[380]*380OPINION OF THE COURT BY
BURNS, J.
Robert L. and Inge E. Giuliani, plaintiffs below, appeal the granting of summary judgment in favor of Walter Chuck, defendant below, in their tort action against him. The questions on appeal are whether any genuine issue of material fact existed and whether defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Haw. 113, 118, 551 P.2d 163, 168 (1976); rule 56, Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP).
For purposes of this appeal, the facts and inferences drawn from them are viewed in the light most favorable to the Giulianis. Iuli v. Fasi, 62 Haw. 184, 613 P.2d 653 (1980).
[381]*381In 1973 the Giulianis, as buyers, entered into a Deposit, Receipt, Offer and Acceptance agreement (DROA) with Henry Chun Hook Dang (Dang), as seller, involving residential property in Kailua, Hawaii.1 Pursuant to the DROA, the Giulianis paid a $1,000.00 deposit to Dang.
Dang’s attorney, Defendant Walter Chuck (Chuck), a lawyer licensed to practice in Hawaii, prepared documents necessary to effect the sale.2 The documents Chuck prepared did not conform to the terms in the DROA.3 The Giulianis refused to sign the documents and made unsuccessful attempts to cause Chuck to reform the documents to conform to the DROA prior to the scheduled closing date (January 15, 1974).
Chuck, by letter of February 6,1974, advised the Giulianis that their $1,000.00 deposit was forfeit because they had breached the DROA.4 The Giulianis tried to negotiate the return of the deposit but did not succeed.
In June 1974, the Giulianis sued Dang in district court for rescission of the contract and for return of their $1,000.00. They won. Dang appealed. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in a memorandum opinion. The Giulianis collected on their judgment.
[382]*382After they obtained the district court judgment, the Giulianis filed this suit in circuit court against Chuck. Their amended complaint alleged the above facts and that:
The Defendant willfully usurped the Plaintiffs’ rights in the DROA contract and denied the Plaintiffs access to their $1,000.00. The Defendant compelled Plaintiffs to needlessly enter into litigation to defend their property and rights which, in turn, caused Plaintiffs to suffer mental anguish as well as deprivation of enjoyment over a long period of time. All this inflicted needless harm upon the Plaintiffs. These acts by the Defendant were such as to amount to wanton disregard for the rights, feelings, and personal property of the Plaintiffs and for that reason, Plaintiffs claim;
General Damages against the Defendant in the sum of Eighty Five Thousand Dollars ($85,000.00) and
Punitive Damages against the Defendant in the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00).
Chuck’s answer denied the gravamen of the amended complaint and raised the separate defenses that he owed no duty to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had already received their remedy in the action against Dang.5
Chuck filed a motion for summary judgment and claimed entitlement to summary judgment because:
1. The amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, i.e., Chuck owed no duty to the Giulianis; and
2. The matters complained of were done by Chuck in the appropriate and legal course of Chuck’s representation of his client Dang, i.e., Chuck did not breach whatever duty, if any, he owed to Giuliani.
The lower court granted Chuck’s motion after a hearing. The transcript of that hearing makes it clear that the basis of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that the Giulianis had failed to establish any duty owed by Chuck to them. The Giulianis filed a HRCP, rule 60, motion for reconsideration, [383]*383which the lower court denied after a hearing. In denying the latter motion, the court stated that Chuck owed no duty to the Giulianis and that the district court’s decision in the Giulianis’ action against Dang indicated that Chuck had sufficient reason to have advised his client Dang to take the actions that he did.
Where the defendant is the moving party, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any discernible theory. Abraham v. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968).
On this appeal, the Giulianis rely on HRS § 663-16 and the case of Campbell v. Brown, 2 Woods 349 (Texas 1876), as authority sufficient to establish that an attorney, while representing a client, has a duty to refrain from committing tortious acts against third parties. They argue that the allegations of their amended complaint are sufficient to establish fraud, misrepresentation, interference in and usurpation of their contractual rights. They assert that the trial court erred in finding that the district court’s decision in Giuliani v. Dang contained sufficient reason as a matter of law for Chuck to have advised his client to take the actions that he did.
Chuck argues that he had no duty to the Giulianis under any discernible theory under any set of facts within the parameters of their allegations and that if he had a duty his actions did not constitute a breach of that duty.
I. DUTY.
The rule of law that an attorney representing a client may be held personally liable to an adverse party or a third person [384]*384who sustains injury as a result of an attorney’s intentional tortious acts is well-settled. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947), Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal. App. 2d 532, 290 P.2d 955 (1955), Newburger, Loeb and Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2nd Cir. 1977). See Warner v. Roadshow Attractions Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1942).
The fact that there are limitations on the extent to which an attorney can go in his or her representation of a client is clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which is made applicable to all Hawaii attorneys by rule 16.2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.
II. PRIVILEGE.7
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[380]*380OPINION OF THE COURT BY
BURNS, J.
Robert L. and Inge E. Giuliani, plaintiffs below, appeal the granting of summary judgment in favor of Walter Chuck, defendant below, in their tort action against him. The questions on appeal are whether any genuine issue of material fact existed and whether defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Haw. 113, 118, 551 P.2d 163, 168 (1976); rule 56, Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP).
For purposes of this appeal, the facts and inferences drawn from them are viewed in the light most favorable to the Giulianis. Iuli v. Fasi, 62 Haw. 184, 613 P.2d 653 (1980).
[381]*381In 1973 the Giulianis, as buyers, entered into a Deposit, Receipt, Offer and Acceptance agreement (DROA) with Henry Chun Hook Dang (Dang), as seller, involving residential property in Kailua, Hawaii.1 Pursuant to the DROA, the Giulianis paid a $1,000.00 deposit to Dang.
Dang’s attorney, Defendant Walter Chuck (Chuck), a lawyer licensed to practice in Hawaii, prepared documents necessary to effect the sale.2 The documents Chuck prepared did not conform to the terms in the DROA.3 The Giulianis refused to sign the documents and made unsuccessful attempts to cause Chuck to reform the documents to conform to the DROA prior to the scheduled closing date (January 15, 1974).
Chuck, by letter of February 6,1974, advised the Giulianis that their $1,000.00 deposit was forfeit because they had breached the DROA.4 The Giulianis tried to negotiate the return of the deposit but did not succeed.
In June 1974, the Giulianis sued Dang in district court for rescission of the contract and for return of their $1,000.00. They won. Dang appealed. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in a memorandum opinion. The Giulianis collected on their judgment.
[382]*382After they obtained the district court judgment, the Giulianis filed this suit in circuit court against Chuck. Their amended complaint alleged the above facts and that:
The Defendant willfully usurped the Plaintiffs’ rights in the DROA contract and denied the Plaintiffs access to their $1,000.00. The Defendant compelled Plaintiffs to needlessly enter into litigation to defend their property and rights which, in turn, caused Plaintiffs to suffer mental anguish as well as deprivation of enjoyment over a long period of time. All this inflicted needless harm upon the Plaintiffs. These acts by the Defendant were such as to amount to wanton disregard for the rights, feelings, and personal property of the Plaintiffs and for that reason, Plaintiffs claim;
General Damages against the Defendant in the sum of Eighty Five Thousand Dollars ($85,000.00) and
Punitive Damages against the Defendant in the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00).
Chuck’s answer denied the gravamen of the amended complaint and raised the separate defenses that he owed no duty to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had already received their remedy in the action against Dang.5
Chuck filed a motion for summary judgment and claimed entitlement to summary judgment because:
1. The amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, i.e., Chuck owed no duty to the Giulianis; and
2. The matters complained of were done by Chuck in the appropriate and legal course of Chuck’s representation of his client Dang, i.e., Chuck did not breach whatever duty, if any, he owed to Giuliani.
The lower court granted Chuck’s motion after a hearing. The transcript of that hearing makes it clear that the basis of the court’s ruling was its conclusion that the Giulianis had failed to establish any duty owed by Chuck to them. The Giulianis filed a HRCP, rule 60, motion for reconsideration, [383]*383which the lower court denied after a hearing. In denying the latter motion, the court stated that Chuck owed no duty to the Giulianis and that the district court’s decision in the Giulianis’ action against Dang indicated that Chuck had sufficient reason to have advised his client Dang to take the actions that he did.
Where the defendant is the moving party, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any discernible theory. Abraham v. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 628, 446 P.2d 821 (1968).
On this appeal, the Giulianis rely on HRS § 663-16 and the case of Campbell v. Brown, 2 Woods 349 (Texas 1876), as authority sufficient to establish that an attorney, while representing a client, has a duty to refrain from committing tortious acts against third parties. They argue that the allegations of their amended complaint are sufficient to establish fraud, misrepresentation, interference in and usurpation of their contractual rights. They assert that the trial court erred in finding that the district court’s decision in Giuliani v. Dang contained sufficient reason as a matter of law for Chuck to have advised his client to take the actions that he did.
Chuck argues that he had no duty to the Giulianis under any discernible theory under any set of facts within the parameters of their allegations and that if he had a duty his actions did not constitute a breach of that duty.
I. DUTY.
The rule of law that an attorney representing a client may be held personally liable to an adverse party or a third person [384]*384who sustains injury as a result of an attorney’s intentional tortious acts is well-settled. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947), Greenwood v. Mooradian, 137 Cal. App. 2d 532, 290 P.2d 955 (1955), Newburger, Loeb and Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2nd Cir. 1977). See Warner v. Roadshow Attractions Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 35 (1942).
The fact that there are limitations on the extent to which an attorney can go in his or her representation of a client is clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which is made applicable to all Hawaii attorneys by rule 16.2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii.
II. PRIVILEGE.7
We are aware of the need to allow attorneys the freedom to represent their clients zealously within the bounds of the law. CPR, canon 7. We recognize a presently undefined area of privilege where an attorney’s actions will be deemed justifiable under the circumstances and he or she shall not be held liable for his or her actions.
III. FACTS ON THE RECORD.
Although the complaint in this case was filed on November 18, 1975 and Chuck’s motion for summary judgment was filed a year later on November 9, 1976, the factual record is very limited. Chuck’s formal discovery was limited to the taking of Mr. Giuliani’s deposition and this deposition is not part of the record on appeal. The Giulianis conducted no formal discovery. Chuck did not testify in Giuliani v. Dang and the transcript of that trial is not a part of the record in this case. Chuck’s motion for summary judgment was not accompanied by any affidavits. The record does not contain any affidavits by Chuck or Dang.
[385]*385We disagree with the lower court’s decision that the district court’s decision in Giuliani v. Dang indicates, as a matter of law, that Chuck had sufficient reason to have advised his client to refuse to refund the Giulianis’ $1,000.00 deposit. All that decision indicates is that for undefined reasons rescission of the DROA contract was appropriate and, therefore, that the Giulianis were entitled to a refund of their $1,000.00 deposit.
We disagree with the suggestion that Chuck’s February 6, 1974 letter refutes the Giulianis’ cause of action as a matter of law. The fact that Chuck stated in writing that he had a legitimate basis for his actions does not make it so. Had he done so under oath then possibly the Giulianis would have been required to respond with some competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue as to the basis for Chuck’s actions. See 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice AND Procedure: Civil § 2727. Such is not the case here so we do not reach that question.
IV. THE CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED.
In our view of this case, because of the scarcity of facts on the record, the primary issue raised by Chuck’s motion for summary judgment was whether or not the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. See HRCP, rule 12(b)(6), and 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and PROCEDURE: Civil § 1356. Stated another way, the issue was whether the complaint contained a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff was entitled to relief. See HRCP, rule 8(a).
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1357. A complaint is not subject to dismissal with prejudice unless it appears to a certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved in support of its allegations. Id. § 1215. The rules do not require technical exactness or draw refined inferences against the pleader; rather, they require a determined effort to understand what the pleader is attempt[386]*386ing to set forth and to construe the pleading in his favor. This is particularly true when a court is dealing with a complaint drawn by a layman unskilled in the law.8 Id. § 1286.
In our view, the essence of the Giulianis’ amended complaint is that Chuck intentionally and improperly refused to return their $1,000.00 deposit. Therefore, the amended complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional harm to a property interest, a cognizable cause of action sounding in tort. Restatement, Second, Torts § 871.
One who intentionally deprives another of his legally protected property interest or causes injury to the interest is subject to liability to the other if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.
We further find the Giulianis’ amended complaint insufficient to allege any other cause of action.
We especially find the Giulianis’ amended complaint insufficient to allege a cause of action in fraud. The party asserting such a claim must have relied on the claimed misrepresentation. Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 587 P.2d 285 (1978), Peine v. Murphy, 46 Haw. 233, 377 P.2d 708 (1962). Here, the facts as alleged by the Giulianis establish quite the contrary. Rather than relying on the documents prepared by Chuck or any of his statements, the Giulianis refused to execute the documents and pursued their legal remedies vigorously.
V. CONCLUSION
Pleadings are not an end in themselves. They are only a means to assist in the presentation of a case to enable it to be decided on the merits. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND Procedure: Civil § 1473. This opinion states the law applicable to this case. What is missing are the relevant facts. We therefore reverse and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[387]*387Robert L. Giuliani, pro se, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Renton L. K. Nip (Huddy T. Lucas on the brief) for defendant-appellee.