Gloria Flores v. Walmart, Inc. and Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 3, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-10412
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 O 3

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 GLORIA FLORES, Case No.: 2:25-cv-10412-MEMF-MAA

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 12 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL 13 WALMART, INC. and WAL-MART CERTIFICATION OF A COLLECTIVE ASSOCIATES, INC., ACTION [DKT. NO. 27] 14

15 Defendants.

16 17 18 19

20 Before the Court is the Amended Motion for Conditional Certification of a Collective Action 21 Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and Request to Send Court-Authorized Notice filed by Plaintiff 22 Gloria Flores. Dkt. No. 27. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT 23 PREJUDICE. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 / / / 2 I. Background 3 A. Factual Background1 4 The facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint are laid out in this Court’s Order Denying 5 Walmart’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 51. 6 For purposes of this motion, what is critical is that Flores alleges that Walmart—under its 7 Regular Rate Policy—did not pay her at the correct rate of pay for her overtime hours. Id. ¶ 23.She 8 alleges that in determining what rate of pay would be used to calculate her overtime pay, Walmart 9 improperly excluded a number of forms of compensation (or “additional remuneration”) that should 10 have properly been included. Id. ¶¶ 7, 24. This “additional remuneration” included categories of 11 compensation that Walmart labeled as follows: as “SCHED DECREASE,” “SCHED CHANGE,” 12 “INCTV FAC HOURLY,” “W+ MBR GROSS,” “REST BTWN SHIFT,” “Addtnl Pay,” “Covid-19 13 Pay,” “Retro Scdchng,” “Susp/Reas Susp,” and “Nonearnedpwetpmt.” Id. ¶¶ 24, 76.. 14 Flores’s principal allegation is that through this conduct, Walmart unlawfully fails to pay its 15 non-exempt, covered employees overtime wages “at rages not less than 1.5 times their regular rates 16 of pay”—based on all regular pay earned and all regular hours worked, “including hours worked ‘off 17 the clock.’” Id. ¶¶ 185, 195. 18 B. Procedural History 19 On January 8, 2026, Flores filed her First Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint. 20 See 1AC. It alleges the following claims against Walmart: 21 1. failure to pay overtime wages under FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216; 22 2. failure to pay overtime wages, in violation of California law, Cal. Lab. Code § 510; 23 3. failure to authorize, permit, and/or make available meal and rest periods in violation of 24 California law, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512; 25

26 1 The following factual allegations are derived from the allegations in Plaintiff’s operative First Amended Class and Collective Action Complaint, Dkt. No. 25 (“1AC”), unless otherwise indicated. For the purposes of this Motion, the 27 Court treats these factual allegations as true, but at this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no finding on the truth of these allegations, and is therefore not—at this stage—finding that they are true. 28 1 4. failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of California law, Cal. 2 Lab. Code § 226; and 3 5. waiting time penalties under California law, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201–203. 4 See 1AC. 5 On January 8, 2026, Flores filed the instant motion. Dkt. No. 27 (“Motion”). On January 22, 6 2026, Walmart filed a motion to dismiss portions of the first and second causes of action. Dkt. No. 7 32. This Court took Flores’s Motion off calendar and reset it for hearing on March 19, 2026. See 8 Dkt. No. 44. On March 5, 2026, this Court denied Walmart’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 51. 9 The Court found this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and vacated the 10 hearing set for March 19, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 11 II. Applicable Law 12 A. Conditional Certification 13 Under the FLSA, employees may file suit against their employers on behalf of “other 14 employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “A ‘collective action’ differs from a class action,” 15 in that collective action plaintiffs “must opt into the suit by ‘giv[ing] his consent in writing.’” 16 McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 17 216(b)). Section 216(b) “does not require district courts to approve or authorize notice to potential 18 plaintiffs.” Id. But it is “within the discretion of a district court” to authorize notice for potential 19 plaintiffs of a collective action. Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989). 20 “[E]mployees who may be similarly situated but have not opted-in to the action are not bound by its 21 conclusion, and may pursue their actions individually.” McElmurry, 495 F.3d at 1141. 22 Courts consider whether to conditionally certify a collective action “by way of a two-step 23 ‘certification’ process.” Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2018) 24 (quoting 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2.16 (14th ed. 2017)). At the first step, “plaintiffs will, at 25 some point around the pleading stage, move for ‘preliminary certification’ of the collective action, 26 contending that they have at least facially satisfied the ‘similarly situated’ requirement.” Id. “Later, 27 after the necessary discovery is complete, defendants will move for ‘decertification’ of the collective 28 1 action on the theory that the plaintiffs’ status as ‘similarly situated’ was not borne out by the fully 2 developed record.” Id. 3 Preliminary certification in the FLSA context does not “produce a class with an independent 4 legal status[ ] or join additional parties to the action.” Id. (citing Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 5 Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013)). “‘The sole consequence’ of a successful motion for preliminary 6 certification is ‘the sending of court-approved written notice’ to workers who may wish to join the 7 litigation as individuals.” Id. (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp., 569 U.S. at 75). 8 B. Notice Plans 9 The benefits of collective actions “depend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice 10 concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can make informed decisions about 11 whether to participate.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 173. “In the absence of any statutory 12 directive, the proper means of managing a collective action—[including] the form and timing of 13 notice . . . —is largely a question of ‘case management,’ and thus a subject of substantial judicial 14 discretion.” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174); see also 15 Busk v. Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 16 S. Ct. 513 (2014) (noting “that district courts should be able to ‘work[ ] out an adequate notice in 17 this type of case’” (quoting Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2011))). 18 III. Discussion 19 The parties dispute whether Flores meets the lenient standard, at this pre-discovery stage, for 20 certification of her collective action pursuant to Section 216(b). See Motion at 5–11; Opp. at 11–20. 21 The parties also disagree about whether Flores’s proposed notice is proper. See Motion at 12–17; 22 Opp. at 21–25. For the reasons below, this Court concludes that Flores has not sufficiently shown 23 that she is entitled to certification of her collective action, so the Motion is denied without prejudice 24 and this Court does not reach Flores’s proposed notice plan. 25 A. Flores does not meet the standard for certification of the proposed collective. 26 First, at issue is whether Flores has shown that her collective action should be certified. The 27 putative collective of similarly situated employees she proposes is defined as: 28 1 [ream]llu cnuerrraetniot na nadt faonrym teimr heo furrolmy W Oacltmobaerrt e2m9,p 2lo0y2e2e s(i i.ne. C, 3a lyifeoarrnsi ab ewfhoore e tahren efdil iandgd oitfi otnhaisl 2 Action) through final resolution of this Action (the “FLSA Collective Members”). 3 1AC ¶ 44. 4 At this stage, Flores asks this Court to make the “preliminary determination that the 5 collective as defined in the complaint satisfies the ‘similarly situated’ requirement of section 6 216(b).” Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1109. At this stage, the “level of consideration is lenient— 7 sometimes articulated as requiring substantial allegations, sometimes as turning on a reasonable 8 basis, but in any event loosely akin to a plausibility standard, commensurate with the stage of the 9 proceedings.” Id. (citation modified) (collecting cases). 10 Based on the parties’ briefing, Flores’s class appears to be impermissibly overbroad as 11 defined. Flores filed, along with her Motion, seven declarations from putative collective action 12 members. See Dkt. No. 27-1 (“Flores Decl.”); Dkt. No. 27-2 (“Hall Decl.”); Dkt No. 27-3 (“Nieblas 13 Decl.”); Dkt. No. 27-4 (“Patricio Decl.”); Dkt. No. 27-5 (“Clark Decl.”); Dkt. No. 27-6 (“Flethez 14 Decl.”); Dkt. No. 27-7 (“Espinoza Decl.”). These seven declarants worked across different Walmart- 15 owned stores, under different management. See Motion at 9. And they explain that they are similarly 16 situated. As Flores attests, some of the hours that she has worked are associated with pay codes that 17 are “generally paid at half of her base hourly rate of pay.” Flores Decl. ¶ 9. But the hours associated 18 with those pay codes “are not included in [her] total hours worked calculation.” Id. ¶ 10. To that end, 19 she notes that “Walmart does not include these additional categories of pay into [her] regular hourly 20 rate of pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay.” Id. ¶ 11. Flores’s Motion also references one 21 of her pay stubs as an example. See Dkt. No. 27-8. And the other declarants make substantially 22 similar allegations. See Hall Decl. ¶¶ 4–12; Nieblas Decl. ¶¶ 5–12; Patricio Decl. ¶¶ 5–12; Clark 23 Decl. ¶¶ 6–12; Flethez Decl. ¶¶ 4–11; Espinoza Decl. ¶¶ 4–10. To that end, based on the Motion and 24 the evidence it references, it appears plausible that the FLSA Collective Members are similarly 25 situated: The declarations offer reasonable basis to conclude that Walmart’s payment of additional 26 remuneration was not accounted for in overtime calculations, such that the seven declarants—and 27 those who similarly allege they are entitled to overtime that Walmart did not always award—are 28 similarly situated for the purposes of pursuing collective relief. 1 What Flores’s evidence does not do, however, is demonstrate that the entire FLSA collective, 2 as she has defined it, is similarly situated for the purposes of preliminary certification. Walmart 3 notes, in Opposition, the “obvious requirement that an overtime claim necessitates the working of 4 overtime.” Opp. at 12. And it notes that the proposed collective “mixes associates who received 5 additional remuneration [such as PTO or sick pay] and worked overtime with associates who never 6 worked overtime at all.” Id. at 12. And, based on the Complaint, it does appear to this Court that the 7 claimed basis for relief is predicated on the underpayment of overtime—so an employee who never 8 worked overtime is not similarly situated to Flores or the declarants. Indeed, all the declarations note 9 the underpayment of overtime as the basis for their membership in the collective action. But this is at 10 odds with Flores’s proposed definition of the collective, which is broadly defined as “hourly 11 Walmart employees in California who earned additional remuneration.” 1AC ¶ 44. In this context, 12 “additional remuneration” permits the inclusion of Walmart workers who never worked overtime, 13 and so have never been owed overtime pay. So Flores’s proposed evidence does not suffice to allege 14 that the broad proposed collective is, for the purposes of this action, similarly situated. 15 In Reply, Flores responds to Walmart by contending that this argument is a “red herring.” 16 Reply at 4. Flores argues that her Motion is “not aimed at PTO pay, sick pay, or bereavement pay,” 17 but instead, at “Walmart’s vague, non-descriptive pay codes calculated on a per-hour basis.” Id. But 18 this confirms, rather than defeats, Walmart’s argument. It does appear that Flores’s Motion intends 19 to target workers who were deprived of overtime pay to which they were entitled, but the class 20 definition seems to include workers who have never worked overtime at all. Walmart raises this in 21 Opposition, and Flores does not dispute it in Reply. See Opp. at 12. So, if Flores intends to proceed 22 with the definition as she has proposed it, more evidence would be required to demonstrate that 23 Walmart workers who have never received overtime pay are also, for purposes of this action, 24 “similarly situated.” In the alternative, if Flores intends to limit her collective action to certain forms 25 26 27 28 1 of additional remuneration that she asserts should have been included in the overtime calculation, 2 e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 63–64, 70, 73, then the definition should reflect that. 2 3 Also in Reply, Flores also proposes that Walmart’s objection, even if persuasive, should not 4 warrant denial of the Motion. She argues that “there’s a simple solution if employees try to opt-in 5 who only earned additional pay not at issue in this case: following review of their pay records to 6 confirm they did not receive the types of pay relevant to this case, they can be dismissed without 7 prejudice or Walmart can seek summary judgment.” Reply at 4. She cites several district court cases 8 for the proposition that overbreadth is permissible at the preliminary certification stage, particularly 9 as later stages—and the conclusion of discovery—offer an opportunity to narrow the collective 10 action where relevant. It is true that courts have found that “[t]he issue of whether the collective 11 includes some members not entitled to damages is best resolved at the second phase, with the benefit 12 of discovery, not the lenient first phase.” Saravia v. Dynamex, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 412, 424 (N.D. Cal. 13 2015). But it is nevertheless Flores’s burden to present a class that is plausibly similarly situated 14 upon filing a request for preliminary certification. See Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1110; see also Stanfield 15 v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 06-3892, 2006 WL 3190527, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2006) 16 (“The named Plaintiffs’ duties must be generally comparable to those they seek to represent, and it is 17 incumbent on Plaintiff to propose a class that is sufficiently defined and manageable from the 18 outset.”(internal quotation marks omitted)). And this Court is not inclined to conditionally certify a 19 collective action that is facially overbroad in the hopes that it can be clarified later—this would do a 20 disservice to the employees receiving the notice and is not in keeping with the letter or the spirit of 21 the FLSA. 22 Flores’ main persuasive authorities to the contrary appear either inapposite or factually 23 distinguishable. For example, Flores cites Greene v. Cascadia Healthcare, LLC, for the proposition 24 that “courts should refrain from making merit-based determinations or resolving factual disputes” at 25 26 2 The Court notes that Walmart makes two arguments: (1) the definition is overbroad because it includes employees who did not work overtime and (2) the definition is overbroad because it includes employees who 27 only received forms of additional remuneration that are not to be included in overtime. It appears that Flores agrees that there are some forms of additional remuneration that are properly excluded from overtime. See 28 Motion at 11. Should Flores choose to refine her definition, the Court expects that it will address both of these 1 this stage. No. 23-253, 2024 WL 4494902, at *3 (D. Idaho Oct. 15, 2024). And she notes that, 2 relative to the plaintiff in Greene, she has provided evidence that is more comprehensive and 3 detailed that her proposed collective is similarly situated. Reply at 3. But this Court does not deny 4 the Motion on the basis that Flores’s evidence is generally lacking. Instead, Flores’s evidence 5 appears adequate, but does not match the breadth of the proposed collective—as it only shows that a 6 subset of the proposed collective is similarly situated. Indeed, the proposed collectives in Greene 7 were more narrowly tailored. Id. at *4–*8. And there, as here, the court found that the plaintiff had 8 not provided sufficient evidence to show that one subset of her collective was similarly situated. See 9 id. at *8 (“Greene has failed to show that non-patient-care workers are similarly situated. Despite 10 seeking an employee-wide collective, Greene's complaint is based on her experience as a patient- 11 facing RN, and all the supporting declarations are from employees with patient-care 12 responsibilities.”). In Greene, this finding led the Court to partially grant the motion and narrow the 13 noticed collective on its own motion; here, this Court is denying Flores’s Motion without prejudice 14 so that she may either narrow the proposed collective or offer additional evidence for certification of 15 her proposed collective. 16 Flores also cites Fulton v. Bayou Well Services LLC for the proposition that her evidence is 17 more numerous and detailed than is required for preliminary certification. 208 F. Supp. 3d 798 (N.D. 18 Tex. 2016). Again, this misses the mark. “The Fulton Plaintiffs ask[ed] the court to conditionally 19 certify a class consisting of ‘all hourly paid workers who received a safety bonus or “non-revenue” 20 pay who worked for Bayou Well Services, LLC from June 16, 2013 to the present.’” Id. at 802 21 (emphasis added). “And, because the Fulton Plaintiffs [sought] conditional certification only for 22 current and former hourly-paid employees who received nondiscretionary bonus or ‘nonrevenue’ 23 pay in the past three years, whom the policies at issue affect, the Court [found] their request 24 reasonable in scope.” Id. at 802–03. In other words, there did not appear to be a mismatch between 25 the evidence offered and the certification sought. 26 In sum, Flores has presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that some subset of her 27 proposed collective is similarly situated. But the definition as proposed is either overbroad or not 28 sufficiently shown to be similarly situated. To that end, though overbreadth does not necessarily 1 | require the denial of preliminary certification of collective action, the class as defined likely includes 2 || many for whom Flores has made no showing of similarity. So Flores has not met her burden. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that the Motion is DENIED. This 5 || denial is without prejudice; Flores may amend her collective action’s definition and renew her 6 || request. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 --

10 Dated: June 3, 2026. 1] MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28