Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis

496 S.E.2d 469, 230 Ga. App. 364, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 362, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 69

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 14, 1998

DocketA97A2572

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 496 S.E.2d 469 (Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gilman Paper Co. v. Davis, 496 S.E.2d 469, 230 Ga. App. 364, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 362, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

Pope, Presiding Judge.

Bobby Davis sustained a work-related injury by exposure to chlorine gas on July 15, 1994. His employer, Gilman Paper Company, originally accepted the injury as compensable and paid workers’ compensation benefits until January 31, 1995, when it suspended benefits based upon a change in condition.

Davis subsequently filed a motion to reinstate benefits, and on October 24, 1996, the ALJ issued an interlocutory order granting the motion because Gilman Paper improperly suspended benefits without giving ten days’ advance notice as required by Board Rule 221 (i). The Appellate Division upheld the ALJ’s award, specifically noting that the award was “an interlocutory order, pending hearing for a final determination.” The superior court affirmed, and this discretionary appeal followed.

However, “[njowhere in our [workers’ compensation] statute is there provision for an interlocutory appeal.” Garner v. Owens-Illinois &c., 134 Ga. App. 917, 920 (2) (216 SE2d 709) (1975). The statute “plainly, clearly, and unambiguously prescribes that only a final award, order, judgment, or decision of the board is subject to appeal to the superior court. . . . [T]he Workers’ Compensation Act makes no provision for an appeal to the superior court from a decision by the full board other than one which grants or denies compensation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fasher Painting &c. Co. v. Bordelon, 204 Ga. App. 196 (419 SE2d 82) (1992).

In the instant case, as the State Board’s interlocutory ruling that reinstated benefits pending final hearing in the matter did not constitute a final order or judgment, “the superior court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The judgment of the superior court is accordingly reversed with direction that the appeal be dismissed as premature.” Conwood Corp. v. Guinn, 190 Ga. App. 595, 596 (379 SE2d 621) (1989).

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

Johnson and Blackburn, JJ, concur. *365 Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, Richard A. Brown, Jr., Gregory T. Carter, for appellants. Phillip M. Eddings, for appellee.

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Pope, Presiding Judge.

Bobby Davis sustained a work-related injury by exposure to chlorine gas on July 15, 1994. His employer, Gilman Paper Company, originally accepted the injury as compensable and paid workers’ compensation benefits until January 31, 1995, when it suspended benefits based upon a change in condition.

Davis subsequently filed a motion to reinstate benefits, and on October 24, 1996, the ALJ issued an interlocutory order granting the motion because Gilman Paper improperly suspended benefits without giving ten days’ advance notice as required by Board Rule 221 (i). The Appellate Division upheld the ALJ’s award, specifically noting that the award was “an interlocutory order, pending hearing for a final determination.” The superior court affirmed, and this discretionary appeal followed.

However, “[njowhere in our [workers’ compensation] statute is there provision for an interlocutory appeal.” Garner v. Owens-Illinois &c., 134 Ga. App. 917, 920 (2) (216 SE2d 709) (1975). The statute “plainly, clearly, and unambiguously prescribes that only a final award, order, judgment, or decision of the board is subject to appeal to the superior court. . . . [T]he Workers’ Compensation Act makes no provision for an appeal to the superior court from a decision by the full board other than one which grants or denies compensation.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fasher Painting &c. Co. v. Bordelon, 204 Ga. App. 196 (419 SE2d 82) (1992).

In the instant case, as the State Board’s interlocutory ruling that reinstated benefits pending final hearing in the matter did not constitute a final order or judgment, “the superior court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The judgment of the superior court is accordingly reversed with direction that the appeal be dismissed as premature.” Conwood Corp. v. Guinn, 190 Ga. App. 595, 596 (379 SE2d 621) (1989).

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

Johnson and Blackburn, JJ, concur. *365 Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, Richard A. Brown, Jr., Gregory T. Carter, for appellants. Phillip M. Eddings, for appellee.

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Bluebook (online)

496 S.E.2d 469, 230 Ga. App. 364, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 362, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gilman-paper-co-v-davis-gactapp-1998.

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