Giron-Ardon v. Barr
Opinion
17-1803 Giron-Ardon v. Barr BIA
Montante, IJ
A206 635 986/987
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 22nd day of May, two thousand nineteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNIS JACOBS, 8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 9 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 ANDRIANA LISSETTE GIRON-ARDON, AKA 14 ADRIANA LISSETTE GIRON-ARDON, IVANA 15 MARIA DE JESUS GIRON-ARDON 16 Petitioners, 17 18 v. 17-1803 19 NAC 20 WILLIAM P. BARR 21 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 22 Respondent. 23 _____________________________________ 24 25 FOR PETITIONERS: Stephen K. Tills, Orchard Park, 26 NY. 27 28 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 29 Attorney General; Justin R. 30 Markel, Senior Litigation Counsel; 31 Brooke M. Maurer, Trial Attorney,
1 Office of Immigration Litigation, 2 United States Department of 3 Justice, Washington, DC. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. 9 Petitioners Andriana Lissette Giron-Ardon (“Giron- 10 Ardon”), and her minor daughter, Ivana Maria De Jesus Giron- 11 Ardon, natives and citizens of Guatemala, seek review of a 12 May 9, 2017 decision of the BIA affirming an October 18, 2016, 13 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their 14 applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 15 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Andriana 16 Lissette Giron-Ardon and Ivana Maria De Jesus Giron-Ardon, 17 Nos. A 206 635 986/987 (B.I.A. May 9, 2017), aff’g Nos. A 206 18 635 986/987 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Oct. 18, 2016). We assume 19 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, 20 procedural history, and issues raised on appeal. 21 Giron-Ardon challenges the agency’s denial of asylum as 22 time barred and its denial of withholding of removal for 23 failure to establish a nexus to a protected ground. Under 24 the circumstances of this case, we have considered the IJ’s
1 decision as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Yan 2 Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The 3 applicable standards of review are well established. See 4 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 5 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). We review the agency’s findings of 6 fact under the substantial evidence standard. See Hong Fei 7 Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). Under this 8 standard, “[w]e treat factual findings as ‘conclusive unless 9 any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 10 the contrary.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 11 Timeliness of Asylum Application 12 We dismiss the petition as to asylum. Giron-Ardon did 13 not exhaust her challenge to the timeliness finding on appeal 14 to the BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 15 104, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that issue exhaustion is 16 mandatory). Moreover, our jurisdiction to review the denial 17 of an asylum claim as untimely is limited to “constitutional 18 claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see 19 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Giron-Ardon has not identified any 20 such claims, as she argues only that the agency ignored 21 evidence that she filed her application in April 2015. There
1 is no legal error here, particularly as the agency considered 2 the application to be filed earlier, on March 27, 2015. 3 Nexus to a Protected Ground 4 In order to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of 5 removal, Giron-Ardon must establish that “race, religion, 6 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 7 political opinion” was or will be at least one central reason 8 for her persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also 9 Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010). 10 There may be “more than one motive for mistreatment, as long 11 as at least one central reason for the mistreatment is on 12 account of a protected ground.” Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 13 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 An applicant “must provide some evidence of [a persecutor’s 15 motives], direct or circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 16 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of 17 Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency’s 18 findings regarding the persecutor’s motives and the nexus 19 between the harms and a petitioner’s protected status are 20 reviewed for substantial evidence. See Gjolaj v. Bureau of 21 Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 22 2006).
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