Gilstrap v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Gilstrap v. State

410 S.E.2d 423, 261 Ga. 798, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 1029

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedDecember 5, 1991

DocketS91G0888

StatusPublished

Cited by84 cases

This text of 410 S.E.2d 423 (Gilstrap v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gilstrap v. State, 410 S.E.2d 423, 261 Ga. 798, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 1029 (Ga. 1991).

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Opinions

Weltner, Justice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of L. G. Gilstrap of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Gilstrap v. State, 199 Ga. App. 223 (404 SE2d 629) (1991). We granted certiorari to consider the admissibility of “similar transactions” evidence.

1. (a) In Womack v. State, 260 Ga. 21, 22 (4) (389 SE2d 240) (1990), we quoted from Sears v. State, 182 Ga. App. 480, 482 (356 SE2d 72) (1987), as follows:

“The purpose of a statute of (limitation) is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time fol[799]*799lowing the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. . . .”

(b) A like rationale applies to the admission of “similar transaction” evidence, and is the basis for excluding evidence of events that are remote in time. Where “similar transaction” evidence has been admissible otherwise, lapses of time of 11 years (Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11, 14 (1) (325 SE2d 761) (1985)) and of 19 years (Cooper v. State, 173 Ga. App. 254, 255 (325 SE2d 877) (1985)) have not demanded that the evidence was inadmissible. It should be clear, however, that an event 31 years in the past is too remote.¹

2. The trial court, over objection, permitted the state to introduce evidence of nine similar transactions before it offered any evidence concerning the charges contained in the indictment on trial. While the court has discretion as to the order of admission of evidence (Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 140 (1) (51 SE 322) (1905)), that discretion is not unlimited. The procedure followed in the trial court raises a substantial possibility that the jury could have settled upon the guilt of the defendant based solely upon evidence of a large number of similar transactions, and before hearing a single witness to the indicted offenses. However, in view of the holding in Division 1, we need not determine in this appeal the outer limit of discretion.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

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Weltner, Justice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of L. G. Gilstrap of child molestation and aggravated child molestation. Gilstrap v. State, 199 Ga. App. 223 (404 SE2d 629) (1991). We granted certiorari to consider the admissibility of “similar transactions” evidence.

1. (a) In Womack v. State, 260 Ga. 21, 22 (4) (389 SE2d 240) (1990), we quoted from Sears v. State, 182 Ga. App. 480, 482 (356 SE2d 72) (1987), as follows:

“The purpose of a statute of (limitation) is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time fol[799]*799lowing the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. . . .”

(b) A like rationale applies to the admission of “similar transaction” evidence, and is the basis for excluding evidence of events that are remote in time. Where “similar transaction” evidence has been admissible otherwise, lapses of time of 11 years (Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11, 14 (1) (325 SE2d 761) (1985)) and of 19 years (Cooper v. State, 173 Ga. App. 254, 255 (325 SE2d 877) (1985)) have not demanded that the evidence was inadmissible. It should be clear, however, that an event 31 years in the past is too remote.¹

2. The trial court, over objection, permitted the state to introduce evidence of nine similar transactions before it offered any evidence concerning the charges contained in the indictment on trial. While the court has discretion as to the order of admission of evidence (Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 140 (1) (51 SE 322) (1905)), that discretion is not unlimited. The procedure followed in the trial court raises a substantial possibility that the jury could have settled upon the guilt of the defendant based solely upon evidence of a large number of similar transactions, and before hearing a single witness to the indicted offenses. However, in view of the holding in Division 1, we need not determine in this appeal the outer limit of discretion.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

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410 S.E.2d 423, 261 Ga. 798, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 1029, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilstrap-v-state-ga-1991.

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