2020 IL App (1st) 181457-U No. 1-18-1457 Order filed June 19, 2020 Fifth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). __________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT __________________________________________________________________________ CHRISTINA GIUNTA, as Executor for the Estate of ROMEO ) FUGGITI, Deceased, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 L 004900 ) HERITAGE WOODS OF BOLINGBROOK, and GARDANT ) Honorable MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., ) Christopher E. Lawler, ) Judge, Presiding. Defendants-Appellees. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order granting defendants’ Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 103(b)) motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in effectuating service.
¶2 Plaintiff Christina Giunta appeals from an order of the circuit court granting defendants’,
Heritage Woods of Bolingbrook (Heritage Woods) and Gardant Management Solutions, Inc.
(Gardant), motion to dismiss pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b). Ill. S. Ct. R. 103(b).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the circuit court. No. 1-18-1457
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 15, 2017, plaintiff, as executor for the estate of her deceased father, Romeo
Fuggiti, filed a two-count negligence complaint for personal injury and wrongful death against
defendants, alleging that her father was neglected during his residency at the Heritage Woods
facility, owned by Gardant, which caused his death. Plaintiff’s father died on May 13, 2015.
Plaintiff retained attorney Jeffrey Schlapp to represent the estate and file suit against defendants.
¶5 Approximately four and half months after the complaint was filed, on October 3, 2017,
Judge Moira Johnson dismissed plaintiff’s case for want of prosecution. On October 4, 2017,
attorney Schlapp filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the case, attaching a notice
and a certificate of service which listed the names of defendants and was addressed to the registered
agent for Gardant.
¶6 On October 19, 2017, Judge Johnson vacated the dismissal and reinstated the case, and
continued the matter for status on December 5, 2017. On November 22, 2017, attorney Schlapp
was disbarred based on his conduct unrelated to this matter.
¶7 On December 5, 2017, an attorney appeared in court on plaintiff’s behalf as a “friend of
the court,” and plaintiff was granted leave to hire new counsel. On January 4, 2017, plaintiff’s new
counsel entered an appearance, and on January 5, 2018, approximately eight months after her case
was filed, plaintiff issued alias summonses to Gardant and Heritage Woods served on January 8
and 10, 2018, respectively.
¶8 After defendants filed their appearances, on February 7, 2018, Gardant moved for a
substitution of judge and plaintiff’s case was reassigned to Judge Christopher Lawler. That same
day, Gardant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of diligence pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 103(b)), and Heritage Woods joined in Gardant’s motion.
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¶9 On March 4, 2018, plaintiff filed her response to defendants’ motion to dismiss and
attached her affidavit. In her affidavit, plaintiff averred that after she retained attorney Schlapp,
she contacted him in February and April of 2017, and inquired about the progress of the case since
she knew the statute of limitations would run on or about May 13, 2017. Attorney Schlapp
informed her that she had plenty of time to file her complaint. She contacted him again in June
2017, and attorney Schlapp informed her that the complaint had been filed and the case was
scheduled for case management on July 12, 2017.
¶ 10 Plaintiff further averred that in early September 2017, she contacted the clerk of the Cook
County Circuit Court to request a copy of the complaint, and she learned that the next case
management was scheduled for October 3, 2017. On October 4, 2017, plaintiff went to the clerk’s
office and was advised that the case had been dismissed for want of prosecution. A friend advised
her to contact her attorney and request that he file a motion to vacate the dismissal as soon as
possible. Attorney Schlapp filed the motion to vacate, which was granted.
¶ 11 Plaintiff also averred that on November 22, 2017, she learned that attorney Schlapp had
been disbarred, and further stated that: “[a]t no time was I ever told, nor did I know, until after I
found out that Mr. Schlapp had been disbarred, that summons had not been issued.” Plaintiff
averred that on December 5, 2017, another attorney appeared in court on her behalf to explain what
had transpired with attorney Schlapp, and the circuit court entered an order granting her until
January 23, 2018, to retain new counsel and have summons issued to the defendants. Plaintiff
averred that attorney Schlapp did not keep her informed about the progress of her case, informed
her that she did not need to appear for court dates, and assured her that everything was "ok” and
she relied upon him.
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¶ 12 Plaintiff also averred that defendants were in possession of all of her father’s original
records and charts, and “at all times, the [d]efendants had been aware of the basis for the lawsuit
since there was a [s]tate investigation which found, among other things, that Heritage Woods of
Bolingbrook ‘posed an immediate jeopardy to the health and safety of residents.’ Defendants had
actual notice of the potential of the lawsuit.”
¶ 13 On June 14, 2018, the circuit court entered an order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s case pursuant to Rule 103(b) with prejudice. In its written order, the circuit court
reasoned that, “Giunta first served Defendants on January 8 and 10, 2018—almost eight months
after she filed her complaint. On this record, Defendants have made a prima facie case of lack of
reasonable diligence and Giunta bears the burden to demonstrate that her lack of diligence was
justified.” The court noted that plaintiff had attached an affidavit to her response, but further
reasoned that, “the standard for determining reasonable diligence is not a plaintiffs subjective
intent and instead turns on whether the plaintiff acted objectively reasonable.,” - citing Segal v.
Sacco, 136 Ill. 2d 282, 295 (1990) in support. The court further reasoned that “[l]itigants are also
bound by the mistakes and negligence of their attorney,” citing Giles v. Parks, 2018 IL App (1st)
163152. The circuit court concluded that:
“Giunta's affidavit fails to show that any of the Segal factors weigh against dismissal. As noted, she served Defendants almost eight months after the expiration of the applicable limitations period. A time period exceeding seven months between the filing of the complaint and service of the complaint and summons supports a finding of a lack of reasonable diligence. Long v. Elborno, 376 Ill. App. 3d 970, 980 (1st Dist. 2007). There is no evidence that Giunta previously sought to obtain service, and Defendants locations were matters of public record. There is also no evidence that either defendant knew of the pending action and like the plaintiff in Long, Giunta ‘fails to present any authority to support her argument that inadvertent delay in effectuating service by her attorney or her attorney's support staff is a special circumstance sufficient to outweigh the other factors.’ Id. at 982. The previous dismissal of this case on October 3, 2017 for want of prosecution, however, is a circumstance that further establishes Giunta's lack of reasonable diligence. Id. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, dismissal under Rule 103(b) is thus warranted
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and the rule dictates that Plaintiffs complaint ‘shall’ be dismissed with prejudice because service on Defendant took place beyond the limitations period.”
¶ 14 Plaintiff filed her timely notice of appeal on July 10, 2018. 1
¶ 15 DISCUSSION
¶ 16 Plaintiff raises the following issue on appeal: whether the circuit court erred in granting
defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 103(b) based upon plaintiff’s failure to exercise
reasonable diligence to obtain service on defendants.
¶ 17 As an initial matter, plaintiff contends that we review the matter de novo. She contends that
the abuse of discretion standard of review can only be applied if the circuit court followed Rule
103(b) criteria for dismissals, and because the circuit court did not properly apply Rule 103(b), the
standard of review should be de novo as our review requires interpretation of the rule. We disagree.
¶ 18 While it is generally true that the de novo standard of review applies to issues involving
the interpretation of statutes and the application of these interpreted statutes to undisputed facts
(Central Illinois Light Co. v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 335 Ill. App. 3d 412, 415 (2002)),
Illinois courts have consistently applied the abuse of discretion standard to review Rule 103(b)
dismissals. Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 286; see also Womick v. Jackson County Nursing Home, 137 Ill.
2d 371, 381 (1990) (a dismissal under Rule 103(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court);
Emrikson v. Morfin, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶¶ 13-14 (noting “[c]ases subsequent to Lewis
have also applied an abuse of discretion standard to review Rule 103(b) dismissals,” and, even
though the trial court made conclusions of law, refused to apply the de novo standard of review);
Lewis v. Dillon, 352 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515 (2004) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of
1 This case was assigned to the authoring justice’s inventory of cases on July 1, 2019, and fully briefed on July 25, 2019. The authoring justice first circulated a proposed disposition to Justice Hoffman and Justice Rochford on June 11, 2020.
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review to a Rule 103(b) dismissal despite finding the trial court “made certain legal conclusions”
and the plaintiff's argument that the de novo standard of review applied to a case “solely [about]
the application of law to undisputed facts”). Our supreme court has clearly indicated that for cases
involving the application of Rule 103(b), the trial court's determination of a plaintiff's lack of
diligence is a fact-intensive inquiry suited to balancing, not bright lines. Lewis, 352 Ill. App. 3d at
515 (citing Womick, 137 Ill. 2d 371). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's
decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41.
¶ 19 Here, the construction of the rule's language is not at issue and to any extent construction
is required, the plain meaning is clear in that the rule unambiguously requires parties “to exercise
reasonable diligence” in serving opposing parties. Rule 103(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 103(b) (eff. July 1,
2007)). The circuit court reviewed and considered plaintiff’s affidavit and considered and weighed
the due diligence factors enumerated in Segal. We therefore decline plaintiff's invitation to apply
a de novo standard of review to the instant case and review its ruling under an abuse of discretion
standard. Lewis, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 515 (citing Kole v. Brubaker, 325 Ill. App. 3d 944, 949 (2001)).
¶ 20 Turning to the merits of this appeal, Rule 103(b) requires a plaintiff to act with reasonable
diligence in effecting service of process on a defendant, and failure to do so requires a dismissal
of plaintiff's claim. Billerbeck v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 292 Ill. App. 3d 350, 352 (1997). Rule
103(b) provides:
(b) Dismissal for Lack of Diligence. If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service on a defendant prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the action as to that defendant may be dismissed without prejudice, with the right to refile if the statute of limitation has not run. If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service on a defendant occurs after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be with prejudice as to that defendant only and shall not bar any claim against any other party based on vicarious liability for that dismissed defendant’s conduct. The dismissal may be made on the application of any defendant party or on the
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court’s own motion. In considering the exercise of reasonable diligence, the court shall review the totality of the circumstances, including both lack of reasonable diligence in any previous case voluntarily dismissed or dismissed for want of prosecution, and the exercise of reasonable diligence in obtaining service in any case refiled under section 13–217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ill. S. Ct. R. 103(b).
¶ 21 “The purpose of Rule 103(b) is to protect defendants from unnecessary delay in the service
of process on them and to prevent the circumvention of the statute of limitations.” Segal, 136 Ill.
2d at 286.
¶ 22 A defendant seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 103(b) must first establish a prima facie
showing of a lack of reasonable diligence in effectuating service. Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st)
111687, ¶ 17; Kole, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 949. Once a prima facie showing is established, the burden
of proof shifts to the plaintiff “to demonstrate, by way of affidavit or other competent evidentiary
materials, that reasonable diligence was exercised and that any delays in effecting service were
justified.” Mular v. Ingram, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 21 (citing Kole, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 949-
50); Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶ 17.
¶ 23 A number of Illinois cases have determined that a shorter period of time than transpired in
this case, specifically five and seven months, established a prima facie showing of a lack of due
diligence. See Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶ 19 (a time period of even five months
between the filing of a complaint and subsequent service is sufficient to establish a prima facie
showing of failure to diligently effect service); Verploegh v. Gagliano, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1045
(2009) (a time period of five months between the filing of a complaint and subsequent service is
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of failure to diligently effect service); Long v.
Elborno, 376 Ill. App. 3d 970, 980 (2007) (seven months between filing and service supports a
finding of lack of reasonable diligence); Lewis, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 515 (plaintiff failed it issue
summons or effectuate service within a five-month period). In this case, we agree with the circuit
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court that a period of eight months was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of failure to
diligently effect service and shifted the burden to plaintiff to establish that she acted with
reasonable diligence to serve defendants or provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay in
service. Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶ 17 (citing Kole, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 949).
¶ 24 A dismissal under Rule 103(b) is based on the objective test of reasonable diligence; a
plaintiff's subjective intent is immaterial. Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶ 20; Christian v.
Lincoln Automotive Co., 403 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042 (2010); Lewis, 352 Ill App 3d at 518; Parker
v. Universal Packaging Corp., 200 Ill. App. 3d 882, 886 (1990).
¶ 25 Our supreme court has identified the following factors a court must consider when
determining whether to grant a Rule 103(b) motion, which include, but are not limited to: (1) the
length of time used to obtain service of process; (2) the activities of plaintiff; (3) plaintiff's
knowledge of defendant's location; (4) the ease with which defendant's whereabouts could have
been ascertained; (5) actual knowledge on the part of the defendant of pendency of the action as a
result of ineffective service; (6) special circumstances which would affect plaintiff's efforts; and
(7) actual service on defendant. Womick, 137 Ill. 2d at 377 (citing Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 287). Courts
have determined that if a plaintiff waits until close to the expiration of the limitations period to file
suit, a lengthy delay in service nullifies the protection against stale claims the statute of limitations
is designed to afford. Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 27 (citing Polites v. U.S. Bank National
Association, 361 Ill. App. 3d 76, 86 (2005)). Thus, a delay in service in a case filed well in advance
of the expiration of the statute of limitations may be excused while the same delay in a suit filed
close to its expiration may not. Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 27.
¶ 26 The first factor in determining the exercise of reasonable diligence – the length of time
used to obtain service of process – weighs in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff contends that Rule 103(b)
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does not prescribe an exact amount of time for effecting service on a defendant and that an eight-
month lapse in time between the filing of her complaint and the service of summons “has no
bearing in and of itself.” In her response to defendants’ Rule 103(b) motion, she also contended
that the eight-month period of time between the filing of her complaint and service on the
defendants, “is not, per se, unreasonable. There are numerous cases in which service is far greater
than that amount of time.”
¶ 27 Although plaintiff is correct that there are cases in which there was a longer lapse in time
between the date a complaint was filed and the date service was effectuated, the trial court's
determination of a plaintiff's lack of diligence is a fact-intensive inquiry suited to balancing, not
bright lines. Lewis, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 515 (citing Womick, 137 Ill. 2d 371). The circuit court
weighed all the factors and determined that the length of time used to obtain service, in this case,
showed a lack of reasonable diligence. In addition, as stated previously, there are also a number of
cases involving lesser time in which a Rule 103(b) motion to dismiss was granted. The
determination of due diligence pursuant to Rule 103(b) is fact intensive and all factors are
important.
¶ 28 The record reflects that the decedent died on May 13, 2015; plaintiff’s complaint was filed
on May 15, 2017; the case was dismissed on October 4, 2017, for want of prosecution and
reinstated on October 19, 2017; and defendants were served on January 8 and 10, 2018. Not only
were defendants served approximately eight months after the complaint was initially filed, but the
statute of limitations had also expired eight months prior. As noted earlier, a dismissal pursuant to
Rule 103(b) has been upheld where it took five or seven months to effectuate service on the
defendant after the statute of limitations had expired. Emrikson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111687, ¶ 19;
Verploegh, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 1045; Long, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 980; Lewis, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 515.
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¶ 29 In addition, plaintiff waited until the day that the limitations period was set to expire to file
suit. As previously noted, this court has held that a delay in service in a case filed well in advance
of the expiration of the statute of limitations may be excused where the same delay in a suit filed
close to its expiration may not. See Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 27. Therefore, this factor
weighs in favor of the defendants.
¶ 30 The second factor to consider is the activities of plaintiff. Plaintiff identifies affirmative
actions she took to follow her case, which included following up on the status of her case;
contacting the clerk’s office to get a copy of the complaint; going to the clerk’s office; requesting
that her attorney file a motion to vacate the dismissal for want of prosecution and checking the
court docket to ensure that it had, in fact, been filed; requesting that another attorney appear on her
behalf when she learned attorney Schlapp had been disbarred; and retaining new counsel who
subsequently issued summons and served the defendants. While plaintiff may have been diligent
in determining the status of her case, dismissal pursuant to Rule 103(b) turns on reasonable
diligence related to service of summons. It is plaintiff’s nondelegable duty to ensure service of
summons is effectuated. Smith v. Menold Construction., Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1056 (2004);
Kole, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 953. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of defendants.
¶ 31 The third and fourth factors are plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's location and the ease
with which defendant's whereabouts could have been ascertained. Plaintiff contends on appeal that
these factors “are irrelevant to this inquiry because of special circumstances.” Her contention is
incorrect. All relevant factors should be weighed to determine reasonable diligence. Lewis, 352 Ill.
App. 3d at 515 (citing Womick, 137 Ill. 2d 371). Further, the record reflects that the defendants
- were served less than a week after alias summonses were issued which indicates that defendants’
locations and whereabouts were easily ascertainable. See Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 25
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(that defendant was easy to locate is also demonstrated by the fact that she was served on the same
day the third alias summons was issued); Womick, 137 Ill. 2d at 381 (“the fact that service was
effectuated in only one day reflects the ease with which service of summons could have been
had”). Thus, these factors weigh in favor of defendants.
¶ 32 The fifth factor is defendants’ actual knowledge of the pendency of the action as a result
of ineffective service. Plaintiff contends that defendants and their agent would have known about
the lawsuit after October 4, 2017, because attorney Schlapp mailed the notice, motion to reinstate,
and certificate of service to the registered agent, which was well within reasonable time standards.
¶ 33 First, there is nothing in the record indicating that defendants were ever served with
plaintiff’s complaint before it was dismissed in October 2017, and as noted previously, there is
caselaw that supports a determination that even a five-month lapse in time weighs against
plaintiff’s due diligence. Further, although the notice of plaintiff’s motion to vacate the dismissal
and reinstate her case was addressed to Gardant’s registered agent, there is no evidence that notice
was ever sent to Heritage Woods. As such, although it is arguably true that Gardant may have had
actual knowledge in early October 2017, there is nothing in the record that indicates that Heritage
Woods had any knowledge of the lawsuit prior to being served in January 2018. Furthermore,
whether five months or eight months, as we stated earlier, a delay in service in a case filed well in
advance of the expiration of the statute of limitations may be excused where the same delay in a
suit filed close to its expiration may not. See Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 27.
¶ 34 Here, plaintiff’s complaint was arguably filed on the last day before the statute of
limitations expired, which makes service of process within the expiration of the limitations period
impossible. Finally, actual knowledge is but one factor, and standing alone, does not prevent a
dismissal under Rule 103(b) when, considering all the other factors, the trial court finds plaintiff
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did not exercise due diligence in effecting service. Marks v. Rueben H. Donnelly, Inc., 260 Ill.
App. 3d 1042, 1048 (1994); see also Long, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 981 (even if hospital had notice of
the pending action prior to being served, this fact alone fails to overcome plaintiff's seven-month
delay in effectuating service).
¶ 35 The sixth factor for determining whether there has been reasonable diligence to effectuate
service is the existence of any special circumstances affecting plaintiff's efforts. The weight to be
given to a “special circumstance” in relation to the other six Segal factors which must be
considered depends upon the particular facts in each case. Long, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 982 (citing
Marks, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1049). On appeal, plaintiff contends that her delay in effectuating service
was justified because her former attorney, attorney Schlapp, continually engaged in fraudulent
concealment throughout her case including failing to inform her and the court that summons had
not been issued and that defendants had not been served. She argues that the court’s reliance upon
Giles for the proposition that litigants are bound by the mistakes and negligence of their attorney,
is not necessarily true, and that her situation should be judged by the principles of justice and
fairness.
¶ 36 Plaintiff relies upon cases that have applied a more lenient due diligence standard under
section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014), which has been previously rejected by this court
in Marks, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1048. However, the Marks court declined to extend a more lenient
standard of section 2-1401 to cases that were dismissed under Rule 103(b). Marks, 260 Ill. App.
3d at 1048. In Marks, we distinguished the facts in Cohen v. Wood Brothers Steel Stamping Co.,
227 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1991), which noted the existence of two lines of cases under section 2–1401;
one favoring application of a strict due diligence standard, and the other favoring a more relaxed
standard in the interests of justice and fairness. Marks, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1053. Rejecting
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plaintiff’s argument for a more relaxed approach to analyzing due diligence under Rule 103(b) in
the interest of fairness, the Marks court reasoned that “[t]he conclusion reached in the Cohen case
does not extend by analogy or otherwise to the interpretation of the reasonable diligence standard
under Rule 103(b) in the present case. We have discerned no divergence in the Rule 103(b) cases
such as the two lines of cases on section 2–1401 petitions.” Marks, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1053.
¶ 37 Even if we were to draw an analogy between Rule 103(b) and section 2-1401 cases, we
find the reasoning in Marks compelling because most recently, this court held that “the equitable
considerations upon which this court based its decisions in Cohen and Coleman are no longer
relevant in resolving a section 2–1401 petition and those cases have been overruled by [People v.]
Vincent [226 Ill. 2d 1 (2007)] to the extent this court held that a relaxation of the due diligence
standard is appropriate where petitioner's counsel has engaged in unanticipated and inexplicable
misconduct.” R.M. Lucas Co. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 102955, ¶ 24
(this court declined to relax the due diligence standard or depart from the general rule that a party
is bound by the mistakes and negligence of its counsel).
¶ 38 In this case, it is unfortunate that plaintiff’s counsel contributed to the delay in effectuating
service on defendants. Although plaintiff contends that attorney Schlapp acted fraudulently, the
record supports the conclusion that he was negligent at best. As such, we will not depart from this
court’s determination that, generally, a litigant is bound by the mistakes or negligence of their
counsel. Giles, 2018 IL App (1st) 163152, ¶ 20; KNM Holdings, Inc. v. James, 2016 IL App (1st)
143008, ¶ 22; Long, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 982; Ameritech Publishing of Illinois, Inc. v. Hadyeh, 362
Ill. App. 3d 56, 60 (2005). Furthermore, the record reflects that the court considered and rejected
plaintiff’s argument related to the actions of her former attorney and reasoned that she “fail[ed] to
present any authority to support her argument that inadvertent delay in effectuating service by her
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attorney or her attorney's support staff is a special circumstance sufficient to outweigh the other
factors.” Therefore, we find that this factor weighs against plaintiff.
¶ 39 The seventh factor is actual service on defendants. Although defendants were served, they
were served eight months after the statute of limitations expired, which does not weigh in
plaintiff’s favor. Mular, 2015 IL App (1st) 142439, ¶ 27.
¶ 40 Overall, the Segal factors weighed in favor of granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 103(b). We conclude therefore that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting defendant's motion to dismiss the action.
¶ 41 CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
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