STEPHENS, Justice.
George Arnold Giesen, convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced to forty years imprisonment, appeals. In eight grounds of error appellant contends: that the prosecutor committed reversible error by eliciting testimony regarding polygraph tests; that the prosecutor made impermissible comments about appellant during closing argument; that the prosecutor was allowed to argue outside the record; and that the prosecutor impermissibly attacked appellant through appellant’s trial counsel. We disagree with each contention and, accordingly, affirm.
In his first ground of error, appellant contends the prosecutor erroneously elicited testimony regarding the administering of a polygraph test to the complaining witness. We disagree.
The record reflects the following testimony:
(By prosecutor) Q. When a person who comes to you as a rape victim, comes to you after the fact, that being a couple of days later, do you usually follow a certain procedure when you are investigating that particular type of rape victim’s case?
A. I view it with somewhat more skepticism that I would others that would be reported instantly.
Q. If you have a skepticism do you have that rape victim do anything, that is additionally in your procedure?
[178]*178A. In some instances I ask them if they would take a polygraph test.
Mr. Green: Your Honor, object to anything about a polygraph test.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Green: Not admissible. Instruct the jury to disregard it.
The Court: Jury is so instructed.
Mr. Green: At this time, Your Honor, I move the Court for a mistrial for mentioning the word polygraph.
The Court: Overruled.
(By prosecutor): Q. After you interviewed this witness, that is (K_ W_), did you have any doubt about what she was telling you?
A. No sir I didn’t (RII-233, 234).
The witness did not testify that he felt that a polygraph test was warranted in this instance; that a polygraph test was in fact administered to the complainant; what the results of the test were, assuming one was conducted; or that he was basing his opinion of the complainant’s veracity upon such a test. Although the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible in all cases, Fernandez v. State, 564 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), in light of the nature of the offending statement in this case and the court’s prompt instruction to disregard, no reversible error is shown. Reed v. State, 522 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Appellant’s first ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, appellant contends that P_W_’s testimony regarding what the complainant told her the day of the offense was prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
The record reflects the following:
(By prosecutor) Q. Do you recall receiving a telephone call from Ms. (W_) on Saturday, September 17,1983?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did she tell you?
A. Well, she told me that she had been raped the night before—
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I’m going to object to hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. GREEN: Will you instruct the Jury to disregard it, please?
THE COURT: Jury is so instructed.
Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, it is well settled that statements constituting a rape victim’s complaint, her “outcry”, are admissible in the State’s case in chief as direct evidence of that complaint; this evidentiary rule applies without regard to the spontaneity of those statements. King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). We conclude the testimony was admissible and the trial court erred in sustaining appellant’s objection. Since the error benefitted appellant, appellant’s complaint is without merit. Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
In his next two grounds of error, appellant complains the prosecutor deprived him of due process and a fair trial by making the following statements during closing argument:
He said the whole thing is like he is a gladiator and he is sentenced by Caleta (phonetic), well he may be in an arena, but this guy is not a gladiator, he is one of the animals, that’s what he is.
# * * * * *
You know, it’s a reasonable and logical deduction from his own testimony and his version of what the story is is totally preposterous, unbelievable, period. Consent, no. Look at him, look at this thing as he sits here. Do you think—
In both instances appellant’s counsel’s objections were sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard the prosecutor’s statements, but appellant’s motions for a mistrial were denied. We conclude that the prosecutor’s statements were not so extreme or manifestly improper as to deny appellant a fair trial and any error was cured by the court’s instruction to disregard. Stringer v. State, 632 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Appellant’s grounds of error three and four are overruled.
[179]*179In his fifth ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to attack appellant by arguing outside the record. We disagree. The record reflects that during the State’s closing argument the prosecutor stated:
He will do anything he will violate any oath that he takes on the witness stand. He will violate—
Defense counsel’s objection was overruled. Appellant testified under oath that the complainant had invited him into her apartment and had engaged in sexual intercourse voluntarily. In light of the other evidence presented, it was a reasonable deduction from the evidence that appellant’s testimony was untrue, and the prosecutor’s comment was, therefore, proper. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Crim. App.1980). Appellant’s fifth ground of error is overruled.
In his sixth ground of error, appellant complains of the following statements by the prosecutor during the State’s closing argument:
But what about the boy? What kind of life is he going to have. What will he think twenty years from now down the line when he thinks back and he knows that his mother was raped in his bed? By the likes of this man? What is going to happen to him, is he going to—he is seven years old—eight years old.
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STEPHENS, Justice.
George Arnold Giesen, convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced to forty years imprisonment, appeals. In eight grounds of error appellant contends: that the prosecutor committed reversible error by eliciting testimony regarding polygraph tests; that the prosecutor made impermissible comments about appellant during closing argument; that the prosecutor was allowed to argue outside the record; and that the prosecutor impermissibly attacked appellant through appellant’s trial counsel. We disagree with each contention and, accordingly, affirm.
In his first ground of error, appellant contends the prosecutor erroneously elicited testimony regarding the administering of a polygraph test to the complaining witness. We disagree.
The record reflects the following testimony:
(By prosecutor) Q. When a person who comes to you as a rape victim, comes to you after the fact, that being a couple of days later, do you usually follow a certain procedure when you are investigating that particular type of rape victim’s case?
A. I view it with somewhat more skepticism that I would others that would be reported instantly.
Q. If you have a skepticism do you have that rape victim do anything, that is additionally in your procedure?
[178]*178A. In some instances I ask them if they would take a polygraph test.
Mr. Green: Your Honor, object to anything about a polygraph test.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Green: Not admissible. Instruct the jury to disregard it.
The Court: Jury is so instructed.
Mr. Green: At this time, Your Honor, I move the Court for a mistrial for mentioning the word polygraph.
The Court: Overruled.
(By prosecutor): Q. After you interviewed this witness, that is (K_ W_), did you have any doubt about what she was telling you?
A. No sir I didn’t (RII-233, 234).
The witness did not testify that he felt that a polygraph test was warranted in this instance; that a polygraph test was in fact administered to the complainant; what the results of the test were, assuming one was conducted; or that he was basing his opinion of the complainant’s veracity upon such a test. Although the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible in all cases, Fernandez v. State, 564 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), in light of the nature of the offending statement in this case and the court’s prompt instruction to disregard, no reversible error is shown. Reed v. State, 522 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Appellant’s first ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, appellant contends that P_W_’s testimony regarding what the complainant told her the day of the offense was prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
The record reflects the following:
(By prosecutor) Q. Do you recall receiving a telephone call from Ms. (W_) on Saturday, September 17,1983?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did she tell you?
A. Well, she told me that she had been raped the night before—
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, I’m going to object to hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. GREEN: Will you instruct the Jury to disregard it, please?
THE COURT: Jury is so instructed.
Although hearsay is generally inadmissible, it is well settled that statements constituting a rape victim’s complaint, her “outcry”, are admissible in the State’s case in chief as direct evidence of that complaint; this evidentiary rule applies without regard to the spontaneity of those statements. King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). We conclude the testimony was admissible and the trial court erred in sustaining appellant’s objection. Since the error benefitted appellant, appellant’s complaint is without merit. Appellant’s second ground of error is overruled.
In his next two grounds of error, appellant complains the prosecutor deprived him of due process and a fair trial by making the following statements during closing argument:
He said the whole thing is like he is a gladiator and he is sentenced by Caleta (phonetic), well he may be in an arena, but this guy is not a gladiator, he is one of the animals, that’s what he is.
# * * * * *
You know, it’s a reasonable and logical deduction from his own testimony and his version of what the story is is totally preposterous, unbelievable, period. Consent, no. Look at him, look at this thing as he sits here. Do you think—
In both instances appellant’s counsel’s objections were sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard the prosecutor’s statements, but appellant’s motions for a mistrial were denied. We conclude that the prosecutor’s statements were not so extreme or manifestly improper as to deny appellant a fair trial and any error was cured by the court’s instruction to disregard. Stringer v. State, 632 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Appellant’s grounds of error three and four are overruled.
[179]*179In his fifth ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to attack appellant by arguing outside the record. We disagree. The record reflects that during the State’s closing argument the prosecutor stated:
He will do anything he will violate any oath that he takes on the witness stand. He will violate—
Defense counsel’s objection was overruled. Appellant testified under oath that the complainant had invited him into her apartment and had engaged in sexual intercourse voluntarily. In light of the other evidence presented, it was a reasonable deduction from the evidence that appellant’s testimony was untrue, and the prosecutor’s comment was, therefore, proper. Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Crim. App.1980). Appellant’s fifth ground of error is overruled.
In his sixth ground of error, appellant complains of the following statements by the prosecutor during the State’s closing argument:
But what about the boy? What kind of life is he going to have. What will he think twenty years from now down the line when he thinks back and he knows that his mother was raped in his bed? By the likes of this man? What is going to happen to him, is he going to—he is seven years old—eight years old. What is he going to think? What kind of normal life can he lead when this man has violated the sanctity of his home and has robbed him of the ability to have a normal childhood and discover what sex is in a normal way and life is supposed to treat you? That’s been robbed, that’s been taken. That is out the window because of this man and his mother—
Defense counsel objected; his objection was sustained; and the jury was instructed to disregard the statements. We conclude that the court’s instruction was sufficient to cure any error. Stringer v. State, 632 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Appellant’s sixth ground of error is overruled.
In his final two grounds of error, appellant contends the prosecutor committed reversible error during closing argument by attacking appellant through his defense counsel. We disagree. Appellant first complains of the following statement:
(By prosecutor) I want to apologize for (sic) you too, because of the nature of this offense and the trial and the kind of testimony that you have had to hear sitting out there. Beforehand you knew only it was a burglary and that the intent involved was that committing sexual assault but in listening to the testimony yesterday although it wasn’t a rape case, it was pretty much tried like one, with all of the accusations and victimizing again taking place her in front of you and I just want to—
Appellant’s objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard, but his Motion for Mistrial was overruled. This statement was not a direct reference to appellant or to his counsel. We hold that the trial court’s instruction was sufficient to cure any error Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
Appellant next complains of the following statement:
(By prosecutor) On behalf of Mr. Wade’s office and people connected to this case, I join in the apologies offered by my co-counsel because you had to sit there and listen to a bunch of perverted facts, twisted lies and inuendos and implications not brought on by the attorneys, not brought on by the Court—
Appellant’s objection was overruled. We hold that, although improper, this statement was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to constitute reversible error. Appellant’s grounds of error seven and eight are overruled.
Affirmed.
DEVANY, J., dissents.