Glovebox Technologies Inc. v. Da Cruz

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedMay 11, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-01420
StatusUnknown

This text of Glovebox Technologies Inc. v. Da Cruz (Glovebox Technologies Inc. v. Da Cruz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glovebox Technologies Inc. v. Da Cruz, (S.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 GLOVEBOX TECHNOLOGIES INC., Case No.: 22-cv-1420-AGS-BLM 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 6) AND CLOSING 5 v. CASE 6 Ricardo DA CRUZ, Complete Auto 7 Reports, LLC, 8 Defendants. 9 10 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s trademark case, arguing this Court lacks 11 personal jurisdiction and is an inappropriate venue. Because plaintiff cannot meet the venue 12 requirements, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. 13 BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff Glovebox Technologies, Inc., owns registered trademarks in a couple 15 iterations of “ELECTRONIC GLOVE BOX” that it uses in connection with its mobile app, 16 social media, and websites. (ECF 1, at 4–5.) Defendants Ricardo Da Cruz and Complete 17 Auto Reports, LLC, run their own mobile app under the “DIGITAL GLOVEBOX” mark. 18 (Id. at 6.) After being alerted of plaintiff’s accusation that “DIGITAL GLOVEBOX” 19 infringes its trademark, defendants requested that Google and Apple eject plaintiff from 20 their app stores. (Id.; ECF 8, at 9.) Plaintiff then sued, alleging trademark infringement and 21 violations of California’s Unfair Competition statutes. (See generally ECF 1.) 22 Plaintiff is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Colorado, although it 23 contends that it has “employees located in and/or conducting business in Southern 24 California.” (Id. at 2.) Defendants dwell in New Jersey: Da Cruz resides there, and 25 Complete Auto Reports is incorporated and has its principal place of business there. (Id. 26 at 2–3; ECF 6-3, at 3–4.) Defendants claim to have no business contacts with California, 27 other than the fact that the app is available in app stores offered by Google and Apple, both 28 1 of which reside in California. (See ECF 6-3, at 3–4.) So defendants have moved to dismiss 2 this case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (See generally ECF 6.) 3 DISCUSSION 4 A. Venue 5 For trademark cases, suit may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial 6 part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of 7 property that is the subject of the action is situated.”1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Plaintiff 8 claims it meets that venue requirement because defendants “have two significant contacts 9 in California, Apple and Google.” (ECF 8, at 18.) And plaintiff points out that defendants 10 complained “to both entities” to have them take down plaintiff’s app. (Id.) 11 None of which satisfies the venue statute. Venue may only lie in the Southern 12 District of California if this judicial district is home to a substantial part of the relevant 13 “events or omissions” or to a substantial part of the relevant “property that is the subject of 14 the action.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Although both parties agree that Apple and Google 15 reside in California, no one credibly asserts these companies are based within this judicial 16 district. Both instead reside in the Northern District of California. See, e.g., GPNE Corp. 17 v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV 11-00426 SOM-RLP, 2012 WL 12909911, at *5 (D. Haw. 18 May 10, 2012) (“Apple resides . . . in the Northern District of California.”); In re Ex Parte 19 Application of Colegio Americano de Guatemala, No. 16-MC-80261-HRL, 2016 WL 20 7325033, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (“Google resides . . . within the Northern District 21 of California.”). Nor did a “substantial part of the events” regarding this claim arise in this 22 district. Plaintiff accuses these New Jersey defendants of improperly influencing 23

24 25 1 Plaintiff does not rely on another provision of the venue statute that establishes venue in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents 26 of the State in which the district is located.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). And with good 27 reason. Even if Complete Auto Reports resided in this district for venue purposes, it is undisputed that defendant Da Cruz is a New Jersey resident. Thus, plaintiff cannot show 28 1 companies in the Northern District of California, not the Southern District. See 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1391(b)(2). In short, plaintiff offers no evidence that any part of the trademark or 3 California claims have a connection to this district. 4 Because venue is improper here and “dispositive” of the motion to dismiss, the Court 5 need not consider the request to dismiss for “lack of personal jurisdiction.” See Jezign 6 Licensing, LLC v. Maxima Apparel Corp., No. 20-CV-1438-JLS (AGS), 2021 WL 7 3493294, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2021). 8 B. Remedy 9 We now turn to the remedy. The Court may dismiss or “if it be in the interest of 10 justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Ninth Circuit “has taken a broad view of when transfer is 12 appropriate, recognizing that normally transfer will be in the interest of justice.” Amity 13 Rubberized Pen Co. v. Mkt. Quest Grp. Inc., 793 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015). This is so 14 to avoid punishing a plaintiff who was “unaware of or confused about the proper forum in 15 which to file their action.” Id. (alteration omitted). By contrast, transfer is less appropriate 16 when a plaintiff has chosen “not to bring the action in a proper district in the first instance.” 17 Trout v. Cnty. of Madera, No. 21-CV-06061-PJH, 2022 WL 2490410, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 18 6, 2022). 19 Dismissal is appropriate here. Plaintiff offers no colorable justification for filing in 20 this district, instead relying on contacts with a completely different judicial district.2 See 21 Jezign Licensing, 2021 WL 3493294, at *3. Plaintiff avoided filing in New Jersey, the 22 Northern District of California, or even in Colorado in preference for a district that clearly 23 24 2 For the same reason, plaintiff’s request for venue discovery is denied. See Resh, 25 Inc. v. Skimlite Mfg. Inc., No. 5:22-CV-01427-EJD, 2023 WL 2744423, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (denying venue discovery because, like here, it was “unsupported by 26 any suggestion that discovery would yield a different outcome or be anything more than a 27 fishing expedition”).

28 1 || lacks venue. See Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523 2 Cir. 1983). Finally, the parties sharply dispute which district this court should transfer 3 defendants argue that the District of New Jersey is the only proper venue while plaintiff 4 ||claims it’s the Northern District of California. And although “there is normally a strong 5 || presumption in favor of honoring the plaintiff's choice of forum,” Creative Tech., Ltd. v. 6 || Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 1995), it’s not clear to this Court that 7 ||merely offering an app or engaging in a complaint process through Google or Apple— 8 || which is not necessary for any of plaintiff's claims as alleged—is a “substantial part” of 9 || plaintiff's alleged claims. The one thing that is clear on the record before this Court is that 10 || this case doesn’t, and never did, belong here.

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Glovebox Technologies Inc. v. Da Cruz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glovebox-technologies-inc-v-da-cruz-casd-2023.