Gladney v. Pollard

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 21, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00606
StatusUnknown

This text of Gladney v. Pollard (Gladney v. Pollard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gladney v. Pollard, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MYRON A. GLADNEY,

Petitioner, Case No. 21-cv-606-pp v.

WILLIAM POLLARD,

Respondent.

ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION AS UNAUTHORIZED SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITION (DKT. NO. 1); DENYING AS MOOT PETITIONER’S MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2); DENYING AS MOOT PETITIONER’S MOTION TO AMEND PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (“FRCP”) 15 (DKT. NO. 8); DISMISSING CASE AND DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

On May 14, 2021, the petitioner, who is incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his 1996 conviction in Milwaukee County Circuit Court for first-degree intentional homicide. Dkt. No. 1; see also State v. Gladney, Milwaukee County Case No. 96CF964194 (available at https://wcca.wicourts.gov). With the petition, the petitioner filed a motion to proceed without prepaying the $5.00 filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. Three weeks later, the petitioner filed a “Motion to Amend Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 15.” Dkt. No. 8. This order screens the petition, dismisses it as an unauthorized second or successive petition, denies as moot the petitioner’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, denies as moot the petitioner’s motion to amend his petition, declines to issue a certificate of appealability and dismisses the case. I. Background

A. Underlying State Case The petition refers to Milwaukee County Criminal Case “F-964194.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The court has reviewed the publicly available docket for that case. See State v. Gladney, Milwaukee County Case No. 96CF964194 (available at https://wcca.wicourts.gov). It shows that on December 19, 1996, the court entered the judgment of conviction. Id. B. Gladney v. Pollard, Case No. 13-cv-805-WCG On July 17, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his conviction in Milwaukee County Case No. “F-964194.” Gladney v. Pollard, Case No. 14-cv-805-WCG (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2. The petition asserted two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. Id. at 6-7. On August 6, 2013, Judge William C. Griesbach ordered the petitioner to show cause why his petition was not time-barred. Dkt. No. 1. A month later, Judge Griesbach concluded that the petition was untimely by more than a decade, dismissed it and denied a

certificate of appealability. Dkt. No. 12. Judge Griesbach reasoned that the petitioner’s conviction became final on January 12, 1999 and that his one-year limitations period expired on January 12, 2000. Id. at 2. He determined that neither statutory nor equitable tolling applied. Id. at 2-5. Judge Griesbach also found both of the petitioner’s claims meritless. Id. at 5. On September 27, 2013, the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his petition. Dkt. No. 14. On March 20, 2014, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

granted a certificate of appealability. Dkt. No. 28. Seventeen months later, it affirmed Judge Griesbach’s decision. Dkt. No. 30-1. The court noted that even if the petitioner had prevailed on his tolling argument, his petition would have been untimely. Id. at 2. And the court found the petitioner’s actual innocence argument “not persuasive.” Id. C. Instant Habeas Petition (Dkt. No. 1) On May 14, 2021, the petitioner filed the instant habeas petition challenging his conviction in Milwaukee County Case No. 96CF964194.

Gladney v. Pollard, Case No. 21-cv-606 (E.D. Wis.), Dkt. No. 1. The petition asserts that “[t]he Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District 1, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it ‘arbitrarily and capriciously’ applied state and federal law on lesser-included offense instructions to the facts of petitioners case.” Id. at 6. II. Analysis Usually, the court must “screen” a §2254 petition under Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which states that [i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must order the respondent to file an answer, motion or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order. A district court must allow a habeas petition to proceed unless it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. At the screening stage, a district court expresses no view as to the merits of any of the petitioner's claims. Rather, it reviews the petition and exhibits to determine whether the petitioner

alleges that he is in custody in violation of the “Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). But the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides that a district court is not required to screen certain petitions. AEDPA says that a federal district court need not entertain an inquiry into the legality of a petitioner's detention if a federal court already has determined the legality of that detention in a prior application for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §2244(a). AEDPA requires petitioners who wish to file a “second or successive”

federal habeas petition to first obtain authorization from the federal court of appeals before filing the petition in the district court. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A). “Section 2244(b)(3)(A) ‘is an allocation of subject matter jurisdiction to the court of appeals. A district court must dismiss a second or successive petition, without awaiting any response from the government, unless the court of appeals has given approval for the filing.’” In re Page, 170 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nuñez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis in Page)). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, not every petition that a petitioner previously filed constitutes a prior application for the purposes of §2244(b). Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit does not count “previous petitions that were dismissed for technical or procedural deficiencies that the petitioner can cure before refiling.” Id. Such petitions include those “dismissed because the petitioner filed in the wrong district,” id. (citing Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1999)), those in which the

petitioner failed to pay the filing fee, id. (citing Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1996)), and those dismissed as premature, id. (citing Slack v. McDaniel,

Related

Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Rafael Nunez v. United States
96 F.3d 990 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Leantry Benton v. Odie Washington
106 F.3d 162 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
In Re Thomas F. Page, Warden
170 F.3d 659 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
In Re: Benedict Joseph Cook, Iii, Movant
215 F.3d 606 (Sixth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
Gladney v. Pollard, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gladney-v-pollard-wied-2021.