ZINTER, Justice.
[¶ 1.] Scott Gloe’s parents were struck and killed by an automobile. Gloe’s [240]*240parents did not reside in his household, they were not insured under his auto policy, and neither Gloe nor his covered automobile was involved in the accident. Nevertheless, Gloe asserted a wrongful death claim under the underinsured motorist (UIM) provision of his auto policy with Iowa Mutual. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment determining that there was no UIM coverage for Gloe’s claim, and he appeals. We affirm because (1) Iowa Mutual’s policy only provided UIM coverage for insureds who suffer bodily injury or death, (2) Gloe suffered no bodily injury or death, (3) his parents were not insureds under his policy, and (4) South Dakota’s statutes do not mandate UIM coverage for pecuniary losses insureds may suffer as a result of the death of third parties who have no connection with the insured’s policy.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 2.] On September 1, 2001, pedestrians Larry and Verna Mae Gloe were struck and killed in an auto accident. Pursuant to SDCL 21-5-1,1 Scott Gloe, their son, was appointed as the personal representative to pursue wrongful death claims on behalf of the decedents’ statutory beneficiaries.2
[¶ 3.] Two insurers provided liability coverage for this accident. American Family Insurance Company insured the automobile, with liability limits of $25,000 per person. Farmer’s Insurance Group insured the driver, with liability limits of $100,000 per person. Each company paid its limits: $125,000 was paid for the wrongful death claims arising from Larry Gloe’s death, and $125,000 was paid for the wrongful death claims arising from the death of Verna Mae Gloe.3 These sums were paid in return for a release of the tortfeasor and the liability carriers. Scott Gloe, his brother Michael Gloe,4 and their sister Karen Nelson5 received the wrongful death proceeds.
[¶ 4.] After settling with the liability carriers, Scott Gloe brought this declarato[241]*241ry action seeking to establish UIM coverage under his policy with Iowa Mutual. Gloe’s claim was asserted in his individual capacity, and he sought to recover additional uncompensated wrongful death damages. Under South Dakota law, those damages are limited to Gloe’s pecuniary loss caused by the death of his parents.
[¶ 5.] Gloe’s policy with Iowa Mutual provided UIM benefits, with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence. Gloe conceded that if Iowa Mutual’s policy provided UIM coverage, Iowa Mutual was entitled to set-off the amount that he received from the two liability insurers. However, Iowa Mutual denied that its policy provided any UIM coverage. Iowa Mutual’s denial was based upon a policy endorsement that only provided UIM coverage for “bodily injury or death” sustained by an “insured.” Because Gloe sustained no bodily injury or death in this accident, and because Gloe’s parents were not insureds under his policy, Iowa Mutual contended that its UIM coverage was unavailable.
[¶ 6.] Gloe acknowledged the policy language, but argued that the provision requiring “bodily injury or death” by an “insured” was incompatible with South Dakota’s law requiring UIM coverage. The trial court disagreed. Gloe now appeals, raising the following issue:
1. Whether South Dakota statutes preclude an insurer from restricting UIM coverage to bodily injury or death sustained by an insured.
By notice of review, Iowa Mutual raises the following issues:
2. Whether Gloe is a real party in interest with an individual claim for damages after he settled the wrongful death claims on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries.
3.Whether the personal representative’s release of the tortfeasor, precludes Gloe’s individual claim.
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 7.] “We review declaratory judgments as we would any other judgment or order.” Nelson v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. of Nebraska, 2004 SD 86, ¶ 5, 684 N.W.2d 74, 76 (citing SDCL 21-24-13; Parks v. Cooper, 2004 SD 27, ¶ 20, 676 N.W.2d 823, 828-29). In this case, our review involves a question of law regarding the interpretation of statutes and their application to insurance contracts. That review is de novo. See Id. (citing Roden v. General Casualty, 2003 SD 130, ¶ 6, 671 N.W.2d 622, 625); Jones v. AIU Ins. Co., 51 P.3d 1044, 1045 (Colo.Ct.App.2001) (stating that whether a statute mandates coverage is a matter of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review).
South Dakota’s Statutes Do Not Mandate UIM Coverage for Wrongful Death Damages Arising Out Of the Death of a Third Party Who Has No Relationship With the Insurance Policy.
[¶ 8.] “In South Dakota, automobile insurance providers must provide underin-sured motorist coverage in their policies.” Nelson, 2004 SD 86, ¶ 8, 684 N.W.2d at 77 (citing SDCL 58-11-9.4). In Nelson, we noted that “courts in other jurisdictions are split on the propriety of allowing an insured, pursuant to statutorily required underinsured motorist policy provision[s], to recover damages arising from bodily injury or death of a third person.” Id. ¶ 7. However, we did not “address the wisdom or public policy of allowing such suits” [242]*242under our statutes because the insurer in that case conceded coverage. Id.
[¶ 9.] The policy language at issue here provides coverage for damages an insured is “legally entitled to recover”6 from the owner or operator of an underin-sured motor vehicle because of “bodily injury or death” sustained by “an insured.” The policy provides:
We will pay compensatory damages which an ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ because of ‘bodily injury:’
1. Sustained by an ‘insured,’ and
2. Caused by an accident.
The policy defines ‘bodily injury’ as bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death, that results. It defines insureds as:
1. You or any ‘family member.’
2. Any other person ‘occupying’ ‘your covered auto.’
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of ‘bodily injury’ to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
‘Family member’ means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.
[¶ 10.] Because Gloe’s parents were not residents of Gloe’s household and were not occupants of a covered auto, they were not insureds under this policy language. Furthermore, the insured, Scott Gloe, suffered no bodily injury or death in the accident. Therefore, no UIM coverage was available under the policy.
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ZINTER, Justice.
[¶ 1.] Scott Gloe’s parents were struck and killed by an automobile. Gloe’s [240]*240parents did not reside in his household, they were not insured under his auto policy, and neither Gloe nor his covered automobile was involved in the accident. Nevertheless, Gloe asserted a wrongful death claim under the underinsured motorist (UIM) provision of his auto policy with Iowa Mutual. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment determining that there was no UIM coverage for Gloe’s claim, and he appeals. We affirm because (1) Iowa Mutual’s policy only provided UIM coverage for insureds who suffer bodily injury or death, (2) Gloe suffered no bodily injury or death, (3) his parents were not insureds under his policy, and (4) South Dakota’s statutes do not mandate UIM coverage for pecuniary losses insureds may suffer as a result of the death of third parties who have no connection with the insured’s policy.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 2.] On September 1, 2001, pedestrians Larry and Verna Mae Gloe were struck and killed in an auto accident. Pursuant to SDCL 21-5-1,1 Scott Gloe, their son, was appointed as the personal representative to pursue wrongful death claims on behalf of the decedents’ statutory beneficiaries.2
[¶ 3.] Two insurers provided liability coverage for this accident. American Family Insurance Company insured the automobile, with liability limits of $25,000 per person. Farmer’s Insurance Group insured the driver, with liability limits of $100,000 per person. Each company paid its limits: $125,000 was paid for the wrongful death claims arising from Larry Gloe’s death, and $125,000 was paid for the wrongful death claims arising from the death of Verna Mae Gloe.3 These sums were paid in return for a release of the tortfeasor and the liability carriers. Scott Gloe, his brother Michael Gloe,4 and their sister Karen Nelson5 received the wrongful death proceeds.
[¶ 4.] After settling with the liability carriers, Scott Gloe brought this declarato[241]*241ry action seeking to establish UIM coverage under his policy with Iowa Mutual. Gloe’s claim was asserted in his individual capacity, and he sought to recover additional uncompensated wrongful death damages. Under South Dakota law, those damages are limited to Gloe’s pecuniary loss caused by the death of his parents.
[¶ 5.] Gloe’s policy with Iowa Mutual provided UIM benefits, with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence. Gloe conceded that if Iowa Mutual’s policy provided UIM coverage, Iowa Mutual was entitled to set-off the amount that he received from the two liability insurers. However, Iowa Mutual denied that its policy provided any UIM coverage. Iowa Mutual’s denial was based upon a policy endorsement that only provided UIM coverage for “bodily injury or death” sustained by an “insured.” Because Gloe sustained no bodily injury or death in this accident, and because Gloe’s parents were not insureds under his policy, Iowa Mutual contended that its UIM coverage was unavailable.
[¶ 6.] Gloe acknowledged the policy language, but argued that the provision requiring “bodily injury or death” by an “insured” was incompatible with South Dakota’s law requiring UIM coverage. The trial court disagreed. Gloe now appeals, raising the following issue:
1. Whether South Dakota statutes preclude an insurer from restricting UIM coverage to bodily injury or death sustained by an insured.
By notice of review, Iowa Mutual raises the following issues:
2. Whether Gloe is a real party in interest with an individual claim for damages after he settled the wrongful death claims on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries.
3.Whether the personal representative’s release of the tortfeasor, precludes Gloe’s individual claim.
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 7.] “We review declaratory judgments as we would any other judgment or order.” Nelson v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. of Nebraska, 2004 SD 86, ¶ 5, 684 N.W.2d 74, 76 (citing SDCL 21-24-13; Parks v. Cooper, 2004 SD 27, ¶ 20, 676 N.W.2d 823, 828-29). In this case, our review involves a question of law regarding the interpretation of statutes and their application to insurance contracts. That review is de novo. See Id. (citing Roden v. General Casualty, 2003 SD 130, ¶ 6, 671 N.W.2d 622, 625); Jones v. AIU Ins. Co., 51 P.3d 1044, 1045 (Colo.Ct.App.2001) (stating that whether a statute mandates coverage is a matter of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review).
South Dakota’s Statutes Do Not Mandate UIM Coverage for Wrongful Death Damages Arising Out Of the Death of a Third Party Who Has No Relationship With the Insurance Policy.
[¶ 8.] “In South Dakota, automobile insurance providers must provide underin-sured motorist coverage in their policies.” Nelson, 2004 SD 86, ¶ 8, 684 N.W.2d at 77 (citing SDCL 58-11-9.4). In Nelson, we noted that “courts in other jurisdictions are split on the propriety of allowing an insured, pursuant to statutorily required underinsured motorist policy provision[s], to recover damages arising from bodily injury or death of a third person.” Id. ¶ 7. However, we did not “address the wisdom or public policy of allowing such suits” [242]*242under our statutes because the insurer in that case conceded coverage. Id.
[¶ 9.] The policy language at issue here provides coverage for damages an insured is “legally entitled to recover”6 from the owner or operator of an underin-sured motor vehicle because of “bodily injury or death” sustained by “an insured.” The policy provides:
We will pay compensatory damages which an ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ because of ‘bodily injury:’
1. Sustained by an ‘insured,’ and
2. Caused by an accident.
The policy defines ‘bodily injury’ as bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death, that results. It defines insureds as:
1. You or any ‘family member.’
2. Any other person ‘occupying’ ‘your covered auto.’
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of ‘bodily injury’ to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
‘Family member’ means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.
[¶ 10.] Because Gloe’s parents were not residents of Gloe’s household and were not occupants of a covered auto, they were not insureds under this policy language. Furthermore, the insured, Scott Gloe, suffered no bodily injury or death in the accident. Therefore, no UIM coverage was available under the policy. Gloe, however, contends that this policy provision violates the public policy of the UIM and uninsured (UM) statutes of this State.
[¶ 11.] “Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.” Martin-maas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611. Furthermore, because of the similarity of subject and purpose of UM and UIM statutes and coverage, most of the decisions considering this issue construe UM and UIM claims, policies, and statutory language interchangeably. This is understandable because, as was noted in Jones, 51 P.3d at 1045, construing UM and UIM statutes separately “would create the anomalous situation where benefits for the wrongful death of an uninsured person were not required if the motorist causing death was uninsured, but required if the motorist was underinsured.” Therefore, we construe our UM and UIM statutes together.7 We also apply the case law considering UM and UIM coverage interchangeably.
[243]*243[¶ 12.] Although the essence of the South Dakota statutes is quite similar, the UM provision is the most specific in declaring who is intended to be protected by the mandated coverage. It provides that coverage is required for the protection of persons insured under the policy. It also suggests that coverage was intended for the bodily injury or death of the insured:
No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle may be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state ... unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death equal to the coverage provided by such policy for bodily injury and death, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. However, the coverage required by this section may not exceed the limits of one hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit for one person, three hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, unless additional coverage is requested by the insured. ...
SDCL 58-11-9 (emphasis added).
[¶ 18.] The complementary UIM statutes fail to as specifically address the question of who is intended to be protected by the mandated coverage and whether bodily injury or death of an insured was contemplated. Instead, they simply refer to coverage for “bodily injury to or death of [a] person” and “damages as its insured may recover on account of bodily injury or death arising out of an automobile accident....”
No motor vehicle liability policy of insurance may be issued or delivered in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state ... unless underinsured motorist coverage is provided therein at a face amount equal to the bodily injury limits of the policy. However, the coverage required by this section may not exceed the limits of one hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to the limit for one person, three hundred thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, unless additional coverage is requested by the insured. ...
SDCL 58-11-9.4.
Subject to the terms and conditions of such underinsured motorist coverage, the insurance company agrees to pay its own insured for uncompensated damages as its insured may recover on account of bodily injury or death arising out of an automobile accident because the judgment recovered against the owner of the other vehicle exceeds the policy limits thereon. Coverage shall be limited to the underinsured motorist coverage limits on the vehicle of the party recovering less the amount paid by the liability insurer of the party recovered against.
SDCL 58-11-9.5.
[¶ 14.] Gloe disregards the language in SDCL 58-11-9 that indicates coverage is [244]*244intended for the protection of the insured for bodily injury or death. Instead, he focuses only upon references generally referring to legal entitlement to recover or coverage for “uncompensated damages as its insured may recover” as a result of “bodily injury or death.” SDCL 58-11-9 and SDCL 58-11-9.5 (emphasis added). Because Gloe is legally entitled to recover wrongful death damages as a result of the death of his parents, he asserts that these general references are broad enough to mandate coverage for the uncompensated pecuniary loss that he may suffer as a result of his parents’ death in an automobile accident that had no relationship to his policy. Given his general right of recovery for the wrongful death of his parents, Gloe argues that the UIM statutes should “not concern [themselves] with an insured’s bodily injury,” and therefore, Iowa Mutual may not limit UIM coverage to wrongful death or bodily injury sustained by an insured.
[¶ 15.] Iowa Mutual responds by pointing out that SDCL 58-11-9.5 specifically provides that UIM coverage is subject to an insurer’s terms and conditions. Iowa Mutual further points out that this Court has recognized the “right of insurance companies to place conditions on underin-sured motorist coverage.” See Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881, 886 (S.D.1992) (superseded on other grounds by SDCL 32-35-70) (permitting an insurer to place a condition on coverage excluding an insured’s vehicle from UIM coverage). Iowa Mutual concludes that its policy provision limiting coverage to death or bodily injury of an insured is valid as a “term” or “condition” of its policy.
[¶ 16.] However, the “subject to the terms and conditions” language of SDCL 58-11-9.5 was not intended to permit any restriction an insurer may wish to create. It was only intended to allow limitations on coverage to the extent that they do not violate the public policy expressed in the statutes. We have specifically stated that “the conditions and limitations imposed by the insurance company must be consistent with public policy....” Phen v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 2003 SD 133, ¶ 6, 672 N.W.2d 52, 54. On the other hand, “[p]olicy language ... is not automatically void as against public policy simply because it narrows the circumstances under which coverage applies.” London v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 63 P.3d 552, 555 (Okla.Civ.App.2002) (considering a similar UM dispute). See also, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Chacon, 939 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.Ct.App.1997) (considering a limitation on UM coverage and stating that “a policy term is not void as against public policy simply because it narrows the circumstances under which coverage applies”). This Court has concluded that some restrictions violate public policy and some do not.8 Therefore, the “subject to” language does not automatically resolve ■this matter, and we must return to the ultimate question whether the Iowa Mutual language is prohibited by the public policy of this state.
[¶ 17.] The public policy of this state is set forth in its statutes and [245]*245cases. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 454 N.W.2d 555, 559 (S.D.1990) (citations omitted). Most significant to this appeal, our cases have noted that the purpose of UM/UIM coverage is to protect the insured party toho is injured in an automobile accident by the negligence of an uninsured/underinsured motorist:
The purpose of uninsured [and therefore underinsured] motorist statutes is to provide the same insurance protection to the insured party who is injured by an Uninsured [or Underinsured] or unknown motorist that would have been available to him had he been injured as a result of the negligence of a motorist covered by the minimum amount of liability insurance.
Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26, 29 (S.D.1978) (emphasis added); Nickerson v. American States Ins., 2000 SD 121, ¶ 15, 616 N.W.2d 468, 472 n. 4. Thus, when the purpose expressed in Clark (protecting the insured party who is injured by another motorist) is considered with the purpose expressed in SDCL 58-11-9 (protecting persons insured for bodily injury or death), we believe that the Legislature intended to mandate coverage for the protection of the insured for the insured’s bodily injuries or death caused by the negligence of an uninsured/underinsured motorist.
[¶ 18.] We do not, however, believe that UM/UIM coverage was mandated for the consequential losses a wrongful death beneficiary incurs simply because that beneficiary has an auto policy and the decedent happens to be a relative for which the beneficiary is legally entitled to maintain a wrongful death action. As the court in Livingston v. Omaha Property & Cas. Ins. Co., stated:
[T]o accept plaintiffs interpretation would permit plaintiff to recover under her uninsured motorist policy for the death of any person from whom she is legally entitled to bring a claim under the wrongful death statute, such as the death of her children, any lineal descendant, her brothers and sisters, her parents, or any other descendant. It would provide coverage by plaintiffs insurance company for hazards associated with the operation of the vehicles of all of these individuals, none of whom are insured under her policy.
927 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (citing Elder v. Metropolitan Prop, and Cas. Co., 851 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Mo.Ct.App.1993)).
[¶ 19.] Thus, most courts have concluded that coverage is not mandated where the cause of action is for wrongful death of a person “who was in no way connected to [the insured’s] automobile insurance policy, who did not reside in [the insured’s] household, nor who, if had survived the accident, would have had any right of recovery under [the insured’s] policy.” Temple v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 2000 WL 33113814 *5 (Del.Super.Ct.2000) (unpublished opinion) aff'd., 782 A.2d 267, (Del.Supr.2001). See also Jones, 51 P.3d at 1045 (stating that allowing recovery of UIM benefits for the death of an individual who was not insured under the insured’s auto policy, did not reside in the insured’s household, and would have had no right of recovery under the insurance policy if he had survived, would be contrary to common sense); Lafleur v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York, 385 So.2d 1241, 1245 (La.Ct.App.1980) (holding the legislature did not intend UM statute to require UM policy to cover wrongful death of third persons); Spurlock v. Prudential Ins. Co., 448 So.2d 218, 219 (La.Ct.App.1984) (holding the Legislature never intended “to afford coverage for what an insured may be legally entitled to recover as his ‘wrongful death’ damages, sustained because of some third [246]*246party’s death”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 72 Wash.App. 664, 865 P.2d 560, 568 (1994) (holding, under language that did not explicitly require injuries by the insured, that one must “engage in a strained and forced interpretation of the ... policy to conclude that it provides compensation for an insured household member for injuries to non-resident, uninsured relatives”). Finally, and probably most pertinent to this appeal, is the Georgia decision construing broad language that, like the South Dakota UIM statute, generally referred to coverage for “all sums which said insured shall legally be entitled to recover as damages.” The Georgia court concluded that such broad language was “not ... enacted ... with the intention of requiring insurance companies to pay damages for the death of a person not insured under the policy in question.” Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Gordon, 266 Ga.App. 666, 598 S.E.2d 70, 71 (2004).
[¶ 20.] Gloe, however, argues that we should not follow this clear weight of authority because it would write the word “death” out of the UM/UIM statutes. To support this argument, Gloe points out that our statutes specifically allow recovery for wrongful death as well as bodily injury, but an insured decedent cannot recover for his own death under South Dakota law. See SDCL 21-5-5 (wrongful death action is for the exclusive benefit of the wife or husband and children, or if there be none of them, then the parents and next of kin of the decedent). Because an insured decedent cannot recover for his or her own wrongful death, Gloe contends Iowa Mutual’s endorsement effectively writes out the right of recovery for “death,” even though that word is repeatedly used in the statutes.
[¶ 21.] However, Gloe fails to recognize that the Legislature included the word “death” to cover other wrongful death claims. Although the majority rule does not contemplate coverage for the wrongful death of third parties, wrongful death claims are covered if the person killed is an insured. Thus, the word “death” has meaning in the statute because, while Gloe may not recover under his policy for the death of non-insured relatives, UIM coverage is provided for the wrongful death of Gloe’s family household members who suffer death at the hands of an underinsured motorist because they are insureds. Likewise, Gloe’s family household members have UM/UIM coverage for his wrongful death at the hands of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. And finally, any other person who has a right to recover because of an insured’s death has coverage. They are afforded UIM coverage because paragraph three of the endorsement at issue specifically makes them insureds. That endorsement provides that insureds include “[a]ny person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of ‘bodily injury [or death]’ to which this coverage applies sustained by [an insured].” See supra ¶ 9. For these reasons, the word “death” is not written out of the statute. Rather, the term has significant effect because the named insured, his family household members, and any other person who has a right to recover for wrongful death are all afforded UIM coverage for the wrongful death of an insured.
[¶ 22.] Other states recognize this UIM death benefit. Thus, the word “death” has meaning because “coverage is intended to provide indemnity for damages resulting from an insured’s wrongful death payable” to those persons entitled to bring a wrongful death action. Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 446 (emphasis added). See also Farmers Ins. Exchange, 939 P.2d at 521. Stated another way, the word death has meaning because when it comes to wrongful death claims “the legislature contem[247]*247plated that the survivors of a person killed in an accident with an uninsured motorist would pursue a claim under the decedent’s uninsured motorist coverage, rather than the survivor’s policy.” Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 446.
[¶ 23.] Gloe’s argument is also fundamentally flawed because, as Florida has noted, he incorrectly focuses solely upon the fact that he was an insured under his UIM policy, when the correct focus should be whether the person who suffered bodily injury or death had UM (or UIM) coverage. Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.1990) (disapproved on other grounds). However, when the question correctly focuses on whether the party injured in an automobile accident had UM/ UIM coverage, the weight of authority concludes that the “statute does not require coverage for anyone who may be entitled to recover consequential damages as a survivor under the wrongful death statute when the decedent himself had neither liability nor uninsured motorist coverage under the policy.” Id. at 411.
[¶ 24.] Gloe also notes that Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, and Ohio have all concluded that coverage is afforded. The Iowa Supreme Court determined that because their UM statute did not require bodily injury to the insured, a wife could recover for her non-insured husband. Hinners v. Pekin Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 345 (Iowa 1988). That court reached the same result in a case involving UIM coverage in Wetherbee v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1993). Maryland concluded that it would be contrary to the broad purpose of their uninsured motorist law to restrict coverage to cases involving damages arising from death sustained by an insured. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991). Nebraska similarly held that an insured may recover wrongful death damages arising from the death of a non-insured person. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N.W.2d 789 (1971). Finally, Ohio held that it was contrary to their law to restrict coverage to bodily injury sustained by an insured. Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 433 N.E.2d 555 (1982).
[¶ 25.] However, in reaction to this minority interpretation, all but one of these state’s respective legislatures corrected each court’s interpretation and clarified that such coverage was not intended. In Ohio, the legislature amended their UIM statute to specifically overrule Sexton so that policies may limit coverage to bodily injury suffered by an insured. Atlanta Cas. Co., 598 S.E.2d at 72 (citing Beagle v. Walden, 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 676 N.E.2d 506 (1997)). Similarly, Forbes is no longer the law in Maryland. That legislature corrected the court’s interpretation and clarified its statute to only “apply to, and require UIM coverage for, a wrongful death claim where the deceased is an ‘insured.’ ” Id. (citing Nicholson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WL 985099 (Del.Super.Ct.2001)). Finally, as with the other states, the Nebraska legislature amended its UM statutes to disallow recovery in these cases. London, 63 P.3d at 556 n. 1.
[¶ 26.] Thus, the vast majority of courts that have considered this issue have “uniformly interpreted their respective statutes as providing coverage only for injuries to those insured under the policy.” Atlanta Cas. Co., 598 S.E.2d at 72. Atlanta Cas. Co. notes that the states that have upheld the insurance provision at issue here include: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and [248]*248Wisconsin. Id. at 72-73.9 And most significantly, this majority interpretation has been adopted whether or not the UM/UIM statute construed specifically referred to [249]*249coverage for bodily injury or death of the insured. The majority of these cases interpreted statutes that, like ours, simply referred to coverage for one “legally entitled to recover”10 based on bodily injury or death.
[¶ 27.] Because we reiterate that the purpose of these statutes is to protect the insured party who is injured in an accident, we agree with the reasoning of the clear majority of courts that have found no mandated UM or UIM coverage for the wrongful death of one not insured under the claimant’s policy. We also do so because “[w]hile uninsured [and underin-sured] motorist coverage is to be given a liberal interpretation, coverage should not be created where there is none.” Livingston, 927 S.W.2d at 446 (citing Elder, 851 S.W.2d at 562). Therefore, mandating UIM coverage for Gloe would result in an extension of coverage “for a decedent who is not an insured under the claimant’s policy.London, 63 P.3d at 556. See also Farmers Ins. Exchange, 939 P.2d 517.
[¶ 28.] We finally note that mandating coverage for wrongful death in this case would require insurance coverage for Gloe’s parents’ deaths even though neither Gloe nor his parents would have had any coverage had his parents survived with serious uncompensated injuries. There would be no coverage because Larry and Verna Mae were not insureds and Scott Gloe has no right of recovery for his parents’ personal injuries. Consequently, Gloe’s construction of the statutes would create the anomalous result that UIM coverage would be available if the victim of the accident died, but unavailable if the victim survived and sustained substantial uncompensated damages. The legislature could not have intended that result.
[¶ 29.] Because Gloe’s parents were not insureds and did not have UIM coverage under this policy, there could have been no recovery had they been injured, instead of being lolled. Furthermore, although Gloe was an insured, he did not suffer any bodily injury and he had no involvement in the accident. Yet, after settling the wrongful death action for the death of his parents, he sought to recover further pecuniary loss under his automobile policy only because the decedents hap[250]*250pen to be relatives covered by a wrongful death statute. We do not believe the South Dakota statutes were intended to mandate UIM coverage for such consequential losses. Instead, we agree that such statutes do “not require coverage for anyone who may be entitled to recover consequential damages as a survivor under the wrongful death statute when the decedent himself had neither liability nor uninsured [or underinsured] motorist coverage under the policy.” Valiant, 567 So.2d at 411.
[¶ 30.] In light of the disposition of this issue, we need not reach the other issues raised in Iowa Mutual’s notice of review.
[¶ 31.] Affirmed.
[¶ 32.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, Justice, concur.
[¶ 33.] SABERS and MEIERHENRY, Justices, dissent,