Goldberg v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HEMPSTEAD SCHOOL D.

777 F. Supp. 1109, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, 1991 WL 253022
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedNovember 26, 1991
Docket91-CV-3161 (TCP)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 777 F. Supp. 1109 (Goldberg v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HEMPSTEAD SCHOOL D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goldberg v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF HEMPSTEAD SCHOOL D., 777 F. Supp. 1109, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, 1991 WL 253022 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLATT, Chief Judge.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

In November, 1984, plaintiff was appointed to the administrative position of Director of Pupil Personnel Services (“DPPS”) by the defendant Board of Education of the Hempstead School District (“Board”). Plaintiff was granted tenure on November 1, 1987. In a Board meeting on August 1, 1991, plaintiffs position was eliminated, allegedly for financial reasons. The duties previously performed by plaintiff were incorporated into the job responsibilities of a new position, created at that same Board meeting, entitled Assistant Superintendent for Personnel: Professional Staff, Civil Service, and Pupils. Plaintiff was not given a hearing prior to the elimination of his position, nor was plaintiff offered the new position of Assistant Superintendent of Personnel.

*1110 Plaintiff sued the Hempstead School District alleging in his complaint a violation of his right to substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a violation of section 2510(1) of the New York Education law. Defendant moved to dismiss arguing that no hearing was required and that there was no violation of New York law.

DISCUSSION

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.Amend. 14, § 1. In any action alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a threshold issue is whether plaintiff has a constitutionally protected life, liberty or property interest at stake. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In this case, plaintiff was a tenured administrator for the Hempstead Board of Education. As a tenured administrator, plaintiffs position was protected by New York Education law section 3012(2), which provides that plaintiff “shall hold [his] position during good behavior and efficient and competent service, and shall not be removed except for [certain causes], after a hearing.” N.Y.Educ.Law § 3012(2) (McKinney 1981). This State law creates a property interest protected (or more accurately capable of protection) under the Constitution. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. at 1491-92.

There are now two closely related issues before the Court. First, whether plaintiff was entitled to a pre-termination hearing prior to the abolition of his position in the School District; and second, whether under section 2510(1) plaintiff was entitled to the newly created position of Assistant Superintendent of Personnel. These same issues were discussed at length, in a case involving a very similar set of facts, in an opinion of this Court rendered by Judge Leonard D. Wexler. DeSimone v. Board of Ed., South Huntington Union Free School Dist., 612 F.Supp. 1568 (E.D.N.Y.1985).

In DeSimone, the defendant Board of Education abolished plaintiff’s position as High School Dean and simultaneously created a new position entitled High School Administrative Assistant. The plaintiff was not given any kind of hearing prior to these steps. As in the present case, plaintiff sued alleging a violation of section 2510 of the New York Education law and the Fourteenth Amendment. “Without annun-ciating a comprehensive theory regarding the circumstances in which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would require a hearing prior to the discontinuance of a teacher’s services pursuant to [New York] Education law § 2510(2),” Judge Wexler held that “the Due Process Clause required such a pre-termination hearing” in the DeSimone case. Id. at 1571.

In holding that due process required a pre-termination hearing, the Court noted three factors: first that the plaintiff had been deprived of his means of livelihood; second that the old and new positions were sufficiently similar so that “there was [a] substantial possibility that plaintiff might possess a substantive right under [section 2510(1)] to occupy the new position,” id.; and third that the issue of whether two positions were “similar” for section 2510(1) purposes was not “readily reducible to pure questions of law.” Id.

Judge Wexler then discussed the appropriate remedy for the School Board’s deprivation of plaintiff’s property right without due process. “When official policy results in a person being deprived of property or liberty without procedural due process, and such deprivation would have taken place even if a proper hearing had been held, then the person is not entitled to compensatory damages for the deprivation itself." Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1050, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). In such a case, the Court noted, the plaintiff would only be entitled to nominal damages for the denial of due process (ie., the lack of a pre-termination hearing), unless he demonstrates actual injury attributable to the denial of due process as opposed to the deprivation itself.

*1111 Although the Court held that the plaintiff was deprived of property without procedural due process of law because the School Board failed to give plaintiff a pre-termination hearing, the Court could not determine, on the basis of the papers submitted, whether the old and new positions were in reality “similar” for purposes of section 2510(1). If the positions were in reality similar, then the plaintiff would have been entitled to compensatory damages for the denial of due process. On the other hand, if the positions were found to be not similar under section 2510(1) such that the plaintiff would have been discontinued even if a proper hearing had been held, then he would not be entitled to more than nominal damages, absent a demonstration of actual injury attributable to the denial of due process as indicated above. The Court found a trial would be necessary to resolve these issues. See id. 612 F.Supp. at 1571-72, 1574.

With DeSimone as a guide, we now consider the facts of the present case. As in DeSimone, this case involves the plaintiffs means of livelihood and the question of “similarity” under New York Education law section 2510(1). We agree with Judge Wexler that these factors weigh in favor of requiring a pre-termination hearing. To assess whether there was a “substantial possibility” that the two positions were “similar,” we must examine the job descriptions of the positions in question.

The job description for the position of Director of Pupil Personnel Services lists the following performance responsibilities:

1. Member of the Superintendent’s Cabinet;
2.

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Related

Fairbairn v. Board of Education
876 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. New York, 1995)
Fairbairn v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF S. CENT. SCHOOL
876 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. New York, 1995)

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777 F. Supp. 1109, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, 1991 WL 253022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goldberg-v-board-of-educ-of-hempstead-school-d-nyed-1991.