OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
Appellants and a third codefendant who did not appeal his conviction waived trial by jury and entered pleas of guilty before the court to the offense of burglary with intent to commit theft. The trial eourt denied probation to these appellants and sentenced each to five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellants raise five grounds of error challenging the voluntariness of their guilty pleas and the refusal of the trial judge, after assessment of punishment, to permit withdrawal of the pleas and award new trials. The substance of all grounds of error is stated in appellants’ brief as follows:
“The sole issue is ‘whether the plea by Gibson and Reeves was voluntarily made, or whether in truth and fact, it was induced by the plea bargaining guarantee of the State and the Sheriff?’ ”
The record on appeal before us contains transcribed court reporter’s notes from hearings on four different days. On May 16, 1974, the pleas of guilty were entered and accepted, and appellants were found guilty. On July 11, 1974, appellants again appeared and punishment was assessed. On August 28, 1974, the court heard and denied appellants’ motion for new trial. Finally, on November 21, 1974, appellants were called before the court for formal pronouncement of sentence.
On May 16, 1974, before accepting appellant Gibson’s plea of guilty, the trial judge made the following inquiries, among others:
“THE COURT: Have you been persuaded to plead guilty against your will?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Have you been promised anything in this case—
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: —to plead guilty. You know that if you plead guilty in this case, and the evidence shows that you’re guilty, that the attorneys may make a recommendation to the Court, and that’s all that is, a recommendation. I do not have to take the recommendation.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: I will consider it, but that’s all; just consider it. If they recommend that you be granted probation, I may deny that recommendation and send you to the penitentiary for as much as twelve years. You understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
[71]*71“THE COURT: Knowing all that, do you still plead guilty in this case?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
The following inquiries were made of appellant Reeves:
“THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything to plead guilty?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: I don’t know whether I told A. L. Reeves or not, but the recommendation of the District Attorney or the State is nothing more than a recommendation. He may recommend probation and I could still send you to the penitentiary.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
After accepting the pleas of guilty, the trial judge further stated:
“In addition to announcing judgment here, if you should be granted probation, if you should be, and don’t think that I’m saying that you’re going to be because I don’t know, if your records are not sufficient, your past records are not sufficient to warrant what I think would be a good probation risk, well, I will send you to the Department of Corrections. . . . "
On July 11 the case was called for assessment of punishment.1 Prior to assessment of punishment the prosecutor recommended probation and defense counsel made the following statement to the court:
“Judge, I would respectfully request the Court to be very compassionate in this case and grant these boys probation. The term of probation is not that important. Mr. Fielder has seen fit after reading all the investigation to recommend probation. I know that you’re the final word. But we would urge upon the Court to exercise extreme leniency in this case and grant all three of them probation. Thank you.”
The court assessed punishment in each case at five years and denied probation. At that point appellants sought to withdraw their guilty pleas, and defense counsel stated as grounds:
“ . . . Of course, the State has made its recommendation for probation, realizing, of course, it’s discretionary with the Court. But, nevertheless, the decision to enter a plea of guilty was based upon entirely and solely the recommendation for probation and the delusive hope of getting probation. . . . ”
The trial court refused to allow withdrawal of the pleas.
Subsequently appellants filed motions for new trial alleging in part that they entered pleas of guilty only because they had been guaranteed probation. Attached was an affidavit by Sheriff Bobby Kinser, read into evidence, in which it is stated:
“ ‘I am aware of the fact that none of the Defendants in this case would have changed their plea of “Not Guilty” to a “Guilty” plea had they not been assured that they would receive probation.”
Also attached was an affidavit by District Attorney Richard Fielder which recites in part:
“ T am cognizant of the allegations contained in the foregoing verified Motion for New Trial by the Defendants, Delbert Allen Gibson and A. L. Reeves, Jr., and said allegations are true and correct. Further, in an effort to fairly represent the people of the State of Texas, and by the authority vested in me as District Attorney of the 22nd Judicial District, I made an agreement with the Defendants, Delbert Allen Gibson, A. L. Reeves, Jr., and Larry Wayne Miller, and their attorney of record, Rodger M. Zimmerman, to recommend probation in their case, if they would change their pleas from “Not Guilty” to “Guilty.” The basis for this agreement was to move the trial docket and to see that restitution was [72]*72made. Restitution was made and the interest of the State of Texas was best served by this “plea bargaining” procedure.
“ ‘There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that had these Defendants thought that they would not get probation, none of them would have changed their pleas of “Not Guilty” to “Guilty” and thereby given up their fundamental right to a trial by jury.” ’
Both appellants testified at the hearing on the motion.
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OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
Appellants and a third codefendant who did not appeal his conviction waived trial by jury and entered pleas of guilty before the court to the offense of burglary with intent to commit theft. The trial eourt denied probation to these appellants and sentenced each to five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellants raise five grounds of error challenging the voluntariness of their guilty pleas and the refusal of the trial judge, after assessment of punishment, to permit withdrawal of the pleas and award new trials. The substance of all grounds of error is stated in appellants’ brief as follows:
“The sole issue is ‘whether the plea by Gibson and Reeves was voluntarily made, or whether in truth and fact, it was induced by the plea bargaining guarantee of the State and the Sheriff?’ ”
The record on appeal before us contains transcribed court reporter’s notes from hearings on four different days. On May 16, 1974, the pleas of guilty were entered and accepted, and appellants were found guilty. On July 11, 1974, appellants again appeared and punishment was assessed. On August 28, 1974, the court heard and denied appellants’ motion for new trial. Finally, on November 21, 1974, appellants were called before the court for formal pronouncement of sentence.
On May 16, 1974, before accepting appellant Gibson’s plea of guilty, the trial judge made the following inquiries, among others:
“THE COURT: Have you been persuaded to plead guilty against your will?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Have you been promised anything in this case—
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: —to plead guilty. You know that if you plead guilty in this case, and the evidence shows that you’re guilty, that the attorneys may make a recommendation to the Court, and that’s all that is, a recommendation. I do not have to take the recommendation.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: I will consider it, but that’s all; just consider it. If they recommend that you be granted probation, I may deny that recommendation and send you to the penitentiary for as much as twelve years. You understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
[71]*71“THE COURT: Knowing all that, do you still plead guilty in this case?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
The following inquiries were made of appellant Reeves:
“THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything to plead guilty?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: I don’t know whether I told A. L. Reeves or not, but the recommendation of the District Attorney or the State is nothing more than a recommendation. He may recommend probation and I could still send you to the penitentiary.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
After accepting the pleas of guilty, the trial judge further stated:
“In addition to announcing judgment here, if you should be granted probation, if you should be, and don’t think that I’m saying that you’re going to be because I don’t know, if your records are not sufficient, your past records are not sufficient to warrant what I think would be a good probation risk, well, I will send you to the Department of Corrections. . . . "
On July 11 the case was called for assessment of punishment.1 Prior to assessment of punishment the prosecutor recommended probation and defense counsel made the following statement to the court:
“Judge, I would respectfully request the Court to be very compassionate in this case and grant these boys probation. The term of probation is not that important. Mr. Fielder has seen fit after reading all the investigation to recommend probation. I know that you’re the final word. But we would urge upon the Court to exercise extreme leniency in this case and grant all three of them probation. Thank you.”
The court assessed punishment in each case at five years and denied probation. At that point appellants sought to withdraw their guilty pleas, and defense counsel stated as grounds:
“ . . . Of course, the State has made its recommendation for probation, realizing, of course, it’s discretionary with the Court. But, nevertheless, the decision to enter a plea of guilty was based upon entirely and solely the recommendation for probation and the delusive hope of getting probation. . . . ”
The trial court refused to allow withdrawal of the pleas.
Subsequently appellants filed motions for new trial alleging in part that they entered pleas of guilty only because they had been guaranteed probation. Attached was an affidavit by Sheriff Bobby Kinser, read into evidence, in which it is stated:
“ ‘I am aware of the fact that none of the Defendants in this case would have changed their plea of “Not Guilty” to a “Guilty” plea had they not been assured that they would receive probation.”
Also attached was an affidavit by District Attorney Richard Fielder which recites in part:
“ T am cognizant of the allegations contained in the foregoing verified Motion for New Trial by the Defendants, Delbert Allen Gibson and A. L. Reeves, Jr., and said allegations are true and correct. Further, in an effort to fairly represent the people of the State of Texas, and by the authority vested in me as District Attorney of the 22nd Judicial District, I made an agreement with the Defendants, Delbert Allen Gibson, A. L. Reeves, Jr., and Larry Wayne Miller, and their attorney of record, Rodger M. Zimmerman, to recommend probation in their case, if they would change their pleas from “Not Guilty” to “Guilty.” The basis for this agreement was to move the trial docket and to see that restitution was [72]*72made. Restitution was made and the interest of the State of Texas was best served by this “plea bargaining” procedure.
“ ‘There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that had these Defendants thought that they would not get probation, none of them would have changed their pleas of “Not Guilty” to “Guilty” and thereby given up their fundamental right to a trial by jury.” ’
Both appellants testified at the hearing on the motion. Both testified that they were promised probation, yet both also admitted that at the time they entered their pleas they told the court that they had been promised nothing and acknowledged that the trial judge had explained to them that any recommendations made would be nothing more than recommendations, and the trial court could sentence them to the penitentiary despite any recommendation of probation.
Following presentation of evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel argued:
“ . . . But I am convinced that these two young men, all three of these young men, would not have changed their pleas if in their own mind they weren’t convinced that they were not going to go to the penitentiary. I realize my duty as defense counsel with these individuals; and going further than that duty, knowing what this Court has done in the past or what other courts do in the past. I talked with these Defendants about it and I said, ‘Regardless of what the District Attorney does, this judge has the power to do whatever he wants to do within what we’re talking about. But when the State’s attorney and the law enforcement agencies all get behind and recommend probation, and will go so far as to promise and add to that if the Court does not for any reason at all ‘I’ll join with you,’ then I think, Judge, to send these two young men to the penitentiary would be a real trick. . . . ”
On November 21 appellants appeared for sentencing. Prior to pronouncement of sentence the trial judge permitted the sheriff, defense counsel and himself to be called as witnesses by the defense “to make a record on some matters.” Counsel stated that he had filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment on Plea of Guilty and Assessment of Judgment [sic?].” The testimony was not relevant to or offered in support of any of the grounds stated in Article 42.07, V.A.C.C.P., as reasons to prevent sentence.2
In their brief appellants assert:
[74]*74“There is no dispute of the following material facts contained in the Statement of Facts:
“(6) That the district attorney Fielder guaranteed Defendants they would get probation and not go to jail if they changed their plea.
“(7) That the sheriff guaranteed the Defendants if they made restitution and changed their plea, they would get probation and not go to jail.
“(8) That the defense counsel assured Defendants the bargain and guarantee would be kept by the State.
“(9) That the Defendants would not have changed their plea except for this guarantee.”
A reading of the record as a whole, including those portions of the record quoted above, reveals that the assertions made by appellants that they were “guaranteed” probation are by no means established as undisputed fact. Appellants at the time of entering their pleas informed the court that no promises had been made and indicated to the court that they understood any recommendation of probation would not be binding on the court, but to the contrary, the court could sentence them to imprisonment notwithstanding any recommendations of probation. Statements by defense counsel acknowledged full understanding on his part and communication to his clients of the principle of law that on the decision of whether to grant probation the judge is “the final word” and “it’s discretionary with the court.” The ultimate issue, as framed in appellants’ brief, of whether appellants’ guilty pleas were induced by a guarantee of probation, was, on the record before us, an issue of fact which the trial court resolved against appellants. The record contains evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that there was no guarantee, but that instead there was nothing more than a traditional and valid plea bargain by which the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. It appears that upon failure of the trial court to follow the recommendation for probation appellants sought to withdraw their pleas, not because of failure of a bargain guaranteeing probation, but because their assessment of the weight that the prosecutor’s recommendation would carry with the trial court proved inaccurate.
The record does not show that appellants’ pleas were induced by a guaranteed probation and the grounds of error are overruled.
Suggested by the record but not adequately developed in the evidence or argued on appeal are possible claims of prose-cutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, or both. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (though not adopted in this State), relating to the Prosecution Function, Approved Draft, 1971 (Section 2.8(a)), state, “It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court.” The Standards relating to the Defense Function, Section 1.1(d), likewise state, “It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer intentionally to misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court.” Regarding plea bargains, the Standards relating to the Prosecution Function state in Section 4.3(a) and (b):
[75]*75“(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to make any promise or commitment concerning the sentence which will be imposed or concerning a suspension of sentence; he may properly advise the defense what position he will take concerning disposition.
“(b) A prosecutor should avoid implying a greater power to influence the disposition of a case than he possesses.”
The following Standards are proposed in the delineation of the Defense Function:
Section 5.1(b):
“It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer intentionally to understate or overstate the risks, hazards or prospects of the case to exert undue influence on the accused’s decision as to his plea.”
Section 7.5(a):
“It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer knowingly to offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity.”
Although the record before us no more supports findings of conduct violative of the above quoted standards than it supports a finding that the pleas were induced by a guarantee of probation, we can only conclude that were it to support the latter, it almost certainly would support the former. The prosecutor and defense counsel are without authority to bind the court to a fixed punishment or to probation by plea negotiation. An attempt to base a negotiated plea upon such a guarantee would violate Prosecution Function Standard 4.3(a) and (b), supra, and Defense Function Standard 5.1(b), supra. To then represent to the court at the entry of the plea that no plea bargain has been struck or that no improper plea bargain has been struck would violate Prosecution Function Standard 2.8(a), supra, and Defense Function Standard 1.1(d), supra. To stand silent while the defendant makes such representations known by the prosecutor and defense counsel to be false would possibly violate both previously cited standards and Defense Function Standard 7.5(a), supra.
As previously stated, the record before us does not prove and the brief does not assert violation of the above quoted standards. The record supports the implied findings and the ruling of the trial court. Nevertheless, we have quoted from the Standards for Criminal Justice in order to draw the attention of the bench and bar to the need for proper conduct of plea negotiations, and demonstrate the soundness of the recommended practice upon entry of a guilty plea of inquiring whether the plea is the consequence of negotiations, and if so, what the terms of the negotiated plea are. Of. Galvan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 525 S.W.2d 24, in which the trial court, as in the instant case, followed “the highly desirable practice” (Galvan v. State, 525 S.W.2d at 26) of explaining to the accused that a recommendation is only a recommendation, and does not bind the Court.3 No less desirable a practice is that the results of any negotiations upon which the plea is based be made known to the trial court and made a part of the record. See Cruz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 817. Since proper[76]*76ly negotiated pleas are acceptable and improper plea bargains render the plea involuntary, there is nothing to lose and all to gain by bringing the fruit of negotiations out of the closet and into the record.
The record in the instant case supports the conclusion that appellants entered their pleas of guilty voluntarily and knowing that the court was not bound by the prosecutor’s recommendation of probation.
The grounds of error are overruled and the judgments are affirmed.
DOUGLAS, J., not participating.