GOFF v. STATE BAR

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RYAN C. GOFF, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, et al., Respondents/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0208

FILED 09-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2025-036469

The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ryan C. Goff, Phoenix Petitioner/Appellant

State Bar of Arizona, Phoenix By James D. Lee Counsel for Respondents/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

Decision of the Court

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 After investigating an allegation that Ryan C. Goff had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”), the State Bar of Arizona (the “State Bar”) notified Goff by letter that the investigation was being closed. The letter also informed Goff that the “investigation into the matter will remain a matter of public record unless the superior court enters a protective order[.]” Goff then petitioned for the entry of a protective order, asking the superior court to “direct[]” the “removal of the file from public records.” The superior court denied his petition. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 A business entity jointly owned by Goff and his sister filed a lawsuit against a third party in superior court. Although he is not a licensed attorney, Goff participated in the lawsuit on behalf of the entity. Concluding that Goff had performed legal services without a license, the assigned judge referred the matter to the State Bar.

¶3 After conducting a UPL investigation, counsel for the State Bar sent Goff a letter in April 2025 informing him that the State Bar had dismissed the charge.1 According to counsel’s letter, the State Bar determined that Goff had, in fact, “engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” In light of its determination, however, that he “did not engage in the practice of law as a business,” and instead was “attempting to assist [his] sister and a business [they] co-owned,” the State Bar decided to dismiss the charge with “an educational comment” informing Goff that “an owner of [a] company may not represent [a] company in legal proceedings unless s/he is an attorney or legal paraprofessional.” The letter concluded by stating that the investigation “will remain a matter of public record unless a superior court enters a protective order pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 80(b)(6).”

¶4 Goff petitioned for a protective order to require the State Bar to “remov[e]” the file “from public records,” alleging that the “[r]etention” of the file, “despite no misconduct finding, imposes continuing harm . . . and undermines his professional reputation.” Goff further argued that making the file available to the public “violates due process” and “[e]qual [p]rotection.” Finally, Goff alleged that the retention of the file “[v]iolates

1 A “charge” is “any allegation or other information of misconduct or incapacity that comes to the attention of the state bar.” Ariz. R. S. Ct. 46(h)(4).

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the [Americans with Disabilities Act]” in light of his “documented disabilities” and “need for accommodation.” In a later filing, he disputed the State Bar’s assertion that he is a “nonlawyer,” insisting that he was an “Accredited Representative” of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and was authorized to “represent clients in immigration proceedings.”

¶5 The State Bar opposed Goff’s petition, and the superior court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on January 14, 2026.

¶6 Before the hearing, the State Bar moved the court to take judicial notice of the EOIR’s roster of accredited representatives as of January 12, 2026, on which Goff’s name did not appear. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201. Goff opposed the State Bar’s motion, arguing that it “improperly seeks to substitute administrative rosters for jurisdictional analysis, ignores federal preemption, and mischaracterizes [his] federally protected activities.” Although the record does not contain a transcript of the January 14 evidentiary hearing, the minute entry from the hearing reflects that the superior court granted the State Bar’s motion and took judicial notice of the EOIR roster.

¶7 After the hearing, the court issued a ruling denying Goff’s petition. In so ruling, the court found that although the UPL charge was dismissed, the State Bar “did in fact make an adverse finding” that Goff “engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.” “A dismissal,” the court noted, “is not the same as an exoneration.” The court further found that Goff presented no evidence that the State Bar’s retention of the UPL file constituted “extraordinary or inequitable treatment” or that failing to seal the file would cause him “irreparable injury.” Denying all requested relief, the superior court entered final judgment.

¶8 Goff timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Goff argues that the court erred in denying his petition for a protective order to remove his UPL investigation file from the public record.2

2 In his opening brief, Goff contends that he merely requested the “[t]emporary sealing” of “portions” of the State Bar’s file. This assertion is

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¶10 This Court reviews “the interpretation of a court rule de novo and according to the principles of statutory interpretation.” Goldman v. Sahl, 248 Ariz. 512, 522, ¶ 29 (App. 2020). We review a ruling on a protective order for an abuse of discretion. Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Ass'n, 244 Ariz. 228, 233, ¶ 22 (App. 2018). A court “abuse[s] its discretion if it commit[s] an error of law in formulating its ruling.” Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, 107, ¶ 9 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). “We defer to the court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Advantage Pool & Spa Plumbing, Inc. v. Miles, 261 Ariz. 509, 512, ¶ 8 (App. 2026) (citation omitted).

¶11 Authority to regulate the practice of law in Arizona is vested in the Arizona Supreme Court. Scheehle v. Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Ariz., 211 Ariz. 282, 290, ¶ 29 (2005). The procedure governing UPL proceedings is set forth in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona (the “Supreme Court Rules”). Ariz. R. S. Ct. 75(a). Rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona (“Rule”) 80(b) provides that records of dismissed UPL cases are generally “open to the public.” Ariz. R. S. Ct. 70, 80(b)(1)(A). Subsection 6 of Rule 80(b) provides, however, that “[u]pon motion by a party . . . and for good cause shown, the superior court . . . may order that a portion of the . . . state bar file be sealed[.]” Ariz. R. S. Ct. 80(b)(6).

¶12 Goff argues that the superior court did not properly evaluate his petition under the standards set forth in Rule 80(b)(6). Specifically, he contends that the court “failed to properly evaluate irreparable harm.” But the minute entry reflects that the court found that Goff failed to establish that the failure to seal the file would cause “irreparable injury.” Because Goff has not provided us with a transcript of the hearing, we must presume that the evidence presented at the hearing supports the court’s ruling. See McGlothlin v. Astrowsky in and for County of Maricopa, 255 Ariz. 449, 460, ¶ 35 (App. 2023) (“A party is responsible for making certain the record on appeal contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised on appeal. When a party fails to include necessary items, we assume they would support the court’s findings and conclusions.” (citation omitted)).

¶13 In any event, Rule 80(b)(6) does not require a court to consider “irreparable harm” in determining whether to seal a file. Instead, the rule

not consistent with his petition, which made no request that the sealing be “temporary” or that only “portions” of the file be sealed. On the contrary, the petition flatly asked the court to order the State Bar to “remove File No. 24-1582” — i.e., the entire file — from public view and “expunge” it.

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provides that a court may order that a file be sealed upon a showing of “good cause.” Although the Supreme Court Rules do not define the term “good cause,” the determination of good cause is a fact-intensive, casespecific inquiry. Cf. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 531, 536, ¶ 20 (App. 2015) (noting that while the Indian Child Welfare Act does not define “good cause,” “good cause is ultimately a matter of discretion, which is to be exercised in light of myriad factors specific to a given case.”) (citation modified). Goff thus bears the burden of establishing specific facts and circumstances to warrant sealing the file from public view. Ariz. R. S. Ct. 80(b)(6) (providing that a sealing order may be entered “for good cause shown”); see also Center for Auto Safety v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 247 Ariz. 567, 572, ¶ 20 (App. 2019) (“A party asserting good cause [for entry of a protective order] bears the burden, for each document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” (citations omitted)).

¶14 Goff has wholly failed to make the required showing. In his opening brief, he asserts that the court’s “denial of injunctive or protective relief” has allowed the “[c]ontinued dissemination of unproven allegations,” causing “[o]ngoing reputational and professional damage,” “[o]ngoing exclusion and prejudice,” and “[i]nterference with professional opportunities.” His opening brief, however, is devoid of references to the record and identifies no factual support for his arguments. He does not identify, for example, any evidence of “reputational” harm, nor does he explain how he purportedly suffered “exclusion and prejudice.” Likewise, Goff does not identify any “professional opportunities” that have been denied him. Goff’s conclusory assertions fail to establish any prejudice from the denial of his petition to seal the UPL file. Center for Auto Safety, 247 Ariz. at 572, ¶ 20 (“Broad allegations of harm will not suffice.” (citations omitted)). And although Goff complains that the court “fail[ed] to consider relevant factors,” he does not identify any specific factors that the court purportedly failed to consider. In the absence of a transcript, we have no basis for second-guessing the court’s determination. McGlothlin, 255 Ariz. at 460, ¶ 35; see Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 108, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2005) (“In the absence of a transcript, an appellate court will presume that the record supports the trial court’s rulings.”).

¶15 In his briefing, Goff cites Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) for the proposition that “reputational harm becomes actionable when coupled with a tangible deprivation.” In Paul, Davis, an accused-but-not-convicted criminal defendant brought claims against police officers who publicly identified him as an “active shoplifter,” asserting that they violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

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and 42 U.S. 1983. In rejecting his argument, the United States Supreme Court held that although Davis stated a viable claim for defamation under state law, he had identified “no specific constitutional guarantee” that the police officers purportedly “invaded.” Id. at 699, 700. Injury to reputation alone, the Paul court held, does not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property. Id. at 709, 712. In so holding, the Court distinguished case law recognizing constitutional claims in circumstances in which, for example, a government entity’s designation of certain organizations as “Communist” cost members of those organizations their jobs and harmed their employment prospects. See id. at 703-04. Paul thus stands for the proposition that a state actor’s stigmatizing designation of an individual may support a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights if the designation is coupled with a deprivation of federally-protected liberty or property interests. See Chaudhry v. Aragon, 68 F.4th 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Paul for the proposition that “[a]lthough . . . damage to reputation—without more—is insufficient to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a ‘stigma-plus’ due process claim may lie where reputation harm is accompanied by some additional deprivation of liberty or property.” (citations omitted)).

¶16 Because Goff has never asserted a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights, and because he cites to no evidence in the record suggesting that he suffered any “reputational harm,” much less an accompanying “deprivation” of liberty or property, Paul does not aid Goff in this appeal.

¶17 Goff also cites Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), for the proposition that “state action cannot interfere with federally authorized conduct.” In Sperry, a Florida state court enjoined Sperry, a practitioner registered to practice before the United States Patent Office, from “holding himself out” as “an attorney” or “engaging in the practice of law.” Id. at 382. Vacating the state court’s order, the United States Supreme Court held federal law governing the practice of law before the Patent Office preempted conflicting state licensing requirements. Id. at 384-85.

¶18 Because Goff cites no evidence that he is authorized to practice law before any federal agency, nor any evidence that the State Bar’s retention of the UPL investigation file otherwise interferes with any federally authorized activity, Sperry provides no support to Goff’s position.

¶19 In his briefing, Goff suggests that the court’s denial of his petition infringed on rights protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. According to Goff, “state-

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law restrictions cannot be applied in a manner that nullifies” the rights of “parents participating in IDEA proceedings.” Goff does not explain the IDEA’s relevance to this case, or the basis for his contention that the court’s ruling somehow “nullified” the rights of “parents.” Further, nothing in the record suggests that Goff presented this argument in the superior court. We therefore do not address it. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995) (declining to consider “issues raised for the first time on appeal” and arguments “insufficient[ly]” developed “for appellate review.”).

¶20 In his reply brief, Goff argues, for the first time, that the court erred in denying his petition without “conduct[ing] the balancing required by [Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure] 65.” Because Goff did not raise this argument in his opening brief, we will not address it. See Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 111, ¶ 91 (App. 2007) (“We will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief.”).

¶21 Because Goff has failed to establish any error in the court’s denial of his petition, he is entitled to no relief.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm. The State Bar may recover its costs upon its compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR