306 Ga. 55 FINAL COPY
S19A0224. GOINS v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Charmane Goins was convicted of malice murder in
connection with the strangling death of Lauren Taylor. On appeal,
Appellant contends, among other things, that the evidence
presented at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction and
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. As
explained below, the evidence was sufficient, but the trial court did
not make the findings and conclusions regarding Appellant’s speedy
trial claim that we require for appellate review. We therefore vacate
in part the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for new
trial and remand the case for the court to properly address the
speedy trial claim.1
1 We decide the sufficiency issue because, if Appellant prevailed, his conviction would be reversed and he could not be retried. See Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 343 (751 SE2d 399) (2013). We do not address his remaining enumerations of error, which might be rendered moot by the trial court’s 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence at trial showed the following. Appellant, who was married
and lived in Tunnel Hill in northeast Georgia, began an affair with
Taylor in 2013. In August 2014, Appellant told his friend Karl Wyatt
that he wanted to end the affair but could not because Taylor was
threatening to expose it to his wife and children. Taylor was last
seen leaving her friends’ house with Appellant around 1:30 p.m. on
October 7, 2014; the next morning, her partially burnt body was
found in Deshong Park in Gwinnett County. The cause of death was
manual strangulation, after which her body had been doused in
gasoline and set on fire.
Appellant told investigators that he dropped off Taylor at a
speedy trial ruling on remand. Taylor was killed on October 8, 2014. On February 27, 2015, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At a trial from August 28 to September 5, 2017, the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without parole for malice murder; the felony murder count was vacated, and the aggravated assault count merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on April 10, 2018. After a hearing on April 23, 2018, the trial court summarily denied the motion on July 12, 2018. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2018 and submitted for decision on the briefs. mall in Chattanooga, Tennessee on the afternoon of October 7 and
then returned to Chattanooga around 11:00 that night to help Wyatt
with car trouble. Wyatt initially confirmed that alibi, but he later
recanted and testified that he was not with Appellant that night and
that Appellant had asked him to provide the false alibi. Appellant’s
cell phone records showed that, instead of going to Chattanooga that
night as he had claimed, Appellant actually traveled south along I-
75 around midnight, and then traveled east along I-285 toward
Gwinnett County around 1:00 a.m. In addition, later on the day of
the murder, Appellant pawned a guitar that Taylor had stolen from
an ex-boyfriend. Finally, Appellant’s former cellmate testified that
Appellant had confessed that he killed Taylor by strangling her with
the seatbelt while she was sleeping and left her body at a “gang
park” that Wyatt had told him about. Appellant testified at trial,
giving a new version of his alibi story and claiming that Taylor gave
him the stolen guitar as payment for gas.
Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support his conviction because it was circumstantial and unpersuasive. See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). There was,
however, direct evidence of Appellant’s guilt — his confession to his
former cellmate. Moreover,
to the extent [Appellant’s] conviction[ ] rest[s] on circumstantial evidence, this evidence “need not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it must rule out only those that are reasonable.” And it is principally for the jury to determine whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable.
Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 781, 783 (822 SE2d 203) (2018) (citations and
footnote omitted). When viewed properly in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above
was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See
also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for
the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’” (citation omitted)).
2. Appellant contends that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial was violated. We are unable to properly consider this claim at
this time, however, because the trial court failed to make the
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(a) Appellant was arrested on December 22, 2014, and his trial
began 32 months later on August 28, 2017. Among other events
occurring in the case, during the initial 24 months after Appellant’s
arrest, his first attorney apparently filed a pre-indictment
constitutional speedy trial demand, on which the trial court appears
never to have ruled; counsel filed a statutory speedy trial demand,
which was struck as untimely; there were several calendar calls at
which discovery and other issues were discussed; and Appellant’s
counsel requested two continuances on the ground that the State
had failed to provide timely discovery, which the trial court granted.
In December 2016, Appellant’s first attorney suffered a debilitating
stroke, and a medical leave of absence until April 1, 2017 was
requested on his behalf. Appellant spoke up at several of the hearings to tell the court that he opposed delays and wanted a trial
as soon as possible.
On March 1, 2017, through a new lawyer, Appellant filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. At a hearing on May 12,
Appellant testified about the difficult conditions of his pretrial
confinement, and his counsel proffered that an anticipated defense
witness had died; the trial court orally denied the motion to dismiss.
The trial began three-and-a-half months later. In his amended
motion for new trial, Appellant asserted a constitutional speedy trial
violation, along with other claims. At the hearing on the motion in
April 2018, Appellant and both of his attorneys testified, but there
was no argument and the trial court made no oral comments about
the speedy trial claim. The court denied the motion by summary
order on July 12, 2018.
(b) To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to
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306 Ga. 55 FINAL COPY
S19A0224. GOINS v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Charmane Goins was convicted of malice murder in
connection with the strangling death of Lauren Taylor. On appeal,
Appellant contends, among other things, that the evidence
presented at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction and
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. As
explained below, the evidence was sufficient, but the trial court did
not make the findings and conclusions regarding Appellant’s speedy
trial claim that we require for appellate review. We therefore vacate
in part the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for new
trial and remand the case for the court to properly address the
speedy trial claim.1
1 We decide the sufficiency issue because, if Appellant prevailed, his conviction would be reversed and he could not be retried. See Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 343 (751 SE2d 399) (2013). We do not address his remaining enumerations of error, which might be rendered moot by the trial court’s 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence at trial showed the following. Appellant, who was married
and lived in Tunnel Hill in northeast Georgia, began an affair with
Taylor in 2013. In August 2014, Appellant told his friend Karl Wyatt
that he wanted to end the affair but could not because Taylor was
threatening to expose it to his wife and children. Taylor was last
seen leaving her friends’ house with Appellant around 1:30 p.m. on
October 7, 2014; the next morning, her partially burnt body was
found in Deshong Park in Gwinnett County. The cause of death was
manual strangulation, after which her body had been doused in
gasoline and set on fire.
Appellant told investigators that he dropped off Taylor at a
speedy trial ruling on remand. Taylor was killed on October 8, 2014. On February 27, 2015, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At a trial from August 28 to September 5, 2017, the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without parole for malice murder; the felony murder count was vacated, and the aggravated assault count merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on April 10, 2018. After a hearing on April 23, 2018, the trial court summarily denied the motion on July 12, 2018. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2018 and submitted for decision on the briefs. mall in Chattanooga, Tennessee on the afternoon of October 7 and
then returned to Chattanooga around 11:00 that night to help Wyatt
with car trouble. Wyatt initially confirmed that alibi, but he later
recanted and testified that he was not with Appellant that night and
that Appellant had asked him to provide the false alibi. Appellant’s
cell phone records showed that, instead of going to Chattanooga that
night as he had claimed, Appellant actually traveled south along I-
75 around midnight, and then traveled east along I-285 toward
Gwinnett County around 1:00 a.m. In addition, later on the day of
the murder, Appellant pawned a guitar that Taylor had stolen from
an ex-boyfriend. Finally, Appellant’s former cellmate testified that
Appellant had confessed that he killed Taylor by strangling her with
the seatbelt while she was sleeping and left her body at a “gang
park” that Wyatt had told him about. Appellant testified at trial,
giving a new version of his alibi story and claiming that Taylor gave
him the stolen guitar as payment for gas.
Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support his conviction because it was circumstantial and unpersuasive. See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). There was,
however, direct evidence of Appellant’s guilt — his confession to his
former cellmate. Moreover,
to the extent [Appellant’s] conviction[ ] rest[s] on circumstantial evidence, this evidence “need not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it must rule out only those that are reasonable.” And it is principally for the jury to determine whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable.
Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 781, 783 (822 SE2d 203) (2018) (citations and
footnote omitted). When viewed properly in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above
was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See
also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for
the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’” (citation omitted)).
2. Appellant contends that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial was violated. We are unable to properly consider this claim at
this time, however, because the trial court failed to make the
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(a) Appellant was arrested on December 22, 2014, and his trial
began 32 months later on August 28, 2017. Among other events
occurring in the case, during the initial 24 months after Appellant’s
arrest, his first attorney apparently filed a pre-indictment
constitutional speedy trial demand, on which the trial court appears
never to have ruled; counsel filed a statutory speedy trial demand,
which was struck as untimely; there were several calendar calls at
which discovery and other issues were discussed; and Appellant’s
counsel requested two continuances on the ground that the State
had failed to provide timely discovery, which the trial court granted.
In December 2016, Appellant’s first attorney suffered a debilitating
stroke, and a medical leave of absence until April 1, 2017 was
requested on his behalf. Appellant spoke up at several of the hearings to tell the court that he opposed delays and wanted a trial
as soon as possible.
On March 1, 2017, through a new lawyer, Appellant filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. At a hearing on May 12,
Appellant testified about the difficult conditions of his pretrial
confinement, and his counsel proffered that an anticipated defense
witness had died; the trial court orally denied the motion to dismiss.
The trial began three-and-a-half months later. In his amended
motion for new trial, Appellant asserted a constitutional speedy trial
violation, along with other claims. At the hearing on the motion in
April 2018, Appellant and both of his attorneys testified, but there
was no argument and the trial court made no oral comments about
the speedy trial claim. The court denied the motion by summary
order on July 12, 2018.
(b) To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to
a speedy trial was violated, the trial court must first consider
whether the length of time between the defendant’s arrest and trial “is sufficiently long to be considered ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ If
not, the speedy trial claim fails at the threshold.” State v. Pickett,
288 Ga. 674, 675 (706 SE2d 561) (2011) (citation and punctuation
omitted). A one-year delay is typically presumed to be prejudicial.
Id.
If the presumptive-prejudice threshold is crossed, the trial
court must consider the following four Barker factors: “(1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Johnson
v. State, 300 Ga. 252, 257 (794 SE2d 60) (2016) (citing Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and
Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 651 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d
520) (1992)). This “second stage of the constitutional speedy trial
analysis requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process and necessarily compels them to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Pickett, 288 Ga. at 675 (citations and
punctuation omitted).
Because of the fact-intensive nature of speedy trial analysis, and because the trial court’s resulting ruling is reviewed on appeal
for abuse of discretion, we have explained that it is “imperative” that
“the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
consistent with Barker.” Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 430-
431 (704 SE2d 786) (2011). “Absent such findings, there is no
exercise of discretion for this Court to review.” Id. at 431. See also
Pickett, 288 Ga. at 679-680 (“It is not the job of the appellate
court . . . to weigh the Barker factors in the first instance.”).
(c) In its brief oral ruling denying Appellant’s pretrial motion
to dismiss the indictment, the trial court said that the pretrial delay
“might have been three or four months beyond the presumptive
appropriate time”; that although the State had been ready for trial
since April 2016, Appellant’s first attorney requested two
continuances (which Appellant disagreed with) and then became ill;
and that “the totality of the circumstances places the delay with”
Appellant’s first attorney. The court concluded that “most of the
delay in this case has been or appears to the Court to be delay that
rests I think more heavily with the defense and not with the State, and I am going to deny your motion to dismiss at this point.” The
court did not mention or make any findings about Appellant’s
assertion of his right to a speedy trial or prejudice to the defense
from the delay, and the court never entered an order on the motion
making findings and conclusions or even referring to what it had
said at the hearing. Later, the court failed to make any findings or
conclusions at the motion for new trial hearing or in the summary
order denying Appellant’s motion and its speedy trial claim.
Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s order and remand
the case “for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of
fact and conclusions of law [on the speedy trial claim].” Johnson, 300
Ga. at 252. See also, e.g., Leopold v. State, 324 Ga. App. 550, 558
(751 SE2d 184) (2013); Cawley v. State, 324 Ga. App. 358, 360 (750
SE2d 428) (2013). In doing so, we express no opinion about the
merits of Appellant’s post-trial speedy trial claim or the limited
findings the trial court announced regarding Appellant’s motion to
dismiss the indictment.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except Bethel, J.,
disqualified.
Decided June 3, 2019.
Murder. Gwinnett Superior Court. Before Judge Turner.
Ramón Alvarado; Richard C. Armond, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lee F. Tittsworth, Daryl E.
Manns, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B.
Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.