Stukes, Justice.
This action is for damages to plaintiff’s automobile and for his loss of consortium by reason of personal injuries suffered by his wife in a collision between his automobile, which she was driving, and the defendant automobile which was operated by the personal defendant Ford. The insurance company was joined as a defendant upon allegations that Ford was its agent and servant and in the scope of his employment at the time of the collision, whereby it is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Trial of a companion action against the same defendants by plaintiff’s wife for her damages for personal injuries resulted in verdict in her favor against all of the defendants. Upon appeal it was held that the only reasonable inference from the evidence adduced in the trial of that action was that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, carelessness and recklessness which contributed as a proximate cause to her injury, whereby the verdict and judgment thereupon were set aside and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S. C. 46, 71 S. E. (2d) 596.
At the conclusion of the evidence offered for plaintiff at the trial of the present action the trial judge granted defendants’ motion for order of nonsuit upon the ground that the case for the plaintiff could not be distinguished on the facts from the former, cited action. Plaintiff appealed and the defendant insurance company filed additional sustaining grounds for the order of nonsuit in its favor which are to the effect that plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish that the agency of Ford included the operation of his automobile which he was driving, that Ford was an independent [109]*109contractor and not a servant of the company and, finally, that Ford was not acting within the scope of his agency or employment at the time of the accident.
After careful consideration of the evidence adduced in the first action, as stated in the opinion of this court upon the appeal of it, cited supra, and comparison of it with the evidence presented in the instant case, as contained in the record now before us, we are convinced that there are important differences which required the denial of the motion for nonsuit; and this conclusion is equally applicable, for the reasons hereinafter stated, to the primary appeal of the present appellant, which relates to the facts of the accident, and to the issues relating to the liability of the insurance company for the tort of Ford, its admitted agent, at the time and place of the collision. The evidence will be briefly stated in order to demonstrate the soundness of the view expressed.
The wife of appellant, who was driving his automobile alone, will be referred to as Mrs. Gilliespie. She testified that she was on her way from her Easley home to that of her mother in Belton and went by an unusual route because of construction in progress on the more direct and usual route. She knew the way she went on this occasion but not very well, having traveled it only once or twice before and then with her husband driving. She was cognizant of her approach to the intersection at which the collision occurred but thought that the road on which Ford approached to her left, which was paved only to the intersection, terminated at the paved road which she was traveling. She was driving at a speed of thirty miles per hour until she slowed for the intersection and put her foot on the brakes but, seeing nothing and thinking the road clear, she did not apply them; she looked first to the right at what she thought was a driveway from a house situate at the intersection, then she looked to her left and saw no vehicle approaching whereupon she started through the intersection, which was at a point about one hundred feet from [110]*110it; she thought that she could see about three hundred feet up the road on which Ford approached, btit she never saw his car, looking ahead at the road before her when the vehicles collided. (She had to look three ways within a few seconds — see the patrolman’s testimony, infra.) She was driving on the right of her road and denied the accuracy of her testimony at the trial of the other action that she was on the left of the road. She was cross-examined at length from the record of her former testimony and explained that she must have misunderstood some of the questions on cross-examination at that time because she always drove on the right of the road, and she said that at the time of the trial of the first action she was suffering from her injuries and was hearing poorly. (Her testimony in the former action was properly permitted to be used to contradict and discredit her, but that went to the credibility and was for the consideration of the jury; the court was bound upon the motion for nonsuit in the trial of this action to consider the testimony as then given; and#so are we upon appeal.)
A disinterested witness who lived in the neighborhood, and had met the mailman at the intersection, testified that he saw the collision and observed both automobiles as they approached. He said that Mrs. Gillespie was on her right and Ford’s car, quoting, “was going really fast.” The latter applied his brakes and the car skidded sixteen or eighteen “good long steps” before the collision. Mrs. Gillespie’s car, which he thought was traveling about thirty or thirty-five miles an hour, entered the intersection ahead of Ford and the front of it was practically through the intersection when struck; he further described Ford’s speed as “plenty fast.” This witness also testified to the distance from the intersection at which an automobile was visible on the respective roads, which was in agreement with the testimony of the highway patrolman to which we next refer. After the collision Ford, who seems not to have been seriously injured, asked this witness, quoting from the latter’s testimony again, [111]*111“What to do, must he go to jail, must he call the law or what must he do * *
The patrolman testified that the scene of the collision, which he investigated, was three or four miles north of the town of Williamston. He found skid marks extending about fifty feet in the direction from which Ford came. The collision occurred about the middle of the road; Ford’s car was damaged on the right front corner and Mrs. Gillespie’s on the left, about the door. A car traveling sixty miles an hour covers eighty-eight feet per second and one traveling thirty miles, forty-four feet. There were no stop signs at the intersection. As Ford approached, Mrs. Gillespie was on his right, and he on her left as she approached. From her approach, a car on Ford’s road was visible from a point about three hundred feet from the intersection; Ford could see the car from her. approach when he was about two hundred and twenty-eight feet from the intersection. Ford’s approach to the intersection was downgrade, while Mrs. Gillespie’s was level.
The foregoing summary of the evidence concerning the circumstances of the collision is by no means complete but we think it is sufficient to show that it was error to grant the order of nonsuit. It is axiomatic that in considering such a motion the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, should be considered most favorably to the plaintiff. Ordinarily, it is the function of the jury to pass upon the issues of negligence, willfullness and wantonness and contributory negligence, willfullness and wantonness. Moreover, in this case the unusual ground upon which the nonsuit was granted makes the error clearer; contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and the defendant who pleads it has the burden of establishing it by the preponderance of the evidence. It rarely becomes a question of law for the court.
We should not unnecessarily comment upon the facts of the case as it will have to be tried again, but because of the division of the court it will be said [112]*112that under the evidence offered by the plaintiff, standing alone as it does now, the trial jury might reasonably find that Ford was guilty of recklessness, willfullness and wantonness to which the simple contributory negligence of Mrs. Gillespie, if found by the jury, would not constitute a defense to defendants’ liability. There was direct and circumstantial evidence of excessive speed of Ford’s automobile in approaching an intersection where the statute required him to drive more slowly. For a distance of two hundred and twenty-eight feet from the intersection he had a view of Mrs. Gillespie’s car, if he was looking; and, on his right as they approached, she admittedly had the right-of-way. Of course, despite this, she was bound to exercise due care under the circumstances but whether she did or whether she was guilty of negligence and, if so, in what degree, if" Ford was guilty of more than simple negligence, are all issues which should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions, as is the ever-present issue of proximate cause in such cases.
The foregoing rules are so well-established that authorities need hardly be cited to sustain them, but see generally the following recent decisions which are taken from appellant’s brief: Spearman v. Couch, 218 S. C. 430, 63 S. E. (2d) 161; Dawson v. South Carolina Power Co., 220 S. C. 26, 66 S. E. (2d) 322; Hopkins v. Derst Baking Co., 221 S. C. 497, 71 S. E. (2d) 407; Rogers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 222 S. C. 66, 71 S. E. (2d) 585.
The present action is similar to that of Priester v. Southern R. Co., 151 S. C. 433, 149 S. E. 226, 227. There the plaintiff’s wife lost her suit for damages for personal injuries in the Federal Court. The cited case was thereafter brought by her husband for damages for the loss of the services of his wife, etc., as here verdict was obtained and the judgment affirmed by this court which said: “The causes of action in the two cases are entirely different and distinct, and the judgment in favor of the defendants in an action on one is not a bar to an action [113]*113on the other. On this point the authorities are practically unanimous.”
We now turn to the sustaining grounds of the respondent insurance company and shall first refer to the testimony of the manager of the branch office of the company in Williamston, who was called as a witness by appellant and whose testimony, in view of the nature of the appeal, should be stated and considered favorably to appellant.
He had supervision of the ten agents of that branch office. When Ford was employed in February before the automobile accident in December he was assigned a debit territory, which included the place of the accident and extended about five miles north of Williamston. (We interpolate that this reasonably implied the necessity for the use of an automobile.) He was taken over the territory by the witness, who was his manager; his testimony thereabout follows: “Well, we made a list of the policyholders’ names and addresses and we carried Ford around and introduced him to the policyholders, and, of course, informed them that he would be their agent to service the business there.”
Ford and the other agents were required to visit the branch office in Williamston weekly on Thursdays and account for their premium collections, etc.; and Ford had also been there on the day of the accident, which was Monday. He was paid a commission of fifteen per cent on his premium collections and additionally for increased business, from all of which he earned about $50.00 per week. Receipt book was furnished by the company and he issued receipts from the book in return for premium payments. All of the agents have automobiles and the witness understood that Ford used his part of the time for the collection of premiums, and walked occasionally. Sometimes another representative of the company would go with Ford in order to help him get business, upon which Ford would receive the commission. With reference to new business, an agent may only accept an application for insurance which is transmitted to [114]*114the company. Social Security taxes were taken from Ford’s earnings. Ford had, and could have, no other job and could not delegate his duties to the company to anyone else; he had to personally make the premium collections, but a substitute was provided for him for vacations. Ford’s duties were described by the witness as, quoting, “to collect premiums from policyholders and solicit new business.” He turned the premium collections into the branch office. The employment could be terminated by Ford or- the company on one day’s notice. Ford never refused to collect premiums on policies in his territory or debit. Occasionally the witness accompanied Ford on his route or debit. The witness was paid a salary and also commissions on any business which he personally produced. Ford is no longer employed by the company. The company did not prescribe working hours for the agents and it is unimportant whether an agent makes all of his collections in one day or in six .days of the week; and the company did not direct the agent where he should go or when. (The latter statement of the witness must be considered in connection with the assignment of Ford by the company to a definite territory or debit.) The witness talked to Ford after the accident and then went to the scene.
From the foregoing, which is derived from the questions and answers in the record, the highlights of the company manager’s testimony may be fairly re-stated for emphasis as follows: Ford was a collecting agent with allotted town and rural territory, which included the scene of the accident, and at such distance from Williamston that it may be reasonably inferred that an automobile was necessary; Ford was in the agency office that morning; he collected weekly from most of the policyholders for which purpose he used a receipt book furnished by the company. It was understood by the manager that part of the time Ford used his automobile and none of the ten agents in this branch was without one for use in the business; social security taxes were deducted from Ford’s earnings; he was not allowed to delegate the performance of his duties to anyone else; was re[115]*115quired to report at the branch office once a week; was subject to discharge from the employment on a day’s notice; when he was absent from duty a substitute was provided to make the collections; the branch manager went to the scene of the accident when he heard about it. When Ford was first employed he was furnished with a list of the policyholders in his debit territory and was taken around and introduced to tjie policyholders by the branch manager who informed them that he (Ford) would be their agent to service their business.
The employment contract between the company and Ford was in evidence. It limited the agent to the territory assigned by his Branch Office which might be changed from time to time by the company. The agent was required to immediately remit all collections for the company and to keep a complete account; all books, records, etc., should be the property of the company, subject to examination by it, and surrendered to the company upon termination of the contract; the accounts kept by the company, of which it is not required to give copies to the agent, shall be conclusive evidence of the state of the accounts; the agent shall receive money for the company only in exchange for its printed receipts. Section 7 of the contract is here quoted:
“7. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to create the relation of employer and employee between the Company and the Agent. Within the territory above described the Agent shall be free to exercise his own judgment as to the persons from whom he will solicit business and the time and place of solicitation, but the Company may from time to time prescribe rules and regulations respecting the conduct of business covered hereby, not interfering with such freedom and action of the Agent, which rules and regulations shall be observed and conformed to by the Agent.”
(The contract declaration against an employee relationship is unavailing in view of the other provisions of the contract. See McNeill v. Electric Storage Bat[116]*116tery Co., 109 S. C. 326, 96 S. E. 134, 135, where it was said: “It is true the contract provided that the relation of principal and agent should not exist, but when the provisions of a contract make a contract of agency then it is a contract of agency, and it makes no difference by what names the parties may call themselves.” Indeed, the parties to the contract “doth' protest too much.”)
The contract provided that it might be terminated by either party by giving the other one day’s notice and thereupon the authority of the agent to collect premiums shall cease, and no commission shall be thereafter payable to him.
A witness was produced by appellant who lived on the Pelzer road, near the place of the collision. Ford had just been to her house and collected a premium on a policy of the company, which was his custom every Monday morning, and gave her the usual company receipt from his receipt book. When he left, he turned to the right and went toward the intersection where the collision occurred, which was three-fourths of a mile distant. He usually turned back toward Pelzer but this time he turned right.
We think that the evidence which has been stated at least gives rise to a reasonable inference that Ford was a servant of the company at the time of the accident, for whose tort it is liable, if committed in the scope of his employment; and the evidence likewise war-’ rants reasonable inference of the latter. He appears to have been principally a collector, here on his rounds, and nearer in status a messenger than an independent contractor.
In Norris v. Bryant, 217 S. C. 389, 403, 60 S. E. (2d) 844, it was held that the plaintiff having made out a prima facie case of master-servant, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the claimed independent contractor relation. Clearly there was here made out a strong case of such control of Ford by the company as to negative an independent contractor relationship. He was expressly required to collect premiums by personal calls on policyholders [117]*117and impliedly by use of his automobile, although he received no expense allowance or other remuneration for the latter except such as may have been considered to have been included in the commissions which he was paid on the collections. Cf. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, infra, 75 Ga. App. 549, 43 S. E. (2d) 784, where there was an allowance of $2.50 per week for the agent’s use of his automobile, to which .the court gave no weight one way or the other, probably because of the insignificance of the amount.
While the liability of an industrial insurance company for torts upon the roads and streets which are committed by their premium-collecting agents, when about the performance of their duties, has not been heretofore directly decided by this court, there are two recent decisions which clearly point the way to liability. They are Stevens v. Moore, 211 S. C. 498, 46 S. E. (2d) 73, 78, and Carter’s Dependents v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 209 S. C. 67, 38 S. E. (2d) 905.
In the first cited, Moore was a track supervisor of a railroad company. He was furnished a railroad handcar for transportation in the performance of his duties, but he sometimes used his personal automobile, which he was doing when he collided with plaintiff’s motorcycle. There was evidence that he was in the performance of his duties, which issue was submitted to the jury and their verdict for plaintiff was sustained. The following quoted paragraphs are from the opinion:
“Wilson v. [South Carolina] Power Co., 166 S. C. 469, 165 S. E. 186, 188, is controlling to the contrary of appellant’s position that Moore’s ownership of the automobile absolves the master of liability for its tortious operation, in view of the testimony that appellant furnished him a hand-car for his transportation about the master’s business. But it is uncontradicted that he at least. occasionally used his automobile in the company’s business, as he undisputedly did on the day of the accident. In the cited case of Wilson the defendant’s employee, whose duties were somewhat similar [118]*118to Moore’s here, used his own car in going about his work but the master contended that it was a certain, agreed one upon which the master might carry insurance against liability for negligent operation. In driving another car of his own in the master’s work the employee injured the plaintiff and the court overruled the contention that is now made in the instant case and tersely said: ‘The instrument with which the alleged injury to the plaintiff was inflicted, if it was inflicted, is not in our opinion, material, and we cannot agree with the trial judge in his holding, in effect, that the defendant should not be held in damages because the said agent and employee happened to be using his Chevrolet automobile * * It is thus seen that ownership of the instrumentality is unimportant. The vital query is its use at the time. This accords with the general rule in other jurisdictions. See the Annotation in 140 A. L. R. 1150 and the earlier A. L. R. Annotations there cited.
* * *
“Automobiles have added immensely to the ubiquity of agents and servants. The courts cannot close their eyes to this fact and to the commonplace practice of employees going from job to job in automobiles, sometimes owned by them and sometimes by their employers. The ownership of the offending vehicle in a case like that in hand makes no difference to an injured plaintiff and it should not with respect to the responsibility of the employer, whether he owns the vehicle or it is the property of the tort-feasor employee, if the latter’s use of it in the performance of the duties of his employment is with the knowledge, express or implied, of the employer. In the instant case Moore was a sort of roving employee and it is easily inferable from the evidence, as has been said, that his use of his automobile in the performance of his duties was known to the superintendent and other representatives of the employer.”
The Carter case, supra, involved the question of whether an agent of an industrial life insurance company was an employee within the terms of the workmen’s compensation [119]*119act, or an independent contractor which was the contention of the company, as it is here with respect to Ford’s means of transportation. It was concluded that the agent was an employee. The reasoning and authorities which were employed by the court to reach the conclusion are likewise applicable to the instant case; there is no substantial ground of distinction, as careful reading of the decision will show.
Another case, similar to the last cited, which originated in this State and concerned the agents of an industrial life insurance company is Capital Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Cir., 1951, 186 F. (2d) 943. The court held that the company’s commission agents were for social security tax purposes employees rather than independent contractors, as claimed by the company, and that it was obvious that the seeming freedom from control of the agents was lacking in reality. Distinction was made between agents for the collecting of industrial insurance premiums, such a.s Ford in this case, and ordinary life insurance agents or solicitors. The facts of the latter distinction are well known; socalled industrial insurance is maintained by the personal solicitation and collection of weekly, or such, premiums of small amounts. The evidence in the instant case is that the premiums on the policies which Ford “serviced”, were personally collected by him at weekly intervals and turned in by him on fixed schedule to the Williamston Branch Office out of which he worked.
The courts of other jurisdictions differ upon the question at issue but it appears that the later and better-reasoned decisions uphold liability in such cases. Among them are Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, Ga. 1947, 43 S. E. (2d) 784, affirming 203 Ga. 95, 45 S. E. (2d) 64; Pinnix v. Griffin, 1941, 219 N. C. 35, 12 S. E. (2d) 667; Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P. (2d) 191; Hall v. Sera, 112 Conn. 291, 152 A. 148; Cooke v. Drigant, 1942, 289 N. Y. 313, 45 N. E. (2d) 815; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 1942, 179 Tenn. 29, 162 S. W. (2d) 501; Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. [120]*120289, 16 N. E. (2d) 447; and Lewis v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 1950, 96 Cal. App. (2d) 191, 215 P. (2d) 55. It would unduly prolong this opinion to separately review these cases. They involved facts similar to those presented by the evidence in the instant case, some of them not as strong for plaintiff as this, and all held that the issue of the liability of the industrial insurance company-defendants for the traffic torts of their collecting agents should be submitted to the jury.
Applicable generally, and not to industrial insurance companies alone, is the following from 5 Am. Jur. 728, Automobiles, Sec. 393:
“The mere fact that an employee uses his own automobile in the business of the employer does not make the latter liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for injuries inflicted by such employee in the operation of the automobile. If, however, the other circumstances involved in the case are consistent with, or require, the.inference that the activity in which the servant was engaged at the time of the tort complained of, and in which he was using his own car or one which he had hired, was within the scope of his employment, the person injured may recover from the employer, if the servant’s use of the automobile or other vehicle was authorized, either expressly or impliedly.”
From the following text from 60 C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, § 453, page 1159, some of the above insurance cases are cited in the footnotes, as is our case of Stevens v. Moore, supra:
“The mere fact that the employee uses his own motor vehicle does not relieve the employer from liability for the employee’s negligence in driving the vehicle, and where, with the express or implied assent of the employer, an employee uses a vehicle which the employee owns in the discharge of his duties, the employer will be liable for an injury occasioned by its negligent operation by the employee while acting within the scope of his employment.”
[121]*121Dunne v. Contenti, 256 App. Div. 833, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 248, and American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Poole, 24 Tenn. App. 596, 148 S. W. (2d) 14, which have been cited as contra to our view, appear not to be now followed in their own respective jurisdictions. In the subsequent case of Cooke v. Drigant, supra, 1942, 289 N. Y. 313, 45 N. E. (2d) 815, the New York Court of Appeals sustained the finding of the jury that Drigant, under circumstances parallel to the case in hand, was an employee of his insurance company, rather than an independent contractor. No reference was made in this decision of the highest court of New York to the earlier Contenti case which was decided three years before by the inferior Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Likewise the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1942 decided National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Morrison, supra, 162 S. W. (2d) 501, 508, in which the earlier Poole decision of the intermediate Court of Appeals was referred to and not followed. Instead, effort was made to distinguish it and verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. The holding of the Supreme Court was recapitulated at the conclusion of its opinion, as follows: “Summarizing what has been said, we are constrained to hold (1) that Darby was an agent of the Insurance Company, (2) that he was at the time of this accident acting within the scope of his authority on the business of his principal, or master; and (3) that he was using the automobile, the instrumentality involved in the commission of the tort, by the authority, express or implied, of his principal, and that the Insurance Company was therefore, liable for the damages resulting from this tort.”
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, supra, in which the opinion is well-reasoned and replete with authorities from its own and other jurisdictions, is the subject of a note in Wyoming Law Journal, May 1948, page 130. It is there pointed out that the court concluded that the jury were justified in finding a verdict against the insurance company upon evidence that the agent was a servant of the company when he was performing duties in connection with his debit of in[122]*122dustrial policies, although he may have been an independent contractor with respect to the solicitation of life insurance policies in other territory. The writer concludes, after citation in the footnotes of many decisions, as follows: “It is generally agreed that it is a question for the jury whether the employee was a servant or independent contractor at the time of the wrongdoing if there is sufficient evidence to support either'finding. Where employment appears, the burden is on the employer to establish an independent contractor relationship. Control again is the determinant factor. The right of discharge is a circumstance of much importance.”
Heavily relied upon in the brief of the respondent company is Wesolowski v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 117, 162 A. 166, 87 A. L. R. 783. However, the facts there were quite different. The area of the debit of the agent was less than a square mile in the City of Philadelphia, which he might well have walked to make his collections. The court said that the company was in no position to require the agent to use his automobile and such was no part of his contract of service. (Here the use by the agent of his automobile was clearly impliedly required; he could not reasonably be expected to otherwise cover the extensive territory of his debit and his use of his car was known to the company.) The court further sáid that the test of the master’s responsibility is authority to control the servant’s use of the instrumentality with which the injury was inflicted.
In the case in hand it cannot be reasonably doubted that the company may have, under its plenary control of Ford with the right to subject him to rules and regulations, required him to observe rules of highway safety, such as to drive, when about the company’s business, not in excess of a fixed rate of speed, to stop or slow at road intersections, etc., etc. The Connecticut court said in Hall v. Sera, supra [112 Conn. 291, 152 A. 150], which was a case such as this, in which liability of the employer [123]*123was upheld: “The important question, however, is not whether the company had physical control of the movements of the car at the time of the collision, but rather whether it had the right of general control over the driver himself- — a question of status.” The test is not as to the actual control exercised by the employer or master in such cases, but the right to control, of which there was ample evidence in this case.
The Wesolowski case, supra, is critically .reviewed in a note in Georgetown Law Journal, May 1937, pages 914 et seq. It is there concluded concerning the decision, as follows : "The court did not decide in this case that Adams was not an agent and servant of the insurance company. It merely decided that, as to the operation of the automobile, the insurance company did not have sufficient direction and control so as to render it liable under the respondeat superior doctrine. Had the court been of the opinion that the solicitor was an independent contractor it would not have been called upon to decide whether or not the company had such control. Inferentially, therefore, at least, the court decided that non-liability on the part of the principal for torts does not preclude the solicitor from being an agent and servant.”
The Georgetown Law Journal article just cited, which begins at page 894, is by a distinguished author and former law teacher who states at the outset of his article that the purpose of it is to determine whether insurance solicitors are employees or independent contractors. His conclusion, at page 929, is that such solicitors who devote all their working time to that pursuit and solicit for only one company are agents and not independent contractors, and most, if not all, belong to that class of agents who are also servants. The following is from page 912: “As to the two classes of life insurance solicitors herein considered, namely, solicitors of ordinary insurance and solicitors of industrial insurance, there is a small group of rather recent, well considered personal injury and workmen’s compensation cases, some of which hold expressly that an insurance solicitor is not an [124]*124independent contractor, some of which on cursory examination may seem to indicate a contrary conclusion but actually do not, and only one of which indicates an independent contractor relation.”
The exception is sustained, the order of nonsuit reversed, and the case remanded for new trial.
Oxner, J., and Greneker, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
Baker, C. j., and Taylor, J., dissent.