Gliceria Ramos Vda De Sinlao v. United States of America and Sumner G. Whittier, Administrator of Veterans Affairs

D.C. Circuit

Gliceria Ramos Vda De Sinlao v. United States of America and Sumner G. Whittier, Administrator of Veterans Affairs

271 F.2d 846

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedNovember 30, 1959

Docket14970

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 271 F.2d 846 (Gliceria Ramos Vda De Sinlao v. United States of America and Sumner G. Whittier, Administrator of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Gliceria Ramos Vda De Sinlao v. United States of America and Sumner G. Whittier, Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 271 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1959).

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant sought review of a decision of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs terminating payments of death compensation and National Service Life Insurance under the Veterans’ Benefits statute.¹ The Administrator allowed the claims shortly after the death of appellant’s husband, an Army private, but ceased payments in 1948. Appellant filed suit in 1957. The District Court dismissed the complaint.

The court rightly held that suit on the insurance claim was barred because not brought within the time required by statute, namely “within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made. * * * ” 38 U.S.C. § 784(b).

But unless appellant has remarried, she is entitled to death compensation payments. A “purported remarriage”, if “void”, would not terminate her rights. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3). She has lived continuously in the Philippines, where a marriage cannot be contracted without a ceremony. There has been no ceremony, and therefore no remarriage unless a “purported” and “void” one. The Administrator ceased payments on the theory that because appellant had lived with a man, and had represented herself as his wife, she was “estopped to deny remarriage”. Since there is no showing that the Administrator or the United States has been damaged by reliance on appellant’s conduct or representation, there would be no basis for a finding of estoppel, even if we were to assume that a widow might in some circumstances be estopped from asserting her statutory right. The Administrator’s rejection of appellant’s compensa[848]*848tion claim cannot be reconciled with the intention Congress has expressed.

But Congress has provided, with exceptions not relevant to the compensation claim, that “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall be final and conclusive, and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (1958). “It was the purpose of [the] statute to remove the possibility of judicial relief even if the action of the Administrator was arbitrary and capricious.” Hahn v. Gray, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 189, 203 F.2d 625, 626. Therefore the District Court rightly held it had no jurisdiction in respect to the compensation claim. Longernecker v. Higley, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 229 F.2d 27. Cf. Cook v. Higley, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 238 F.2d 41. Even in Wellman v. Whittier, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 259 F.2d 163, 169, on which appellant relies, we said: “We have repeatedly recognized that non-reviewability must be accorded to the Administrator’s decisions as to claims.”

The Administrator may of course correct his own error if he sees fit.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant sought review of a decision of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs terminating payments of death compensation and National Service Life Insurance under the Veterans’ Benefits statute.¹ The Administrator allowed the claims shortly after the death of appellant’s husband, an Army private, but ceased payments in 1948. Appellant filed suit in 1957. The District Court dismissed the complaint.

The court rightly held that suit on the insurance claim was barred because not brought within the time required by statute, namely “within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made. * * * ” 38 U.S.C. § 784(b).

But unless appellant has remarried, she is entitled to death compensation payments. A “purported remarriage”, if “void”, would not terminate her rights. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3). She has lived continuously in the Philippines, where a marriage cannot be contracted without a ceremony. There has been no ceremony, and therefore no remarriage unless a “purported” and “void” one. The Administrator ceased payments on the theory that because appellant had lived with a man, and had represented herself as his wife, she was “estopped to deny remarriage”. Since there is no showing that the Administrator or the United States has been damaged by reliance on appellant’s conduct or representation, there would be no basis for a finding of estoppel, even if we were to assume that a widow might in some circumstances be estopped from asserting her statutory right. The Administrator’s rejection of appellant’s compensa[848]*848tion claim cannot be reconciled with the intention Congress has expressed.

But Congress has provided, with exceptions not relevant to the compensation claim, that “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall be final and conclusive, and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 211(a) (1958). “It was the purpose of [the] statute to remove the possibility of judicial relief even if the action of the Administrator was arbitrary and capricious.” Hahn v. Gray, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 189, 203 F.2d 625, 626. Therefore the District Court rightly held it had no jurisdiction in respect to the compensation claim. Longernecker v. Higley, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 229 F.2d 27. Cf. Cook v. Higley, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 238 F.2d 41. Even in Wellman v. Whittier, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 259 F.2d 163, 169, on which appellant relies, we said: “We have repeatedly recognized that non-reviewability must be accorded to the Administrator’s decisions as to claims.”

The Administrator may of course correct his own error if he sees fit.

Affirmed.

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271 F.2d 846, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gliceria-ramos-vda-de-sinlao-v-united-states-of-america-and-sumner-g-cadc-1959.

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