Girod LoanCo, LLC v. Klein

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GIROD LOANCO, L.L.C. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 24-2366

HENRY L. KLEIN SECTION: “D” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (rec. doc. 36) filed by Plaintiff Girod 1 LoanCo, L.L.C. (“Girod”). Pro se Defendant Henry Klein (“Klein”) filed an Opposition to the motion. (Rec. doc. 39). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as fIo. llowsB. ackground

The majority of the underlying facts are unimportant to the resolution of Girod’s fees 2 motion. In short, this case arises out of Girod’s efforts to recover a post-foreclosure sale balance owed to Girod by Klein as the guarantor of a promissory note. (Rec. doc. 33 at 1). On July 7, 2023, the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, entered a judgment directing Klein to pay $317,185.4 7Id t. o Girod. (Rec. doc. 30). Thereafter, the parties engaged in post-judgment discovery. On October 1, 2024, two days before a hearing on two of Girod’s post-judgment discovery motions, Klein removed this case to this Court. (Rec. doc. 36-1 at 5). After the Court found that Klein’s Notice of Removal did not state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, Klein filed a Comprehensive Notice of Removal,

1 2 The District Court referred the motion to the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). (Rec. doc. 38). asserting federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (Rec. docs. 36-1 at 6; 27-1 at 377; 18 ¶¶ 1, 10). On November 11, 2024, Girod filed a Motion for Sanctions seeking, among other

things, remand as a sanction against Klein. (Rec. doc. 17). The District Court denied Girod’s Motion for Sanctions but nevertheless remanded this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Rec. doc. 30). On the same day that the District Court issued its Order and Reasons remanding this case, Girod filed a Motion to Remand to State Court seeking remand and for the Court to impose attorney’s fees and costs against Klein. (Rec. doc. 29). In the District Court’s Order and Reasons remanding this case, it noted that Girod’s Motion to Remand to State Court is moot, however, the Motion remains pending to the extent that it seeks attorney’s fees and costs. (Rec. doc. 30 at 4 n. 22).

On February 19, 2025, the District Court denied in part Girod’s Motion to Remand to State Court as moot but granted in the part the Motion to the extent that Girod seeks attorney’s fees and costs. (Rec. doc. 33 at 6). Thereafter, Girod filed the instant Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees. (Rec. doc 36). In its fee motion, Girod seeks a total of $14,342.26 for 39.1 hours expended that would not have been incurred had the case remained in state court. (Rec. docs. 36; 36-3 at 4.) In Opposition, Klein filed Response to Motion at Doc. 36 and Re- UIIr. ged RLeaqwu easntd fo Arn Oarlayls Aisrgument. (Rec. doc. 39).

A. Entitlemen t to Attorneys’ Fees for Improper Removal

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” However, “[t]here is no automatic entitlement to an award of attorney's Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. fees.” , 199 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the “mere determination that removal was improper” does not require a district court to award attorney’s fees). Rather, a court “may award aHttoowrnaerdy ’vs. fSete. sG werhmeani nthe removing party lacks

an objectively reasonable basis fMora rretimn ovv. aFl.r”a nklin Capital Corp. , 599 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing , 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005) (holding that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removingM paarrttiyn lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal”)). The Supreme Court in explained that “[t]he appropriate test for awarding fees under Section 1447(c) should recognize the desire to deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general

matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.” 546 U.S. at 140. In thAamt r. eAgiralrinde, sS,e Icntci.o vn. 1Sa4b4r7e(,c I)n fce.e awards are cost recoupments, hence punitive in policy only. , 694 F.3d 539, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2012) Here, the District Court concluded: Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that not only was removal baseless given the pleadings in this matter, but that Mr. Klein knew his arguments lacked validity based on prior court decisions. As the Court explained in Pittman Assets: “Baseless removals such as this one come at a significant cost to plaintiffs, whose time and money is wasted defending such removals, as well as to courts, which must allocate their limited resources to ensuring that they have federal jurisdiction over the cases before them. To say that much ink has been spilled in this matter would be an understatement. To safeguard against future removals which lack an objectively reasonable basis such as this one, the Court exercises its discretion and awards cost and attorney’s fees.” Klein has demonstrated, in this case and others, a pattern of eleventh hour removals of cases over which federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction, seemingly for the purpose of avoiding the effects of adverse state court rulings. For these reasons, the Court awards attorney’s fees and costs to Girod. (Rec. doc. 33 at 5–6). Once a court determines that the removal was improper, Section 1447(c) Agvivitetss va. cAomuorct od iPscroredt. ioCno .to determine what amount of costs and fees, if any, to award Girod.

, 111 F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the language “incurred as a result of removal” to limit the litigation expenses that may be awarded under this section to fees and costs incurredA ivni tftesderal court that would not have been incurred had the case remained in state court. , 111 F.3d at 32. In calculating attorneys’ fees, the Court is to calculate the lodestar, which is the product of the number of hBorouwrsn r ve.a Assocneanbt lAys esuxpr.e, nIndce.d on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly billing rate. 3 , 191 F. Supp. 2d 729, 731 (N.D. Miss. 2002).

3 Compare As GirodG’si rcoodu nTsitelli npgr eTvriuosuts vly. Pdiitdtm ina nsi mAsisleatrs c, aLs.Le. Cbefore this Court, it argues herew tithhat Louisiana law provides the standaGridro odf LreoaasnoCnoa, bLl.eLn.Ce. svs. Hfoern trhye K alweianrd of attorney’ fees and expenses. Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees at 7, ., No. 24-1993, Rec. doc. 36-1 Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees at 8, , No. 24-2366, Rec. doc. 36-1 at 8. In that case, this Court concluded that: See In reG Siyrondg eanrtgau Perso dths.a Lt iLaobu. Lisiitaign.a law provides the standard of reasonableness for the award of attornereyps’o frete asn adn rde ccoomstms, ebnudta tthioisn C aoduorptt’se dreview of the case law reveals otherwise. otte Chem. T,i tNaon. (4M:2) 3S-eCnVd-i0ri3a0n3 B1e, r2h0a2d4 v . WWLil d2e8r35167, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2024), Rey, eNso v.. 4S:p2u3r- DCVis-c0. 3S0to3r1e, N2o0.2 44 WL 2836254 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2024); L , No. Civ. A. H-14-1116, 2014 WL 7151569, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014); , No. Civ. A. 07- 2717, 2007 WL 2571905, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2007). Cases such as these demonstrate that federal courts in the Fifth Circuit apply the feMdaetrhails l ov.d Eexsxtaorn mCoerthpo. d after remanding state-law claims. While Girod cites to cases such as , 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002), to support the proposition thaMt tahteh issu bstantive law of the state that serves as the rule of decision for the substantive issues in the case also cMonattrhoisls the award of and the reasonableness of the fees awarded, and the other cited cases are inapposite as they did not involve attorneys’ fees Sfoere riedm. ands to state court. In , the Fifth Circuit resolved the substantive issues of the lawsuit under Texas state law, and, therefore applies Texas state law to resolve the fees issue. Here, pthaess Dimistrict Court decided its federal jurisdiction and never reached the substantive issues in the lawsuit, remanding said claims to the state court for any such resolution. (Rec. doc. 35, ). In other words, the District Court did not rely on Louisiana law to determine its federal subject-m Gaitrteord jTuirtilsindgic Ttirouns,t avn. Pdi tLtomuainsi Aanssae tlas,w L .L.C was in no way implicated by its decision. Report and Recommendation re Motion to Fix Attorney Fees at 4, ., No. B. The Lodestar Approach

The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have ofHteenn srleeyp ev.a Etecdk etrhhaatr ta request for attorneys’ fees Asshsoouclidat neodt B supialdwenrs m &a Cjoorn atrnacciltloarrsy o lift Ligaa.,t iIonnc.. v . Orleans Par. School,

4B6d1. U.S. 424, 437 (1983); , 919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990). A court’s discretion in fashionii.ne.g a reasonable attorney’s fee is broad and reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, , it will not be reversed unless there is stroHnge nesvleidyence that it is excessHivoep woro oinda vd.e Sqtuaatete o, fo Tre txh.e amount chosen is clearly erroneous. , 461 U.S. at 436-37; , 236 F.3d 256, 277 n.79 (5th Cir. 2000). To determine a reasonable fee, the Court must provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award, making subsidiary factual determinations regarding whether

the requested hourly rate is reasonable, and whether the tasks reporteHde nbsyl ecyounsel were duplicatiAvses,o ucnianteecde Bssuailrdye, rosr & u Cnorenltartaecdt otros the purposes of the lawsuit. , 461 U.S. at 437-39; , 919 F.2d at 379. The Fifth Circuit has noted that its “concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that the findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the Bcoraunrtt lheays v u. Sseudrl epsroper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation.” , 804 F.2d 321, 325- 26 (5th Cir. 1986). In assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the Court must first determine the

"lodestar" by multiplying the reasonable nuSmeeb Here nosfl ehyours expended anGdr etehne vr.e Aadsomn’rasb olef hthoeu rTluy larantee Efodru ce.a Fchu npdarticipating attorney. , 461o Uve.Sr.r uatle 4d3 o3n; other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa F, e2 R8a4i lFw.3ayd C6o4. 2v,. W66h1it e(5th Cir. 2002), Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc. , 548 U.S. 53 (2006); , La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom 135 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); , 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995). The lodestar is presJuomhnesdo rneasonable,F beusts lae rc ovu. Prto mrcaelya tnhae nC oernohnaan Dcee oMre dxeiccor,e Sa.sAe. 4 iDt ea Cft.eVr. considering the twelve factors. Combs v. City of Huntington , 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing , 829 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2016)). “‘[T]heC ommobsst critical factor’ in determiHneinngsl eay reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” , 829 F.3d at 394 (quoting , 461 U.S. at 436). The fee applicant bears the burden of proof on the Jloohdnessotnar issue, but once calculatedS,e teh Fee psaslretry seeking modifica Rtiioleny o vf. tChiety l oodf eJastcakrs ounnder the factors bears the buKredllesntr. o m , 23 F.4thIn a rt e4 S1m6;ith , 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996); , 50 F.3d at 324; 1. , 99R6e Fa.s2odn 9a7b3le, 9 H7o8u (r5ltyh RCairt.e 1s992).

“‘[R]easonable’ hourly rates M‘acrCe ltaoin b ve. cLaulfckuilna tIendd uasc.c, oInrcd.ing to the prevailing market rates in the relevBalnutm c ovm. Smteunnsiotyn.’” , 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence – in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits – that the requested rates are in line with those prevailBinlug min the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill.” , 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “An attorney’s requested hourly rate is prima facie reasonable when [he] requests that the lodestar be computed at [hthise] r a‘ctues itso nmota rcyo nbteilsltiendg rWateh,i’t et hve. I mrapteer iiasl Awdijtuhsitnm tehnet Croarnpg.e of

prevailing market rates and .” , No.

See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc. abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard 4v. Bergeron La. Power 99-3804, 2005 WL 1578810, at *5 (E.D. La. June 28, 2005) (citing , 50 F.3d at 328) (emphasis added). In its fee submission, Girod seeks fees on behalf of three attorneys from Kean Miller

LLP: J. Eric Lockridge, Karli Glascock Johnson, and Kaitlyn M. Hollowell. J. Eric Lockridge is a partner in Kean Miller’s Baton Rouge office with 26 years of experience. Lockridge has tried numerous cases in both federal and state courts. He regularly represents commercial clients in multi-million-dollar litigation in state and federal district courts in Louisiana and Texas, and federal bankruptcy courts in Louisiana, Texas, Colorado, New York, Delaware, and other jurisdictions. Lockridge charges $495.00/hour. Karli Glascock Johnson is also a partner in Kean Miller’s Baton Rouge office with over 25 years of legal experience with complex multi-party litigation. Johnson charges $480.00/hour. Katilyn M. Hollowell is a

Senior Associate in Kean Miller’s Baton Rouge office with eight years of legal experience. She charges $335.00/hour. Girod attaches the recent resumes for each of the attorneys who billed hours in this lawsuit. (Rec. doc. 36-1 at 13). prima facie See DureneW v.h Benri nthkeer r Leaq.u Iensct.ed hourly rate is not contested, it is reasonable. , No. 21-1568, 2022 WL 2828831, at *2 (E.D. La. Jul. 20, 2022). Although Klein filed a “Response” to the instant motion, he does not dispute Girod’s counsels’ requested billing rates. (Rec. doc. 39). Indeed, Klein’s Response states “as to the arithmetic thIda.t computed the fees sought by Girord LoanCo, LLC, this Defendant makes no comment.”

( at 1). Klein further states that he has “no basis to quibble with the GIROD numbers that add up to the $14,342.26 requested” and that if the Court finds, after reading his Response, that the law requires a payment of $14,342.26, “then (respectfully), so be it.” Instead of disputing the fees that Girod seeks, the bulk of Klein’s Response is spent describing reasons he believes this case to be “tainted from the start,” abnormal, and warranting oral argument. (Rec. doc. 39). Accordingly, the requested hourly rates are prima facie reasonable. All of the hours billed in this lawsuit occurred in late 2024. Having reviewed Stheee, cea.gse.,

lUanwit, etdh eS tCaoteusr et xf irnedl.s M tchNate itlh ve. Jhoolluyrly billing rates are reasonable for this market. , 451 F. Supp. 3d 657, 675 (E.D. La. 2020) (finding in 2020 that attorneys’ fees at the requested rate of $450.00 per hour for an attorney with over 25 years of experience in False Claims Act litigation and $250.00 per hour for a Jseefvfeerns-oyne avr. aBtatyowrnaetyer wDirtihll infogu, rL .Ly.eCa.rs of False Claims Act experience were reasonable); , No. CV 14-1711, 2015 WL 7281612, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2015) (affirming magistrate judge’s report and recommendation finding that rates of $500.00 and $450.00 perR hedoHura wwke rHeo rledainsogns aCbolrep f.o vr. tSwchor aetitboerrneys with 40 years of experience in maritime

litigation); , No. CV 17-819, 2022 WL 65860, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2022) (finding in 2022 $425.00 per hour reasonable for a partner with over thirty y2e. ars’ eRxepaesrioennacbe)le. Hours Expended

The party seeking the fee bears the burden of documenting andH seunpslpeoyrting the reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. , 461 U.S. at 437. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to excluIdde. from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary . . .” at 434.

HIdo. u rs that are not properly billed to one’s client are not properly billed to one’s adversary. The Supreme CoIdu.r t calls on fee applicants to make a fee request that demonstrates “billing judgment.” The remedy for failiIndg. to exercWisael k“beril lvin. Cg itjuy dogfm Meenstq”u iist eto exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. at 434; , 313 F.3d Walker v. HUD 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting , 99 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“If there ibsu nt oa erevdiduecnticoen ooff b‘tihllein hgo ujurds gamweanrdt,e hdo bwy eav peerr, ctehnetna tghee i nptreonpdeerd rteom suebdsyt iitsu nteo fto ar dtheen eiaxle orcf ifseee osf, billing judgment.

’” (emphasiSse ea dGdreeden)). Alternatively, thCiasm Ceoruornt vc. aGnr ecaotnedr uNcetw a Olirnleea-bnys -Fliende. Canreadlyits iUsn oifo tnhe time report. , 284 F.3d at 662; , Civ. A. No. 16-8514, 2017 WL 1426970, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017). Having reviewed the billing statement submitted by Girod, the Court finds that all of the hours billed by counsel were reasonably expended to litigate the motion to remand and to respond to Defendants’ various filings before the District Court. These were hours expended by counsel that would not have been incurred had the lawsuit remained in state court and had Defendants not improperly removed this lawsuit. As noted above, the District

Court resolved no substantive issue under state law in this litigation; it determined only whether or not it had federal subject-matter litigation. Such an issue would never have needed to be litigated had this lawsuit remained in state court. As such, the Court finds the hours e3x.p endeTdh ree Jaoshonnasobnle .F actors

As noted above, the lodestar is presumJeodh nrseoansonable, buSte ae cJoouhrnts omna yv . thGean. Henighhawnacey oErx pdreecssr,e aInsce. it after considering the twelve abrogat efda cotonr so.t h er grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron , 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. J1o9h7n4s)o,n

, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989). The factors are (1) time and labor required, (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3) skill required to perform the legal services properly, (4) preclusion of other employment, (5) customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by client or circumstances, (8) amount involved and results obtained, (9) experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) undesirability of the case, (11) nature and length of the professional See id. relationship with the client, and (12) award in similar cases.

5 at 717-19. “‘[TC]hoem mbsost critical factor’ in determHineninsgle ay reasonable fee ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” , 829 F.3d at 394 (quoting , L4a6.1 P Uo.wS.e art 436). The lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee. Fle,m 5i0n gF v..3 Edl liaott t3 S2e4c.. SAodlds.i,t LioLnCa,lly, the lodestar should be modified only in exceptional cases. Watkins v. Fordice No. CV 19-2348, 2021 WL 4908875, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2021 J)o h(cnistionng , 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993)). Lastly, “to the extent that any factors are subsumed in the lodestar, they should noMt bigei sreconsidered when determining whether an adjustment to the lodestar is required.” , 135 F.3d at 1047. The Court finds Jtohhants nono further reduction or increase in the award is warrante dJo bhyn sao nconsideration of the factors. This case is not exceptional and the applicable factors were considered in the above-analysis and are thus subsumed in the lodestar. Name Accordingly, thHeo duirsstributionY oefa frees is as foHlloouwrsl:y rate Amount

J. Eric Lockridge 5.8 2024 $495.00 $2,871.00 Karli Johnson 1.7 2024 $480.00 $816.00 Katie Hollowell 31.3 2T0o2ta4l R ecomm$3e3n5d.0ed0 $$1104,,418752.5.500

III. Costs

Girod also seeks costs in the amount of $169.76, which is comprised of costs for printing copies and postage. The applicable law is that costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.

Johnson 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 provides a list of fees that a judge may tax as costs, including: “fees for . . . transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case” and “fees for . . . costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in

the case.” These are the types of costs sough t by Girod. The Court will accordingly award all cIVos. ts soCuognhctl fuosri oa nto tal of $169.76 in costs.

FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons, tGhRatA tNheT EMDot ion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees (rec. doc. 36) filed by Plaintiff Girod LoanCo, L.L.C., be , and Plaintiff Girod LoanCo, L.L.C., be awarded a total of $14,342.26 in attorneys’ fees and cos2t2s.n d May New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

____________________________________________________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE