1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 GINA L. WRIGHT, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02808-CAB-BLM Plaintiff, 10 ORDER DIMISSING COMPLAINT v. 11 AND DENYING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP 12 ROYAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
GROUP and LUTHERAN TOWERS 13 MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEE, 14 Defendants. [Doc. Nos. 1, 2] 15
17 18 Plaintiff Gina L. Wright (“Plaintiff” or “Wright”) has filed a civil rights complaint 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 20 [Doc. Nos. 1 (“Complaint”), 2.] Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that her constitutional rights 21 were violated when the smoke alarm went off in her apartment and the water sprinkler 22 “drench[ed her apartment] with a foul smelling dark-substance.” [Complaint at 5.] 23 According to Plaintiff, the apartment’s maintenance supervisor and management 24 “harassed, and threaten[ed her]” by publicly blaming her for the incident, and the manager 25 also allowed others to damage and steal her belongings during the cleanup. [Id.] Though 26 the case’s caption does not reflect it, Plaintiff’s complaint named the apartment’s Property 27 Manager (“Tiffany”), Maintenance Supervisor (“Jonathan”), and Corporate Manager, all 28 in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 6.] For the reasons discussed below, the 1 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the Complaint without 2 prejudice for failure to state a claim. 3 I. ANALYSIS 4 A. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must screen any IFP complaint and 6 sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or 7 seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 8 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is not limited to prisoners; 9 instead, it applies to all cases in which the plaintiff proceeds IFP. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 10 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 13 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 14 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient 15 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While 17 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 18 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. 19 Id. “[U]nadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of 20 meeting this plausibility standard. Id. The Court, however, considers Plaintiff’s position 21 as a pro se litigant at the pleading stage and construes the pleading liberally. See Byrd v. 22 Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018). 23 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 24 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 25 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 26 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). “Action under color of state law 27 normally consists of action taken by a public agency or officer.” Taylor v. First Wyoming 28 Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983). A private party’s action, without something 1 more, is insufficient to characterize that party as a state actor. However, “[a] private action 2 may constitute an action under color of state law if the private person willfully participates 3 in joint action with the state or its agents,” or “if it constitutes the exercise of some power 4 delegated to the private person by the state which is traditionally associated with 5 sovereignty or is traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.” Id. (internal quotation 6 marks and alterations omitted). 7 Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that any Defendants were acting under color 8 of state law. She has not alleged at all, let alone with plausible facts, that any of the 9 Defendants are a public agency or officer, that they acted jointly with a government entity, 10 or that their actions constitute exercise of some power, such as policing, traditionally 11 associated with a governmental entity.1 To be sure, there are cases where certain housing 12 entities were considered acting under color of state law, but those involved ownership or 13 significant management by a government agency. E.g. Mendoza v. Frenchman Hill 14 Apartments Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:03-CV-494-RHW, 2005 WL 6581642, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 15 Jan. 20, 2005) (finding state action pleaded where county agency was general management 16 partner and participated in the daily decisions of the housing complex); Guy v. Carson, No. 17 2:20-CV-01581-DDP-SHK, 2020 WL 3884904, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2020), report 18 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-01581-DDP-SHK, 2023 WL 3604316 (C.D. 19 Cal. May 23, 2023) (finding state action pleaded where defendant was alleged to be a state- 20 chartered public housing agency). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to 21 state a § 1983 claim but provides leave to amend within 30 days of the date of this order. 22 /// 23 /// 24
25 1 The Court notes that receipt of government funding or compliance with generally 26 applicable laws, without more, is insufficient to constitute state action. Heineke v. Santa 27 Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Kabbani v. Council House, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“Not every private entity that 28 1 B. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the 5 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007). To satisfy the 7 requirements of § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one 8 cannot because of [her] poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to 9 provide [for herself] and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E. I. DuPont 10 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 GINA L. WRIGHT, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02808-CAB-BLM Plaintiff, 10 ORDER DIMISSING COMPLAINT v. 11 AND DENYING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP 12 ROYAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
GROUP and LUTHERAN TOWERS 13 MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEE, 14 Defendants. [Doc. Nos. 1, 2] 15
17 18 Plaintiff Gina L. Wright (“Plaintiff” or “Wright”) has filed a civil rights complaint 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 20 [Doc. Nos. 1 (“Complaint”), 2.] Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that her constitutional rights 21 were violated when the smoke alarm went off in her apartment and the water sprinkler 22 “drench[ed her apartment] with a foul smelling dark-substance.” [Complaint at 5.] 23 According to Plaintiff, the apartment’s maintenance supervisor and management 24 “harassed, and threaten[ed her]” by publicly blaming her for the incident, and the manager 25 also allowed others to damage and steal her belongings during the cleanup. [Id.] Though 26 the case’s caption does not reflect it, Plaintiff’s complaint named the apartment’s Property 27 Manager (“Tiffany”), Maintenance Supervisor (“Jonathan”), and Corporate Manager, all 28 in their individual and official capacities. [Id. at 6.] For the reasons discussed below, the 1 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES the Complaint without 2 prejudice for failure to state a claim. 3 I. ANALYSIS 4 A. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must screen any IFP complaint and 6 sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or 7 seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 8 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) is not limited to prisoners; 9 instead, it applies to all cases in which the plaintiff proceeds IFP. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 10 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 13 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 14 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain sufficient 15 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While 17 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 18 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. 19 Id. “[U]nadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of 20 meeting this plausibility standard. Id. The Court, however, considers Plaintiff’s position 21 as a pro se litigant at the pleading stage and construes the pleading liberally. See Byrd v. 22 Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018). 23 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation 24 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 25 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 26 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). “Action under color of state law 27 normally consists of action taken by a public agency or officer.” Taylor v. First Wyoming 28 Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983). A private party’s action, without something 1 more, is insufficient to characterize that party as a state actor. However, “[a] private action 2 may constitute an action under color of state law if the private person willfully participates 3 in joint action with the state or its agents,” or “if it constitutes the exercise of some power 4 delegated to the private person by the state which is traditionally associated with 5 sovereignty or is traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.” Id. (internal quotation 6 marks and alterations omitted). 7 Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that any Defendants were acting under color 8 of state law. She has not alleged at all, let alone with plausible facts, that any of the 9 Defendants are a public agency or officer, that they acted jointly with a government entity, 10 or that their actions constitute exercise of some power, such as policing, traditionally 11 associated with a governmental entity.1 To be sure, there are cases where certain housing 12 entities were considered acting under color of state law, but those involved ownership or 13 significant management by a government agency. E.g. Mendoza v. Frenchman Hill 14 Apartments Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:03-CV-494-RHW, 2005 WL 6581642, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 15 Jan. 20, 2005) (finding state action pleaded where county agency was general management 16 partner and participated in the daily decisions of the housing complex); Guy v. Carson, No. 17 2:20-CV-01581-DDP-SHK, 2020 WL 3884904, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2020), report 18 and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-01581-DDP-SHK, 2023 WL 3604316 (C.D. 19 Cal. May 23, 2023) (finding state action pleaded where defendant was alleged to be a state- 20 chartered public housing agency). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to 21 state a § 1983 claim but provides leave to amend within 30 days of the date of this order. 22 /// 23 /// 24
25 1 The Court notes that receipt of government funding or compliance with generally 26 applicable laws, without more, is insufficient to constitute state action. Heineke v. Santa 27 Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Kabbani v. Council House, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (“Not every private entity that 28 1 B. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the 5 required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007). To satisfy the 7 requirements of § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one 8 cannot because of [her] poverty pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to 9 provide [for herself] and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E. I. DuPont 10 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 11 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2015) 12 Here, Plaintiff submitted an incomplete financial affidavit. While the affidavit 13 reflects a monthly income of $1,200.00 from disability, $220.00 from public assistance, 14 and $0.00 in her checking account, many of the expenses portions of the affidavit are blank. 15 [Doc. No. 2.] For example, the amounts for monthly expenses for rent, insurance, medical 16 and dental expenses, and vehicle expenses are blank. [Id. (instructing the applicant: “Do 17 not leave any blanks. If the answer to a question is ‘0,’ ‘none,’ or ‘not applicable (N/A),’ 18 write that response.”).] However, Plaintiff’s supporting documents mention “mental health 19 treatments” and she has requested as part of damages “[t]he cost to buy required dietary 20 supplement for diabetic care,” both of which indicate ongoing medical expenses. [Doc. 21 No. 1-3 at 2.] The Court cannot properly assess Plaintiff’s IFP application without 22 complete documentation as required by the form affidavit. 23 24 25
26 2 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave 28 1 The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's IFP application. In light of the Court’s 2 || dismissal with leave to amend, Plaintiff should submit a complete affidavit—including a 3 complete accounting of her monthly expenses—with any amended complaint. 4 CONCLUSION 5 The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint with leave to amend within 30 days 6 || from the date of this order. The Court also DENIES Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP. 7 || Plaintiff may re-submit a fully completed IFP application or the required filing fee with the 8 ||amended complaint. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: October 29, 2025 OB Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28