Giesler v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Giesler v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

471 A.2d 246, 1983 D.C. App. LEXIS 555

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 19, 1983

Docket82-1547

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 471 A.2d 246 (Giesler v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Giesler v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 471 A.2d 246, 1983 D.C. App. LEXIS 555 (D.C. 1983).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Department of Employment Services disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily resigned from her previous employment without good cause connected with the work. D.C.Code § 46-lll(a) (1981). We affirm.

Petitioner was employed from 1975 until May 15, 1982 by the Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. She is married and the mother of a school aged child. In the spring of 1981, petitioner’s husband became unemployed in Washington and also received word that both of his parents were ill in Florida. Intending only a temporary departure, petitioner’s spouse went to Florida to assist his parents. Although both parents ultimately died, the husband was able to find employment in Florida and remained there. Petitioner and her son continued to reside in Washington. Petitioner observed, however, that over a period of months, their son began suffering numerous headaches and that his performance in school was declining. When the child improved after a brief visit with his father in April 1982, petitioner elected to resign from her job in May 1982, and join her husband in Florida.

Her request for unemployment compensation was denied.

The sole question presented is whether petitioner voluntarily left her employment without good cause connected with her work. While an employee’s depar *247 ture from employment is presumed to be involuntary, it is clear that involuntariness means that the decision to leave must be compelled by the employer as contrasted to a volitional act by the employee. Hockaday v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 443 A.2d 8, 10 (D.C. 1982).

In this instance, the facts are not in dispute and there is no claim that conditions on the job caused petitioner to leave. Rather, the evidence showed, and the hearing officer found, that petitioner’s decision to resign was motivated by her sense of domestic responsibility and was not the consequence of a cause connected with her work. See Huiet v. Schwob Manufacturing Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743 (1943).

Given the framework of the statute, respondent’s decision is supported by the evidence and is not plainly wrong.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Department of Employment Services disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily resigned from her previous employment without good cause connected with the work. D.C.Code § 46-lll(a) (1981). We affirm.

Petitioner was employed from 1975 until May 15, 1982 by the Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. She is married and the mother of a school aged child. In the spring of 1981, petitioner’s husband became unemployed in Washington and also received word that both of his parents were ill in Florida. Intending only a temporary departure, petitioner’s spouse went to Florida to assist his parents. Although both parents ultimately died, the husband was able to find employment in Florida and remained there. Petitioner and her son continued to reside in Washington. Petitioner observed, however, that over a period of months, their son began suffering numerous headaches and that his performance in school was declining. When the child improved after a brief visit with his father in April 1982, petitioner elected to resign from her job in May 1982, and join her husband in Florida.

Her request for unemployment compensation was denied.

The sole question presented is whether petitioner voluntarily left her employment without good cause connected with her work. While an employee’s depar *247 ture from employment is presumed to be involuntary, it is clear that involuntariness means that the decision to leave must be compelled by the employer as contrasted to a volitional act by the employee. Hockaday v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 443 A.2d 8, 10 (D.C. 1982).

In this instance, the facts are not in dispute and there is no claim that conditions on the job caused petitioner to leave. Rather, the evidence showed, and the hearing officer found, that petitioner’s decision to resign was motivated by her sense of domestic responsibility and was not the consequence of a cause connected with her work. See Huiet v. Schwob Manufacturing Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743 (1943).

Given the framework of the statute, respondent’s decision is supported by the evidence and is not plainly wrong.

Affirmed.

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471 A.2d 246, 1983 D.C. App. LEXIS 555, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/giesler-v-district-of-columbia-department-of-employment-services-dc-1983.

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