factual assertions about Defendant’s 3 acquisition of the mining claims that are not contained in the complaint. Id. at 5. 4 Relying on the language in 43 C.F.R. § 3833.92, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 5 predecessor was responsible for paying the maintenance fees on the unpatented mining 6 claims in 2016 because BLM did not recognize the transfer to Plaintiff until 2017. Doc. 6. 7 at 5. Defendant does not dispute that the fees were paid by Plaintiff. It instead relies 8 entirely on the argument that Plaintiff could not pay the fees because the predecessor was 9 required to do so. But as noted above, Defendant cites no authority holding that payments 10 made by someone other than the actual interest holder are insufficient to maintain 11 unpatented mining claims. 12 Defendant has not presented a basis for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Defendant may 13 reassert this issue at summary judgment with a more complete factual record and a more 14 thorough discussion of the statutes, regulations, and any relevant cases on the proper 15 payment of maintenance fees. 16 B. Tortious Interference with Contract.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Golden Star Mine LLC, No. CV-24-02386-PHX-DGC
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Renegade Mining & Milling LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Golden Star Mine LLC asserts claims for trespass, quiet title, tortious 16 interference with contract, and declaratory judgment against Defendant Renegade Mining 17 & Milling LLC. Doc. 1. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. Doc. 6. For 18 the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part. 19 I. Background. 20 On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff was deeded several unpatented lode mining claims 21 by Golden Wonder Mine, LLC. Docs. 1 ¶ 10; 1-1 at 2-3. The Bureau of Land Management 22 (“BLM”) recognized the transfers on July 21 and July 24, 2017. Doc. 1-2 at 3. Plaintiff 23 recorded the deeds with the Gila County Recorder on April 16, 2018. Doc. 1 ¶ 12. Plaintiff 24 asserts that it holds valid title to the claims because it or its predecessor in interest paid 25 BLM maintenance fees for the claims and have taken all legally required actions to 26 maintain them. Doc. 1¶¶ 13-14; see Doc. 1-1. 27 At some point prior to April 29, 2024, Plaintiff learned that Defendant was asserting 28 an interest in the mining claims and had placed fencing and signage on the land where the 1 claims are located. Id. at 18-21. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant requesting that it stop 2 claim jumping and remove the barriers. Doc. 1-2. When Defendant did not acknowledge 3 the request, Plaintiff filed this suit. Doc. 1 ¶ 22. 4 II. Federal Court Jurisdiction. 5 At the Court’s request (Doc. 12), the parties filed a joint memorandum setting forth 6 their views on whether federal question jurisdiction exists in this case. Doc. 13. After 7 reviewing the parties’ memorandum, the Court finds that there is federal question 8 jurisdiction. 9 Plaintiff asserts three state law claims related to the unpatented mining claims: 10 trespass, quiet title, and tortious interference with contract. As addressed in the Court’s 11 order on March 27, 2025, state courts have jurisdiction over controversies between 12 competing locators for possession of federal mining claims. 2 American Law of Mining § 13 33.01[4] (Found. for Nat. Res. and Energy L. ed., 2d ed. 2024). But federal courts have 14 federal question jurisdiction if the claims require resolution of a substantial question of 15 federal law, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 16 (1983), such as the construction of federal mining location law, 2 American Law of Mining 17 § 33.01[4]. 18 The parties disagree on whether Plaintiff’s payment of the claim maintenance fees 19 during the time before BLM recognized transfer of the claims to Plaintiff in 2017 satisfied 20 federal requirements to maintain valid unpatented mining claims. Docs. 6 at 4-5, 9 at 5-6. 21 Defendant argues that the claims were forfeited because Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, 22 not Plaintiff, was required to pay the maintenance fees in 2016, and did not do so. Doc. 6 23 at 5. Plaintiff argues that its payment of the fees at that time maintained the claims. Doc. 24 9 at 5. Significantly, Defendant cites no case suggesting the claimholder must be the one 25 to actually pay the fees. To resolve this issue, the Court must construe the relevant federal 26 statutes and regulations to determine whether Plaintiff’s payment of the fees was sufficient 27 to maintain the mining claims. In other words, the Court will be required to resolve a 28 substantial issue of federal law. 1 This issue is presented on the face of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff 2 or its predecessor in interest always paid or caused to be paid, the annual maintenance fees 3 to maintain the Mining Claims” and that “Plaintiff has always taken the legally required 4 action to maintain the Mining Claims.” Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff attaches BLM 5 documents to the complaint showing that the maintenance fees were paid during the years 6 in question. Doc. 1-1. Because the complaint raises a substantial federal question, the 7 Court concludes that it has federal question jurisdiction over this case. 8 III. Motion to Dismiss. 9 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate when the 10 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its 11 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint 12 that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains 13 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 14 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 15 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads “factual 16 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 17 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court treats all allegations of material fact in the 18 complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cousins 19 v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 A. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations. 21 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a plausible claim 22 for relief. Doc. 6 at 3. But Defendant then proceeds to make arguments that are not really 23 based on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings, but instead try to develop legal 24 insufficiencies and factual contradictions with the allegations — arguments more properly 25 made at summary judgment. 26 Looking to attachments to the complaint, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff paid 27 maintenance fees for the mining claims before their transfer to Plaintiff was recognized by 28 BLM in 2017, that Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest should have paid the fees during that 1 time, and that the predecessor’s failure to make the payments resulted in a forfeiture of the 2 claims. Doc. 6 at 5. Defendant also relies on factual assertions about Defendant’s 3 acquisition of the mining claims that are not contained in the complaint. Id. at 5. 4 Relying on the language in 43 C.F.R. § 3833.92, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s 5 predecessor was responsible for paying the maintenance fees on the unpatented mining 6 claims in 2016 because BLM did not recognize the transfer to Plaintiff until 2017. Doc. 6. 7 at 5. Defendant does not dispute that the fees were paid by Plaintiff. It instead relies 8 entirely on the argument that Plaintiff could not pay the fees because the predecessor was 9 required to do so. But as noted above, Defendant cites no authority holding that payments 10 made by someone other than the actual interest holder are insufficient to maintain 11 unpatented mining claims. 12 Defendant has not presented a basis for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Defendant may 13 reassert this issue at summary judgment with a more complete factual record and a more 14 thorough discussion of the statutes, regulations, and any relevant cases on the proper 15 payment of maintenance fees. 16 B. Tortious Interference with Contract. 17 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract claim fails 18 because it does not adequately allege the existence of a contract with which Defendant 19 could have interfered. Doc. 6 at 6. To succeed on a tortious interference claim, Plaintiff 20 must plead the existence of a contractual relationship. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, 21 Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 493 22 (2002). Unpatented mining claims are property interests over which “the Government 23 retains substantial regulatory power[.]” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985). 24 They are not contractual in nature. Last Chance Min. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 551 25 (1987), aff’d sub nom. Last Chance Min. Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 26 (“It would do violence to traditional contract theory, not to mention the operation of 27 government, to hold that any statute requiring some action by a citizen to obtain a benefit 28 or protect a right constituted an open offer to contract.”). Because the mining claims are 1 not a contract, Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim fails. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 40-41. 2 III. Statute of Limitations. 3 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s quiet title, trespass, and declaratory judgment 4 claims are time barred. Doc. 6 at 8. It claims that Plaintiff’s quiet title claim is subject to 5 a two-year statute of limitations, which has run. Id. at 7-8. It also argues that the trespass 6 and declaratory judgment claims rely on the quiet title claim and are time barred for the 7 same reason. Id. at 7. 8 Although not thoroughly briefed by the parties, it appears that two different rules 9 apply to the time limits on quiet title claims. The first is that no statute of limitations 10 applies to “a plaintiff in possession who brings a quiet title action purely to remove a cloud 11 on the title to his property.” Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 176 (Ct. 12 App. 2013). But this does not extend to cases where a plaintiff’s possession of the property 13 is disturbed. Id. The second rule, therefore, is that “[w]hen a party in possession claims 14 real property by right of possession only, actions to recover possession from him shall be 15 commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” A.R.S. 16 § 12-522. Mining claims are included in the meaning of real property under the statute. 17 A.R.S. § 12-521(a)(3). 18 Defendant — who bears the burden of proof on a time-bar argument, Est. of Page 19 v. Litzenburg, 865 P.2d 128, 135 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) — asserts that the second rule 20 applies in this case and that Plaintiff’s quite title claim is subject to a two-year statute of 21 limitations. But Defendant does not provide sufficient information for the Court to rule on 22 this argument. It does not address the question of possession with respect to the two rules 23 discussed above — which party is in possession of the mining claims for purposes of this 24 case. Nor does Defendant explain how to determine possession of mining claims in a case 25 like this. Defendant instead relies on caselaw where the real property in question is land. 26 Rogers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ariz., 233 Ariz. 262, 267 (Ct. App. 2013); Cook, 232 27 Ariz. at 176-77. 28 Defendants motion also relies on facts outside of the complaint to allege that two || years have passed since Plaintiff's quiet title claim accrued. This includes when Defendant || recorded its interests with Gila County Recorder and when the parties engaged in 3 || conversations over the unpatented mining claims. Doc. 6 at 8-9. While these conversations 4|| are mentioned in the complaint, Defendant itself recognizes that no dates are provided, id. || at 9, and the Court must limit its analysis on a motion to dismiss to the contents of the || complaint, see Marder vy. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 Defendant’s statute of limitations argument cannot be accepted on this record and 8 || at this stage of the litigation. It may be raised at summary judgment when the record is || more complete and there has been more thorough discussion of the relevant legal issues. 10 || Because Defendant’s time-bar argument for the trespass and declaratory judgment claims 11 || rests entirely on the insufficient quiet title argument, it too cannot be accepted. 12 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted on Count 13 || 3 and is otherwise denied. A Rule 16 Case Management Conference will be set by separate order. 15 Dated this 15th day of May, 2025. 16 17 peed 6 Coe plhtl 18 David G. Campbell 19 Senior United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28