Goddard v. County of Contra Costa

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 31, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-02910
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 THOMAS J. GODDARD, Case No. 25-cv-02910-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IFP STATUS; 10 v. SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT; AND DENYING 11 COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al., APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 Defendants.

13 Plaintiff Thomas Goddard filed a pro se complaint and application to proceed in 14 forma pauperis. See Compl. (dkt. 1); IFP App. (dkt. 5). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) authorizes 15 the Court to permit a plaintiff to file a federal lawsuit without prepayment of fees or 16 security so long as the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he is unable to pay the 17 fees or give security. Goddard states that his only income consists of $5,000 in monthly 18 disability payments and that he has no assets, yet he has $5,650 in monthly expenses 19 between rent, utilities, car insurance, car payments, phone payments, and credit card 20 payments.1 IFP App. ¶¶ 1, 5, 8. Based on this information, the Court finds that Goddard 21 has demonstrated that he is unable to pay the filing fee and GRANTS his IFP application. 22 The IFP statute further requires the Court to screen Goddard’s complaint and 23 dismiss the case if, among other things, the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 24 state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court holds 25 that Goddard’s claims are barred by the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 26 1 Though Goddard’s assertion that he has car payments and car insurance seems to 27 contradict his assertion that he has no assets (including a car), compare IFP App. ¶ 5 with 1 37 (1971), and accordingly dismisses Goddard’s complaint for failure to state a claim on 2 which relief can be granted. See Matava v. CTPPS, LLC, 2022 WL 462396, at *6 (D. 3 Conn. Feb. 15, 2022) (dismissing action filed in forma pauperis on basis of Younger 4 abstention); Ysais v. Children Youth & Fam. Dep’t, 353 F. App’x 159, 161 (10th Cir. 5 2009) (affirming dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) on basis of Younger abstention); cf. 6 Telles v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2024 WL 3996566, at *3–5 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 7 2024) (affirming dismissal under PLRA on basis of Younger abstention). 8 Abstention under the Younger doctrine is appropriate if a state criminal action (1) is 9 ongoing, (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity 10 to raise constitutional challenges, as long as (4) “the federal action would have the 11 practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 12 1037, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The Younger doctrine applies equally to 13 claims brought under federal statutes as to federal constitutional claims. See New Orleans 14 Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989) 15 (“There is no greater federal interest in enforcing the supremacy of federal statutes than in 16 enforcing the supremacy of explicit constitutional guarantees.”). 17 Here, although Goddard does not clearly identify the topic of the proceedings in 18 state court, his filings make clear that it is a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., TRO App. 19 (dkt. 7) ¶ 3(a); Compl. ¶¶ 51–59. The proceeding is ongoing, with trial set for April 7, 20 2025. Compl. ¶ 4. Enforcement of criminal laws is “important and necessary.” NOPSI, 21 491 U.S. at 365; see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 345 (1977) (“Pending state 22 criminal proceedings have always been viewed as paradigm cases involving paramount 23 state interests.”). And the Supreme Court instructs that federal courts “should assume that 24 state procedures will afford an adequate remedy” for a state-court defendant to vindicate 25 their federal constitutional rights “in the absence of unambiguous authority to the 26 contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). “[T]he burden on this 27 point rests on the federal plaintiff to show ‘that state procedural law barred presentation of 1 And Goddard’s requested relief would effectively enjoin the state proceedings 2 against him. He seeks a temporary restraining order staying the April 7 trial date, which 3 would literally enjoin the state proceedings. TRO App. ¶ 3(a). As for his requests that 4 Defendants take various steps to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, hold an 5 “immediate hearing” on his request for mental health diversion, and provide him with 6 purported exculpatory information, see id. ¶ 3(b), (d); Emergency Hearing Req. (dkt. 6) at 7 7–8; that would likewise interfere with the ongoing state proceedings. See O’Shea v. 8 Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (Younger abstention proper where plaintiff sought a 9 federal court injunction to control or prevent certain aspects of state criminal trials); Joseph 10 A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002) (“federal court oversight 11 of state court operations, even if not framed as direct review of state court judgments, may 12 nevertheless be problematic for Younger purposes”). His requests for declaratory relief 13 and damages fare no better. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (“no relevant 14 difference” between declaratory and injunctive relief for Younger analysis); Gilbertson v. 15 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (request for damages “would have 16 the same practical effect on the state proceedings as the injunctive relief condemned in 17 Younger and the declaratory relief constrained in Samuels”). 18 Lastly, Goddard’s case does not present the kind of extraordinary circumstances 19 that would warrant federal interference in state criminal proceedings. As one court put it: 20 “Defendants in state criminal proceedings routinely allege that some aspect of their arrest, 21 detention, or prosecution violates their constitutional rights, which makes this a regular 22 occurrence, not an extraordinary circumstance.” Telles, 2024 WL 3996566, at *5. 23 At bottom, Goddard’s claims are “reserved by the Younger doctrine to the state 24 judiciary, with review (if appropriate) by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 25 Milchtein v. Chisholm, 880 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2018). This Court has no role to play. 26 The Court therefore DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the claims for injunctive and 27 declaratory relief and STAYS the damages claims until the termination of litigation in 1 doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court also DENIES Goddard’s 2 application for a temporary restraining order. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: March 31, 2025 CHARLES R. BREYER 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27