NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GALENA GOINS; SONIA LOPEZ; No. 24-4842 TERRY A. JONES-JACKSON, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-08722-PJH Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 4, 2025 San Francisco, California
Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge RAWLINSON.
Galena Goins, Sonia Lopez, and Terry Jones-Jackson (collectively,
“plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of their
employer, United Parcel Service, Inc., on their claims alleging unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs brought claims under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,
and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code §§
12940 et seq. Jones-Jackson individually brought additional claims under the Equal
Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the California Equal Pay Act (CEPA),
Cal. Lab. Code § 1197.5. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Adcock
v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999). We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to modify a scheduling order, Noyes
v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), and a district court’s
refusal to continue a hearing on summary judgment pending further discovery,
SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823, 833 (9th Cir. 2018).
1. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s order partially denying UPS’s
motion to dismiss, arguing that the court mischaracterized their surviving claims
by conflating the legal requirements of a Title VII claim with the elements of a
failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because
plaintiffs prevailed in that order—that is, the court denied the motion to dismiss in
relevant part and allowed the case to proceed—plaintiffs lack standing to challenge
it. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir. 1999). Insofar
as plaintiffs believe that the district court misunderstood their claims or applied the
2 24-4842 wrong legal standard in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs can
raise those issues in their challenge to the district court’s summary judgment order.
2. We analyze plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, Title VII plaintiffs must first make out
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that they are members of a
protected class, (2) that they were qualified for their positions and performing their
jobs satisfactorily, (3) that they experienced adverse employment actions, and (4)
that “similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected class were treated more
favorably.” Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d
599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)). If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action, after which the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to show that the
employer intentionally discriminated. Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 721–24 (9th
Cir. 2023). FEHA claims are governed by the same framework. See Guz v. Bechtel
Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103 (Cal. 2000).
Plaintiffs fail to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. It is
undisputed that plaintiffs, as women, are members of a protected class, and we
assume without deciding that plaintiffs were qualified for their positions. As to
3 24-4842 prong three, plaintiffs assert that they suffered an adverse employment action when
UPS refused to accommodate their mobility limitations despite informally
accommodating male employees’ similar injuries. Although failure to
accommodate is not a cognizable adverse employment action in a sex-
discrimination case under FEHA, Doe v. Department of Corr. & Rehab., 255 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 910, 923 (Ct. App. 2019), we assume without deciding that failure to
accommodate can be an adverse action under Title VII. Nevertheless, because
plaintiffs fail to identify similarly situated male comparators who were treated
more favorably by UPS under prong four, they cannot establish a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas.
To show that plaintiffs were similarly situated to male comparators, they
must show that their roles were “similar in all material respects” to those of the
comparators. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nicholson v.
Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)). “[I]ndividuals are
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”
Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that they and their comparators shared a common core of
tasks or performed similarly. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations on this point are
cursory, lacking details about their male colleagues’ positions, job responsibilities,
and performance. See FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168,
4 24-4842 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr. 11, 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving
affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact.”).
3. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to UPS on Jones-
Jackson’s EPA and CEPA claims. Under the EPA and CEPA, plaintiffs must show
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GALENA GOINS; SONIA LOPEZ; No. 24-4842 TERRY A. JONES-JACKSON, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-08722-PJH Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 4, 2025 San Francisco, California
Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge RAWLINSON.
Galena Goins, Sonia Lopez, and Terry Jones-Jackson (collectively,
“plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of their
employer, United Parcel Service, Inc., on their claims alleging unlawful
employment discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiffs brought claims under
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,
and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code §§
12940 et seq. Jones-Jackson individually brought additional claims under the Equal
Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the California Equal Pay Act (CEPA),
Cal. Lab. Code § 1197.5. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Adcock
v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999). We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to modify a scheduling order, Noyes
v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), and a district court’s
refusal to continue a hearing on summary judgment pending further discovery,
SEC v. Stein, 906 F.3d 823, 833 (9th Cir. 2018).
1. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s order partially denying UPS’s
motion to dismiss, arguing that the court mischaracterized their surviving claims
by conflating the legal requirements of a Title VII claim with the elements of a
failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because
plaintiffs prevailed in that order—that is, the court denied the motion to dismiss in
relevant part and allowed the case to proceed—plaintiffs lack standing to challenge
it. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir. 1999). Insofar
as plaintiffs believe that the district court misunderstood their claims or applied the
2 24-4842 wrong legal standard in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs can
raise those issues in their challenge to the district court’s summary judgment order.
2. We analyze plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
To survive a motion for summary judgment, Title VII plaintiffs must first make out
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that they are members of a
protected class, (2) that they were qualified for their positions and performing their
jobs satisfactorily, (3) that they experienced adverse employment actions, and (4)
that “similarly situated individuals outside [their] protected class were treated more
favorably.” Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d
599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)). If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts
to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action, after which the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to show that the
employer intentionally discriminated. Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 721–24 (9th
Cir. 2023). FEHA claims are governed by the same framework. See Guz v. Bechtel
Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103 (Cal. 2000).
Plaintiffs fail to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. It is
undisputed that plaintiffs, as women, are members of a protected class, and we
assume without deciding that plaintiffs were qualified for their positions. As to
3 24-4842 prong three, plaintiffs assert that they suffered an adverse employment action when
UPS refused to accommodate their mobility limitations despite informally
accommodating male employees’ similar injuries. Although failure to
accommodate is not a cognizable adverse employment action in a sex-
discrimination case under FEHA, Doe v. Department of Corr. & Rehab., 255 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 910, 923 (Ct. App. 2019), we assume without deciding that failure to
accommodate can be an adverse action under Title VII. Nevertheless, because
plaintiffs fail to identify similarly situated male comparators who were treated
more favorably by UPS under prong four, they cannot establish a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas.
To show that plaintiffs were similarly situated to male comparators, they
must show that their roles were “similar in all material respects” to those of the
comparators. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nicholson v.
Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)). “[I]ndividuals are
similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”
Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that they and their comparators shared a common core of
tasks or performed similarly. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations on this point are
cursory, lacking details about their male colleagues’ positions, job responsibilities,
and performance. See FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168,
4 24-4842 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr. 11, 1997) (“A conclusory, self-serving
affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact.”).
3. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to UPS on Jones-
Jackson’s EPA and CEPA claims. Under the EPA and CEPA, plaintiffs must show
that “employees of the opposite sex were paid different wages for equal work.”
Stanley v. University of S. California, 178 F.3d 1069, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 1999)
(EPA); Green v. Par Pools, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 846 (Ct. App. 2003) (CEPA).
Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the compared jobs are “substantially equal,” which
courts evaluate by looking to (1) whether the jobs share a “common core of tasks”
and (2) whether any additional tasks make the jobs “substantially different.”
Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074 (citations omitted).
The district court correctly found that Jones-Jackson did not establish a
prima facie case of discrimination because she did not identify a male comparator
who had a substantially equal job. Jones-Jackson has not shown that she and her
comparator shared a common core of tasks, nor has she rebutted UPS’s evidence
that Jones-Jackson was paid less than a male colleague of the same seniority
because they had different job classifications and skill levels.
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by partially denying
plaintiffs’ motion to modify the scheduling order because plaintiffs failed to
5 24-4842 demonstrate the requisite diligence. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16(b)(4), a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause.” Good cause
requires a showing of diligence, see Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992), but plaintiffs waited until the last minute to conduct
the depositions at issue and rebuffed UPS’s attempts to meet and confer on the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition topics.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying additional
discovery under Rule 56(d) because, as the requesting party, plaintiffs were
required to set forth by affidavit “the specific facts [they] hope[d] to elicit from
further discovery,” that the facts they sought existed, and “that the sought-after
facts [were] essential to oppos[ing] summary judgment.” See Family Home & Fin.
Ctr., Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008).
In addition, “the failure to conduct discovery diligently is grounds for the denial of
a Rule [56(d)] motion.” Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th
Cir. 2002). We agree with the district court that plaintiffs did not provide specifics
about the particular facts they expected additional discovery to uncover, nor did
they show that the facts they sought actually existed and were essential to opposing
summary judgment. And plaintiffs do not meaningfully challenge the district
court’s finding that they “show[ed] an extreme lack of diligence” by relying on
6 24-4842 non-party agency records for materials that were readily available from party
discovery.
AFFIRMED.
7 24-4842 FILED Goins v. UPS, Inc., Case No. 24-4842 JAN 12 2026 Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I concur in the result.