NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2516 __________
GLAVIN IVY, Appellant
v.
WELLPATH; CRNP LESLIE; CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS; CRNP SUTHERLAND; DR. MAXA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00061) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo (by consent) ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 25, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Glavin Ivy, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants in this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
The undisputed facts show that, in January 2018, while incarcerated at SCI-Forest,
Ivy began suffering from gastrointestinal issues and sought medical attention. Over the
course of the next two years, CRNPs Leslie and Sutherland saw Ivy many times,
provided him a wide array of medications, ordered abdominal X-rays, conducted
bloodwork, tested for numerous gastrointestinal diseases, and sent Ivy for a colonoscopy.
Dr. Maxa reviewed those test results and noted that there were no clinically significant
findings of disease.
In January 2020, when Ivy was temporarily transferred to the Mercer County Jail
for court hearings, he sought medical attention and was referred for an abdominal
ultrasound and CT scan. This testing indicated that Ivy possibly suffered from ileitis (an
inflammation of the bowels). Ivy returned to SCI-Forest in March 2020 and was again
examined by Leslie and Sutherland on multiple occasions over the next several months.
They examined Ivy, provided medications, interpreted the results of the ultrasound and
CT exams, and ordered follow-up testing. Among other medications, they continued to
prescribe laxatives, which Ivy maintains were unhelpful.
On November 10, 2020, Ivy met with Sutherland and requested Ensure, which had
been provided at the county jail. Sutherland consulted with Dr. Maxa, they determined
2 Ensure was not medically necessary, and Sutherland prescribed Miralax. Ivy then
objected that he needed a different medication (Budesonide), and he threatened to sue if
he did not receive it. Sutherland then ordered Ivy to leave the office, and Ivy maintains
that Sutherland then said that “you’re not getting any treatment.” ECF No. 66 at ¶ 22.
Ivy raised complaints of renewed abdominal stress to a nurse on November 13, 2020. He
was seen by Sutherland the next day, at which time Sutherland prescribed additional
medications, including Budesonide.
Ivy filed his complaint in January 2021 against CRNPs Leslie and Sutherland, Dr.
Maxa, and the corporate medical services provider at the prison. Ivy brought claims of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, related claims against the prison’s medical services provider under Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a claim of retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment, and a medical malpractice claim under state law. The
defendants answered the complaint, and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the motion. This appeal ensued.
II.
We have jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendants. 1 We exercise plenary review over that
1 The District Court denied Ivy’s motion for reconsideration after Ivy filed his notice of appeal. Because Ivy did not file a timely new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying his motion for reconsideration, we do not consider that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).
3 order. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the court concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 422–23.
III.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
merits of all of Ivy’s Eighth Amendment claims. 2 To succeed on his claims that prison
medical care violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Ivy had to establish “(i) a serious
medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016).
“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to
establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
227 (3d Cir. 2017). When medical treatment is provided, “we presume that the treatment
of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Here, as the District Court explained in detail, see ECF No. 78 at 2–12, it is
undisputed that the defendants consistently addressed Ivy’s complaints by responding to
2 Thus, we do not need to address the District Court’s alternative basis for dismissing some of the Eighth Amendment claims as barred by the statute of limitations. 4 his sick calls, examining him, prescribing him medication, arranging for referrals to
specialists and tests, and exercising professional judgment to interpret the results of those
tests. Ivy’s core complaint, that prison officials should have recognized and diagnosed
his ileitis sooner, indicates “mere disagreements over medical judgment,” which are
insufficient for a reasonable juror to find deliberate indifference. White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
While the defendants continued prescribing laxatives despite Ivy’s insistence that
they were unhelpful, the record shows that the defendants also provided other
medications, bloodwork, testing, and treatment. There is insufficient evidence in the
record for a reasonable juror to find, as Ivy contends, that any defendant persisted in a
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-2516 __________
GLAVIN IVY, Appellant
v.
WELLPATH; CRNP LESLIE; CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS; CRNP SUTHERLAND; DR. MAXA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00061) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo (by consent) ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 25, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 13, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Glavin Ivy, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants in this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
The undisputed facts show that, in January 2018, while incarcerated at SCI-Forest,
Ivy began suffering from gastrointestinal issues and sought medical attention. Over the
course of the next two years, CRNPs Leslie and Sutherland saw Ivy many times,
provided him a wide array of medications, ordered abdominal X-rays, conducted
bloodwork, tested for numerous gastrointestinal diseases, and sent Ivy for a colonoscopy.
Dr. Maxa reviewed those test results and noted that there were no clinically significant
findings of disease.
In January 2020, when Ivy was temporarily transferred to the Mercer County Jail
for court hearings, he sought medical attention and was referred for an abdominal
ultrasound and CT scan. This testing indicated that Ivy possibly suffered from ileitis (an
inflammation of the bowels). Ivy returned to SCI-Forest in March 2020 and was again
examined by Leslie and Sutherland on multiple occasions over the next several months.
They examined Ivy, provided medications, interpreted the results of the ultrasound and
CT exams, and ordered follow-up testing. Among other medications, they continued to
prescribe laxatives, which Ivy maintains were unhelpful.
On November 10, 2020, Ivy met with Sutherland and requested Ensure, which had
been provided at the county jail. Sutherland consulted with Dr. Maxa, they determined
2 Ensure was not medically necessary, and Sutherland prescribed Miralax. Ivy then
objected that he needed a different medication (Budesonide), and he threatened to sue if
he did not receive it. Sutherland then ordered Ivy to leave the office, and Ivy maintains
that Sutherland then said that “you’re not getting any treatment.” ECF No. 66 at ¶ 22.
Ivy raised complaints of renewed abdominal stress to a nurse on November 13, 2020. He
was seen by Sutherland the next day, at which time Sutherland prescribed additional
medications, including Budesonide.
Ivy filed his complaint in January 2021 against CRNPs Leslie and Sutherland, Dr.
Maxa, and the corporate medical services provider at the prison. Ivy brought claims of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, related claims against the prison’s medical services provider under Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a claim of retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment, and a medical malpractice claim under state law. The
defendants answered the complaint, and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment.
The District Court granted the motion. This appeal ensued.
II.
We have jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendants. 1 We exercise plenary review over that
1 The District Court denied Ivy’s motion for reconsideration after Ivy filed his notice of appeal. Because Ivy did not file a timely new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying his motion for reconsideration, we do not consider that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).
3 order. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the court concludes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 422–23.
III.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
merits of all of Ivy’s Eighth Amendment claims. 2 To succeed on his claims that prison
medical care violated his Eighth Amendment rights, Ivy had to establish “(i) a serious
medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016).
“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to
establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
227 (3d Cir. 2017). When medical treatment is provided, “we presume that the treatment
of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Here, as the District Court explained in detail, see ECF No. 78 at 2–12, it is
undisputed that the defendants consistently addressed Ivy’s complaints by responding to
2 Thus, we do not need to address the District Court’s alternative basis for dismissing some of the Eighth Amendment claims as barred by the statute of limitations. 4 his sick calls, examining him, prescribing him medication, arranging for referrals to
specialists and tests, and exercising professional judgment to interpret the results of those
tests. Ivy’s core complaint, that prison officials should have recognized and diagnosed
his ileitis sooner, indicates “mere disagreements over medical judgment,” which are
insufficient for a reasonable juror to find deliberate indifference. White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
While the defendants continued prescribing laxatives despite Ivy’s insistence that
they were unhelpful, the record shows that the defendants also provided other
medications, bloodwork, testing, and treatment. There is insufficient evidence in the
record for a reasonable juror to find, as Ivy contends, that any defendant persisted in a
course of delaying care or of prescribing laxatives with an intent to harm Ivy or with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Compare White, 897 F.2d at 109
(explaining that deliberate indifference can be shown by persistence in a course of
treatment despite evidence of “resultant pain and risk of permanent injury” from the
treatment).
Nor could a reasonable juror interpret any of Ivy’s interactions with the
defendants, including the November 10, 2020 interaction Sutherland, as a deliberately
indifferent denial of care. The undisputed facts from November 10 show that Sutherland
examined Ivy, consulted with Dr. Maxa, decided to deny Ensure, and decided to
prescribe Miralax. In response to these professional decisions, Ivy threatened suit, and
only then does Ivy maintain that Sutherland replied, saying “you’re not getting any
5 treatment.” ECF No. 66 at ¶ 22. In context, and considering the fact that Sutherland
examined Ivy in response to renewed gastrointestinal distress four days later, at which
time Sutherland provided additional medications, including the Budesonide that had
sparked the prior argument, no reasonable juror could find that Sutherland acted to delay
or deny care with deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 110.
For essentially the same reasons, we agree with the District Court’s determination
that no reasonable juror could find that Sutherland retaliated against Ivy for threatening to
sue. In context, and given the timing, there is no evidence that Ivy’s threat of suit
motivated any of Sutherland’s medical decisions. See generally Watson v. Rozum, 834
F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing the elements of a First Amendment retaliation
claim, including that “constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating
factor in the decision”).
Finally, because Ivy has challenged neither the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on the Monell claim, nor the District Court’s decision to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over Ivy’s state law claims, those claims are forfeited. See Barna v. Bd. of
Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145-47 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining
that an appellant’s failure to raise an argument constitutes forfeiture of that argument).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 3
3 Ivy’s motion to supplement the record on appeal is denied. See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (indicating that a party may supplement the record on appeal in only “exceptional circumstances”). 6