GNC Community Federal Credit Union v. Stefano (In Re Stefano)

134 B.R. 824, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 98, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1836, 1991 WL 273840
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 20, 1991
Docket19-20307
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 134 B.R. 824 (GNC Community Federal Credit Union v. Stefano (In Re Stefano)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GNC Community Federal Credit Union v. Stefano (In Re Stefano), 134 B.R. 824, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 98, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1836, 1991 WL 273840 (Pa. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION 1

WARREN W. BENTZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

Background

This matter is before the Court on GNC Community Federal Credit Union’s (“GNC”) Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay (“Motion”).

GNC asserts that 1) Michael J. Stefano and Jacque A. Stefano (the “Debtors”) have no equity in their residence, the property which secures GNC’s debt; 2) the Debtors have failed to remit regular monthly payments; 3) the Debtors have failed to adequately protect GNC’s interest by either reaffirming the debt, surrendering the collateral or redeeming the collateral; and 4) the filing of a petition in bank *825 ruptcy constitutes a default under the terms of the mortgage.

The Debtors respond that 1) language in the mortgage providing for default purely for the reason of a bankruptcy filing is not enforceable; 2) the value of the collateral is $25,000 and the balance due to GNC is $24,000, thus there is equity in the property; 3) the Debtors have tendered monthly payments which GNC refuses to accept; 4) there is no requirement that the Debtors reaffirm the debt, or surrender or redeem the collateral; and 5) so long as the regular payments under the mortgage are current, the Debtors may retain the property and continue making the installment payments.

After a hearing on May 2, 1991, we afforded the parties an opportunity to file briefs. Upon review of the record of this case, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we will deny GNC’s motion.

Facts

The Debtors filed a voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on November 14, 1990. The Debtors are owners as tenants by the entireties of a parcel of real estate located at 829 Vogan Street, New Castle, Pennsylvania (the “Property”) which serves as their personal residence.

The Debtors list the fair market value of the Property as $25,000 and also list a first mortgage (the “Mortgage”) debt on the Property to GNC in the amount of $24,000. GNC fails to allege a value for the Property or even state the balance which they believe is due on the Mortgage. Rather, they vaguely assert that the Mortgage balance is in excess of $24,000 and that the Debtors have no equity in the Property. The Debtors claim an exemption in the equity in the Property.

On the Statement of Intention attached to their Bankruptcy Petition, the Debtors indicate that they will reaffirm the Mortgage debt. The Debtors have subsequently refused to execute a Reaffirmation Agreement and have refused to abandon or surrender the Property.

Instead, the Debtors have tendered checks to GNC in an amount sufficient to bring the obligation current and to maintain the regularly scheduled monthly payments. GNC refuses to accept payments from the Debtors without the execution of a Reaffirmation Agreement.

While GNC’s Motion was pending, the Court entered a Discharge Order on March 26, 1991. Thus, the Debtors have been relieved of their personal liability on the obligation to GNC.

Issues

1. Whether Debtors are finally and conclusively bound by their Statement of Intention filed under 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).

2. Whether a debtor who is current on his obligation to a secured creditor may retain possession of the collateral securing the debt following the entry of a discharge order in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding without reaffirmation of the debt or redemption of the collateral.

3. Whether a mortgageholder may foreclose a mortgage on a Chapter 7 Debtor’s residence where the only default is that the Debtor has filed for bankruptcy.

Discussion

I. Whether Debtor is bound by Statement of Intention.

11 U.S.C. § 521(2) provides:

(2) if an individual debtor’s schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the estate—
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
*826 (B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debt- or’s or the trustee’s rights with regard to such property under this title.

The purpose of requiring a debtor to file a Statement of Intention is to provide a secured creditor with knowledge of the debtor’s intentions concerning the collateral and to facilitate speedy resolution of debt compromise and repayment without abrogating the substantive rights of the debtor. In re Elicker, 100 B.R. 180 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1989); In re Barriger, 61 B.R. 506 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1986); In re Eagle, 51 B.R. 959 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1985). A Statement of Intention which indicates a debtor’s desire to reaffirm is not the same thing as reaffirming the debt itself pursuant to the stringent provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). In re Johnson, 114 B.R. 799 (Bankr.D.Dist.Col.1990).

A reaffirmation agreement is a negotiated and fully voluntary agreement by both the debtor and creditor. In re Chavarria, 117 B.R. 582, 583 n. 2 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990). The Court cannot compel the parties to enter into such a contract. Id.

Thus, the Debtors’ Statement of Intention merely states an intent to negotiate a reaffirmation. Such a voluntarily negotiated agreement might not be reached. Therefore, the Debtors cannot be conclusively bound by their Statement of Intention and be compelled to execute a Reaffirmation Agreement.

II. Retaining the collateral absent redemption or reaffirmation.

GNC asserts that § 521(2) provides that the only options available to the Debt- or are to surrender the Property; redeem the Property; or reaffirm the debt. The Debtors assert that they are not limited to the options in § 521 and may instead choose to remain current on their monthly installment payments and retain possession of the Property without reaffirmation of the debt.

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Bluebook (online)
134 B.R. 824, 26 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 98, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1836, 1991 WL 273840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gnc-community-federal-credit-union-v-stefano-in-re-stefano-pawb-1991.