Gipp v. Board of Education

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Gipp v. Board of Education

20 A.D.2d 924, 249 N.Y.S.2d 727, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3945

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 27, 1964

StatusPublished

This text of 20 A.D.2d 924 (Gipp v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gipp v. Board of Education, 20 A.D.2d 924, 249 N.Y.S.2d 727, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3945 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

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Opinion

In a proceeding by an infant pursuant to statute (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 5), for leave to serve a late notice of claim for damages for personal injury, the Board of Education appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered November 29, 1963, which granted the application. Order reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and application denied. Findings of fact implicit in the Special Term’s decision reversed, and new findings made as indicated herein. It appears that the claimed injuries occurred on three separate dates: October 27, 1962, November 6, 1962 and November 10, 1962, and that the present application to Special Term was made returnable on November 6, 1963. It also appears that the claimant retained an attorney in January, 1963 and that the essential facts were eoneededly known to such attorney in the Summer of 1963. No valid reason for the delay in making the application is stated in the papers submitted in support thereof. In our opinion the delay was unreasonable (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 5; Matter of Freifeld v. New York City Sousing Auth., 17 A D 2d 854; Matter of Lynn v. City of New York, 18 A D 2d 1076, affid. 13 N Y 2d 955; Matter of HcEwan v. City of New York, 279 App. Div. 802, affd. 304 N. Y. 628). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding by an infant pursuant to statute (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 5), for leave to serve a late notice of claim for damages for personal injury, the Board of Education appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered November 29, 1963, which granted the application. Order reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and application denied. Findings of fact implicit in the Special Term’s decision reversed, and new findings made as indicated herein. It appears that the claimed injuries occurred on three separate dates: October 27, 1962, November 6, 1962 and November 10, 1962, and that the present application to Special Term was made returnable on November 6, 1963. It also appears that the claimant retained an attorney in January, 1963 and that the essential facts were eoneededly known to such attorney in the Summer of 1963. No valid reason for the delay in making the application is stated in the papers submitted in support thereof. In our opinion the delay was unreasonable (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd. 5; Matter of Freifeld v. New York City Sousing Auth., 17 A D 2d 854; Matter of Lynn v. City of New York, 18 A D 2d 1076, affid. 13 N Y 2d 955; Matter of HcEwan v. City of New York, 279 App. Div. 802, affd. 304 N. Y. 628). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

20 A.D.2d 924, 249 N.Y.S.2d 727, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3945, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gipp-v-board-of-education-nyappdiv-1964.

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