Glen Alden Coal Company's Case

14 A.2d 76, 339 Pa. 149, 1940 Pa. LEXIS 604
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 22, 1940
DocketAppeal, 105
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 14 A.2d 76 (Glen Alden Coal Company's Case) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Glen Alden Coal Company's Case, 14 A.2d 76, 339 Pa. 149, 1940 Pa. LEXIS 604 (Pa. 1940).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Drew,

Pursuant to the provisions of the Act of May 26, 1937, P. L. 891, Glen Alden Coal Company filed a petition *151 in the court below praying that tribunal to convene a Highway Mining Commission to determine, authorize and direct, inter alia, the underlying or adjacent coal, if any, to be left in place for the purpose of furnishing vertical and lateral support to State Highway Eoute No. 185, which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on or about August i, 1930, relocated by appropriate action over petitioner’s land underlaid with mineable coal; the underlying and adjacent coal, if any, which may be removed, and to assess damages for the coal which may be directed to be left in place. The Commission was convened and testimony taken, after which it rendered its decree directing that all coal underlying or adjacent to the highway, as relocated, may be removed without substitution of any material for the coal authorized to be mined, and that petitioner was not entitled to any damages. From that decree, the coal company has taken this appeal.

Appellant strenuously argues that the Commission erred in directing that all coal under the highway may be removed, since the testimony offered by appellant and the stipulation of counsel made at the hearing, this being the only evidence presented to the Commission and upon which it based its findings, clearly established that the removal of all coal under and adjacent to the highway would be a mining of coal necessary for support, although the subsidence would be of such a character that the highway might be used without danger to the traveling public. After a careful study of the Act under which the present proceeding was instituted, as well as a thorough review of the record, we are constrained to sustain the contention of appellant, since the Act imposed upon the Commission the authority only of determining the required amount of coal which must be left beneath or adjacent to the highway, or material to be substituted therefor, so that there be adequate vertical and lateral support afforded to the highway in order to prevent any subsidence, rather than, *152 as here determined by the Commission, the amount of coal which could be removed without danger to the traveling public.

Condemnation of the surface for highway purposes by the Commonwealth is an entry upon the subjacent strata so far as they are necessary to support the surface; and this is so even though the surface owner has released to the underlying owner his right to surface support: Commonwealth v. Pardee Bros., 310 Pa. 353. See also Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 Pa. 522. In mining coal under a public highway the removal must be in such a manner as not to injure the surface: Breisch v. Coal Co., 267 Pa. 546. Good or bad mining in no way affects the right of surface support; and sufficient support can be demanded even though it be necessary to leave every pound of coal under the land untouched. See Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474. It was not the legislative intent by the enactment of the Act of June 1, 1933, P. L. 1409, which was amended by the Act of July 18, 1935, P. L. 1306, and reenacted and further amended by the Act of May 26, 1937, P. L. 891, here under consideration, to authorize the waiver of such support beneath or adjacent to the highways of this Commonwealth. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, an owner, suffering damages by reason of the condemnation of the underlying or adjacent coal necessary for highway support, could only recover, as could any other property owner, through a board of viewers proceeding, and if such owner desired to mine the coal under or adjacent to the highway which he thought unnecessary for support, he did so at his own peril. In interpreting this legislation, it must be kept in mind that the primary intention of the legislature was the adequate support of public highways. It was never considered that any support could be removed which was necessary to uphold the highway, unless other means, filling in of new material or the furnishing of some artificial support, was provided. This for the rea *153 son that modern highways, built at great expense to the public, which must be sound in order to be safe, cannot, except by clear legislative mandate, be permitted to be damaged or destroyed, or even made inconvenient to the traveling public, by the withdrawal from them of necessary support. It was for the purpose of retaining needed support with as little guesswork as possible that the Highway Mining Commission was created to determine how much coal, if any, could be taken out, so that the owner might mine that not required for support without liability for subsidence, and to relieve as far as possible the County, upon which the expense of condemnation might fall, of the heavy financial burden of paying for coal unnecessary for adequate support.

This Commission, with judicial powers and exclusive jurisdiction over the mining of coal within or under the rights of way of State highways, was empowered “to determine, authorize and direct the underlying or adjacent coal, if any, to be left in place for the purpose of furnishing vertical or lateral support to said highway, the underlying or adjacent coal, if any, which may be removed, and the material, if any, to be substituted for the coal so removed, together with the method and manner of placing such material in the mine workings, for the purpose of furnishing both vertical and lateral support to such highway and the party or parties by whom the expense shall be paid, ... to determine and assess damages, if any, for the coal required to be left in place and benefits, if any, for improvements or betterments; to allocate among the parties in interest the cost of its proceedings as well as any work which it may order performed; ...” A reading of this language of the Act shows clearly that the power conferred upon the Commission is that of determining the coal required for subjacent and adjacent surface support of State highways, and of authorizing the removal of the coal not so required. It was not the intent of the legislature to empower the Commission to authorize and di *154 rect the removal of the coal required for highway support, where there would be any subsidence, merely because the removal thereof would not endanger the traveling public. There is no justification for determining a quantity to be retained less than that required for full support purposes. The plain purpose of the Act could only be that the Commission, after hearing the testimony offered by the owner of the coal, the County upon which the expense of condemnation may be imposed, and the State Highway Department upon which rests the responsibility for the construction, reconstruction and maintenance of all State highways and which is vitally concerned in protecting the welfare of the public, should ascertain and determine what coal, if any, could be removed without any subsidence of the surface and assess damages or benefits in connection with the improvement; which findings of the Commission, of course, must be supported by substantial evidence. See Lowrie’s Appeal, 338 Pa. 203.

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Bluebook (online)
14 A.2d 76, 339 Pa. 149, 1940 Pa. LEXIS 604, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/glen-alden-coal-companys-case-pa-1940.