Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc.

282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22089, 2003 WL 22177447
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 19, 2003·No. 03 Civ. 1166 (LMS)·Published·Cited by 83 cases

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

LISA MARGARET SMITH, United States Magistrate Judge.

The Plaintiff brings this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), and New York Labor Law Articles 6 and 19, seeking payment from the Defendants for their alleged failure to pay overtime compensation to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also seeks damages under state law for the Defendants’ alleged discrimination against him based on his age and perceived disability. On June 19, 2003, in connection with his FLSA claims, the Plaintiff moved this Court “for an order allowing this case to proceed as a collective action,” and for approval of a proposed notice to be sent to potential plaintiffs notifying them of their right to “opt-in” to the current action pursuant to 29 U.S. § 216(b) (“Proposed Notice”). By Decision and Order dated September 9, 2003 (see copy attached as Exhibit A), I granted the Plaintiffs motion to proceed as a collective action; approved, with modifications, the Proposed Notice; and ordered the Plaintiff to submit a revised copy of the Proposed Notice for my final review.

Having reviewed the revised Proposed Notice, and having made minor adjustments thereto, I hereby order the Plaintiff to mail the revised Proposed Notice and Consent to Become Party Plaintiff forms (copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit B) to potential members of the collective action in accordance with my September 9, 2003 Order. The Plaintiff is reminded that he must, based on the ultimate date of mailing, insert the appropriate deadline date in Paragraphs two and three, as well as in the Consent to Become Party Plaintiff form.

SO ORDERED.

Exhibit A

DECISION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff brings this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA” or “the Act”), and New York Labor Law Articles 6 and 19, seeking payment from the Defendants for their alleged failure to pay overtime compensation to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also seeks damages for the Defendants’ alleged discrimination against him based on his age and perceived disability, in violation of New York Human Rights Law § 296 et seq. In connection with his FLSA claims, the Plaintiff has moved this Court “for an order allowing this case to proceed as a collective action,” and for approval of a proposed notice to be sent to potential plaintiffs notifying them of their right to “opt-in” to the current action pursuant to 29 U.S. § 216(b). The Plaintiff also seeks discovery of the names and addresses of those current and former employees of the Defendants who are potential plaintiffs.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, Ronald Gjurovich (“Plaintiff’ or “Gjurovich”), began working for the defendant, Emmanuel’s Marketplace (“the Market”) in or about August, 1999. (Notice of Motion dated June 16, 2003, Docket Item # 10, Exhibit A, declaration of Ronald Gjurovich (“Gjurovich Dec.”) at ¶¶ 2, 8.) The Plaintiff was originally hired as a meat cutter in the Market’s meat department, and was paid an hourly rate. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶¶ 8, 10-11; Declaration of Joseph P. Carey, Exhibit 1: Declaration of James Phillips (“Phillips Dec.”) at ¶ 6.)

*103 In or about October 1999, Gjurovich was promoted to a position he refers to as “First Cutter.” (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶ 12.) In such position, the Plaintiff was paid a fixed salary each week, rather than being paid by the hour. (Id.) The Plaintiff claims that his effective hourly rate decreased with this promotion, since he regularly worked 65 hours each week in his position as First Cutter, but only received $670 per week, rather than the $13 per hour he had received as a meat cutter prior to being promoted. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶¶ 11-14.) In or about June 2001, the Plaintiff was again promoted, replacing his supervisor, Mike Schneller. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶ 24.) This post also was paid by salary. Id.

The Plaintiff claims that neither of his salaried positions was exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. In support of his assertion that he was a “nonexempt” employee, the Plaintiff cites FLSA regulations, emphasizing that in each position “[mjanagement was not [his] ‘primary responsibility’ ” and the “management of a recognized department” was not his primary duty. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶ 29). Thus, the Plaintiff says, while employed in those positions he should have received “overtime compensation” at the rate of “time and one-half’ for any work he performed in excess of 40 hours each week. (Brief in Support of Motion to Approve Collective Action Notice at 1-2; Gjurovich Dec. at ¶ 17.) The Defendants did not, however, make such overtime compensation payments. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶ 17; Amended Complaint at ¶ 46.)

The Plaintiff also claims that others at the Market were not paid overtime compensation even though, like him, they were entitled to such payments. According to the Plaintiff, although some other members of the meat department, as well as some members of the “[d]airy, produce, frozen foods, grocery, bakery, deli, and front end” departments, had as their primary duties “production/sales work” rather than management functions; they were also paid a fixed, weekly salary, and likewise did not receive overtime compensation for work they performed in excess of 40 hours each week. (Gjurovich Dec. at ¶¶ 30-34.)

The Defendants deny the Plaintiffs allegations and claim that in each of the salaried positions the Plaintiff held (which the Defendants refer to as the “Assistant Manager” and “Manager” of the Meat Department, respectively), the Plaintiff was an “Executive Exempt employee” pursuant to FLSA Regulations, and as such was not entitled to overtime compensation. (Answer dated April 15, 2003, docket item # 5 (“Answer”) at ¶ 62.)

DISCUSSION

Authorizing Notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

The Plaintiff initially seeks an order permitting him to send notices to other past and present employees of the defendant Market who may have similar claims to those of the Plaintiff, to inform them of the current action, and their rights under § 216(b) to “opt-in” to the pending lawsuit. Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides a private right of action “to recover unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages from employers who violate the Act’s overtime provisions.” Hoffmann v. Sbarro, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 249, 260 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (Sotomayor, J.). Section 216(b) allows such a case to be brought as a collective action, that is, an action by “one or more employees for and in behalf of himself [or herself] or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Unlike a class action lawsuit brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, in an FLSA collective *104

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Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 101, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22089, 2003 WL 22177447 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

282 F. Supp. 2d 101 (Gjurovich v. Emmanuel's Marketplace, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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