Godfrey v. Queen City Coach Co.

159 S.E. 412, 201 N.C. 264, 1931 N.C. LEXIS 220

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: July 2, 1931
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stagy, O. J.

The discretionary power of the Superior Court to set aside the verdict in this case was not invoked, either at the trial term or following the first appeal here. Compare Allen v. Gooding, 174 N. C., 271, 93 S. E., 740; Lancaster v. Bland, 168 N. C., 377, 84 S. E., 529. The only point presented is the legal sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury.

The defendant’s evidence, standing alone, would seem to bring the case within the decision in Burke v. Coach Co., 198 N. C., 8, 150 S. E., 636. But viewing the plaintiff’s evidence with the liberality required on demurrer, we think the question of proximate cause was one for the jury under the principles announced in Earwood v. R. R., 192 N. C., 27, 133 S. E., 180; Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C., 429, 130 S. E., 5; White v. Realty Co., 182 N. C., 536, 109 S. E., 564; Taylor v. Lumber Company, 173 N. C., 112, 91 S. E., 719.

It is provided by O. S., 2621(46), N. O. Code, 1927, that “Any person driving a vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater than is reasonable and proper,” etc. Then follows an enumeration of certain rates of speed at given places, which, if exceeded, shall be deemed violations of the statute, the one here pertinent being as follows: “Eifteen miles an hour in traversing or going around curves or traversing a grade upon a highway when the driver’s view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet along such highway in the direction in which he is proceeding.” It is also provided in said section that “no* person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person.” S. v. Rountree, 181 N. C., 535, 106 S. E., 669.

The violation of a statute, intended and designed to prevent injury to persons or property, or the failure to observe a positive safety requirement of the law, is, under a uniform line of decisions, negligence per se. Dickey v. R. R., 196 N. C., 726, 147 S. E., 15; Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C., 125, 81 S. E., 1066. And when a violation or failure of this kind is admitted or established, it is ordinarily a question for the jury to determine whether such negligence is the proximate cause of the injury. Stultz v. Thomas, 182 N. C., 470, 109 S. E., 361.

Of course, if the negligence of the driver of the Godfrey car were the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s intestate’s death, the defendant would not be liable. Herman v. R. R., 197 N. C., 718, 150 S. E., 361. But if the defendant’s negligence were the proximate cause, or one of the proximate causes, of plaintiff’s intestate’s death, then the defendant would be liable. Wood v. Public Service Corp., 174 N. C., 697, 94 S. E., 459. Upon this theory, the case was properly submitted to the jury. The verdict and judgment will be upheld.

No error.