Gina Parascandolo v. Department of Labor, Board of Review, Brick Township Board of Education and Vinny's King Pizza

90 A.3d 669, 435 N.J. Super. 617, 2014 WL 2117514, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 73
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedMay 22, 2014
DocketA-3209-11
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 90 A.3d 669 (Gina Parascandolo v. Department of Labor, Board of Review, Brick Township Board of Education and Vinny's King Pizza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gina Parascandolo v. Department of Labor, Board of Review, Brick Township Board of Education and Vinny's King Pizza, 90 A.3d 669, 435 N.J. Super. 617, 2014 WL 2117514, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 73 (N.J. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3209-11T1

GINA PARASCANDOLO,

Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

v. May 22, 2014

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, APPELLATE DIVISION BOARD OF REVIEW, BRICK TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION and VINNY'S KING PIZZA,

Respondents. ________________________________________________________________

Submitted October 16, 2013 – Decided May 22, 2014

Before Judges Fisher, Espinosa and Koblitz.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 333,049.

Pezzano Mickey & Bornstein LLP, attorneys for appellant (Lisa Pezzano Mickey, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Berry, Sahradnik, Kotzas & Benson, attorneys for respondent Brick Township Board of Education, join in the brief of respondent Board of Review.

Respondent Vinny's King Pizza has not filed a brief. The opinion of the court was delivered by

ESPINOSA, J.A.D.

In enacting the Temporary Disability Benefits Law (TDBL),

N.J.S.A. 43:21-25 to -66, the Legislature sought to provide

relief to workers who suffered involuntary unemployment and loss

of wages due to illness or injury that was not covered by the

Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128.5.

The TDBL was to "fill the gap" in existing employee welfare

legislation and expressly provided that its benefits should not

duplicate benefits provided under the WCA. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-

26, -30. Because the TDBL was generally applied to situations

involving one employer, the legal issue that typically arose

thereafter involved an "either/or" analysis; the injury was

either covered by the WCA or the TDBL but not both.

We first considered the interplay of the two statutes in a

case where the worker had two employers in In re Scott, 321 N.J.

Super. 60 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd, 162 N.J. 571 (2000). The

worker was injured at his part-time job and we determined that

the receipt of temporary workers compensation benefits (TWCB)

from that employer did not bar the receipt of temporary

disability benefits (TDB) for the loss of wages from his primary

employer. Id. at 65-66. This appeal requires us to examine the

interplay of the two statutes once again to determine their

2 A-3209-11T1 application when only one of two employers is a "covered

employer" under the TDBL and whether the right to subrogation

applies under such circumstances even though there was no

duplication of benefits.

Appellant Gina Parascandolo held two part-time jobs when

she was injured in the course of her employment at one of the

jobs. She received TWCB from the employer where she was

injured, a public employer that did not participate in the State

Disability Benefits Fund, and TDB through her other employment.

Although she received both forms of benefits, she did not

receive duplicate benefits. She appeals from a final agency

decision of the Department of Labor, Board of Review (the

Board), that held appellant was obligated to reimburse the

Division of Temporary Disability Insurance (the Division)

because she received both TDB and TWCB for the same injury. For

the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I

We begin by briefly reviewing the history of employee

welfare legislation, which began with the enactment of the WCA.

Originally enacted in 1911, the WCA represented a "'historic

trade-off whereby employees relinquished their right to pursue

common-law remedies in exchange for automatic entitlement to

certain, but reduced, benefits whenever they suffered injuries

3 A-3209-11T1 by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.'"

Van Dunk v. Reckson Assoc. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449, 458-59

(2012) (quoting Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101

N.J. 161, 174 (1985)). Compensation under the WCA is limited to

injuries suffered "in the course of employment when the employee

is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or

directed by the employer." N.J.S.A. 34:15-36; see Hersh v.

Cnty. of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 249-50 (2014).

The next development came in 1936 with the passage of the

Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -24.30.

See Butler v. Bakelite Co., 32 N.J. 154, 160 (1960). From the

outset, the UCL was recognized as remedial legislation, its

"primary objective" being "to provide a cushion for the workers

of New Jersey 'against the shocks and rigors' of unemployment."

Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 397 N.J. Super.

309, 318 (App. Div. 2007) (internal citation omitted), certif.

denied, 195 N.J. 420 (2008). Accordingly, the provisions of the

UCL are liberally construed, even permitting a statutory

employer-employee relationship, the "center of the UCL," to be

found when the facts might not satisfy common law principles.

Id. at 318-19.

However, the worker who suffered involuntary unemployment

as the result of a disabling accident or illness that did not

4 A-3209-11T1 arise in the course of employment received no relief from these

statutes. See Butler, supra, 32 N.J. at 160-62; Janovsky v. Am.

Motorists Ins. Co., 11 N.J. 1, 4 (1952). In enacting the TDBL

in 1948, the Legislature recognized the need

to fill the gap in existing provisions for protection against the loss of earnings caused by involuntary unemployment, by extending such protection to meet the hazard of earnings loss due to inability to work caused by nonoccupational sickness, accidents, or other disabilities of workers.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-26 (emphasis added).]

The Legislature declared that the TDBL was remedial

legislation to be liberally construed. Ibid. The Legislature

also clearly expressed its intent that, while the TDBL was to

fill a gap in the protections afforded by the WCA and the UCL,

it would not duplicate the benefits provided by those statutes.

The TDBL thus allows "the payment of reasonable cash benefits to

eligible individuals who are subject to accident or illness

which is not compensable under the workers' compensation law."

Ibid. (emphasis added). With certain specified exceptions,

N.J.S.A. 43:21-30(b) explicitly bars the duplication of benefits

paid under the WCA:

No benefits shall be required or paid under this act for any period with respect to which benefits . . . are paid or payable on account of the disability of the covered individual under any workers' compensation law . . . .

5 A-3209-11T1 Thereafter, the legal issue that was typically raised was

which of the statutes applied to provide relief to the worker

who suffered a loss of wages due to involuntary unemployment.

See, e.g., Janovsky, supra, 11 N.J. at 3-5; see also Butler,

supra, 32 N.J. at 157. As the Court explained,

Where an employee is disabled by accident or illness he will generally be entitled to benefits under either the compensation law or the benefits law, but not under both. If liability under the compensation law is clear, payment will be made thereunder, and if absence of liability under that statute is clear, payment will be made under the benefits law.

[Janovsky, supra, 11 N.J.

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90 A.3d 669, 435 N.J. Super. 617, 2014 WL 2117514, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gina-parascandolo-v-department-of-labor-board-of-r-njsuperctappdiv-2014.