Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Consolidated Mining Co.

23 P. 547, 2 Idaho 696, 1890 Ida. LEXIS 12
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 1, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 23 P. 547 (Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Consolidated Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Consolidated Mining Co., 23 P. 547, 2 Idaho 696, 1890 Ida. LEXIS 12 (Idaho 1890).

Opinions

BERRY, J.

(After Stating the Facts). — There are three principal points in this case: 1. Is the plaintiff the owner of the mining grounds claimed by him, so as to be entitled to invoke the aid of this court to prevent the acts complained of ? 2. Is [701]*701tbe injury alleged of such a character as to warrant the exercise of the equity power of the court? And 3. Is such injury, in fact, threatened or being done ?

As to the question of nonjoinder of parties plaintiff, that is not properly in issue on an application for an injunction against ..the acts of a stranger to the property threatened with injury. A party may intervene to protect by injunction his own interests, as well as the interests of his cotenants. But, if this were otherwise, the deeds to plaintiff introduced in evidence on the hearing cover all the interests of each of those persons in each of the three claims alleged by the plaintiff to belong to him, except said W. B. Heyburn, who is not shown to have any interest in either of said claims; and from the evidence there appears to be no ground for such claim.

We may first inquire, then, as to whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient to give him a standing in court. This case seems to have been tried, in part at least, upon the theory and tacit understanding that prima facie proof of the plaintiff’s title was all, on the question of location, that need be shown in such a case as this. After some evidence had been put in by the plaintiff tending to show the validity of his location of the Apex claim the court asked: “Are you gentlemen going into matters showing everything which goes to show a valid location? Plaintiff’s Counsel: We do not want to. Defendant’s Counsel: We do not either. Plaintiff’s Counsel: We just propose to make a prima facie case” — and passed immediately from the subject of the Apex location (which to that point had been the subject of the evidence) to the location of the Kambler. This may not be considered as a stipulation releasing the plaintiff from the obligation to introduce further evidence on the location of the Apex, or that the evidence already in made a prima facie case of location; but it seems to express the mutual understanding between the court and the counsel on either side as to the theory and rule of law on which the case was to be heard and determined; and may well have had an effect in restricting the amount of evidence which either side might deem necessary after making a prima facie case. It is not to be presumed that the defendant, on a preliminary motion, and especially under such circumstances, would introduce all the evidence he would on the trial.' [702]*702From a review of tbe plaintiffs evidence up to tbe close of the examination of John Gill this theory was evidently relied on;but afterward, however, the plaintiff returned to the subject of' the location of the Apex,.introduced Michael Gibbons, John M. Burke, W. Clayton Miller, J. M. Porter, C. D. Porter, and other witnesses as to the facts of locations, as to the character of the-ledge claimed in the Apex, its outcrop within the Apex lines, the character of the material as to ore, its appearance or nonappearance in the shaft sunk from the surface of the Apex, the-dip of the underground veins, and the relation of the ledge-claimed for the Apex with the defendant’s drifts beyond the west side line of the Sierra Nevada, and on other points. Much-of this evidence was controverted by the witnesses of the defendant, and some of it was corroborated; but, on the whole, the weight of the testimony seems to be in favor of the validity of the plaintiff’s locations. He certainly makes a strong primee facie case, covering his surface locations, and, of course, to the vein in the Apex, whatever it may be, and wherever it may run- or dip. The defendant, in its brief, says: “The plaintiff should establish his title to the surface ground under which he claims, which, to say the least, is very doubtful upon the showing.’” This is the defendant’s view after the evidence is all in. Jt. must be noted that the plaintiff is in possession of his claim,, and the presumption is that his possession is lawful, and the burden is on the defendant to repel such presumption, and also-that one objéct of this action is to settle the question of that right. In the cross-bill the defendant demands that it shall be-settled. The action of the judge, or of either of the judges, before whom this motion has been considered, did not afEeet, or tend to afEeet, that settlement. The judges had no authority to do that. The fact of the plaintiff’s compliance with the law, or his noncompliance, is a question of fact only, to be determined on the trial of the case. If, then, after all this preliminary proof on both sides is in, the question is pronounced by the defendant as “doubtful upon the showing,” the status of the plaintiff as a proper party to demand the preservation of the property he is contending for is practically conceded. But without such concession the law insures such right to the plaintiff-

[703]*703We may then inquire as to the character of the injury alleged. By section 4288 of the Bevised Statutes of Idaho, subdivisions 1-3, it is provided that an injunction may be granted “(1) when it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually”; and “(2) when it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff; (3) when it appears during litigation that the defendant is doing . . . . some act, in violation of the plaintiff’s rights, respecting the subject of the action, and [having a] tendency to render the judgment ineffectual.” The statute seems to be framed to meet the ease of such an injury as is here complained of. The subject matter of the litigation is a mine, which is valuable only for the mineral it contains. To remove that mineral is certainly waste, and waste is one ground for the issuance of this writ. It is also great injury; and that is another ground, whether it be reparable or not. Irreparable injury is still another ground, disjoined in the statute from the other grounds. To remove the ore from the mine, and leave but a worthless shell to be contended for, would certainly have a “tendency to render ineffectual” any judgment which the plaintiff might recover. Conceding the plaintiff’s rights to his mining claim and to the ledge to be as stated in the complaint, it cannot be argued that continuing to remove the ore from the mine is not waste of the property, nor that such acts do not constitute great damage, nor that to do so does not tend to render a judgment in his favor ineffectual. The chief argument of the defendant is that the defendant is solvent, and abundantly able to pay any damage which may be found against it. But even on this point the case is against the defendant. The complaint states that the defendant is a foreign corporation. That is admitted. Also, positively, that it is insolvent. That is only denied on information and belief. There was no evidence given on the subject at the hearing. Hence, that allegation of a fact in the case, except for the purposes of pleading only, must be taken as unanswered. [704]*704On tbe whole, upon this point, it may well be questioned whether the plaintiff has not fully shown that the injury, if consummated, will be irreparable.

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Bluebook (online)
23 P. 547, 2 Idaho 696, 1890 Ida. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilpin-v-sierra-nevada-consolidated-mining-co-idaho-1890.