Gibbs v. District of Columbia

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Gibbs v. District of Columbia

180 A.2d 891, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 301

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedMay 11, 1962

Docket2937

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 180 A.2d 891 (Gibbs v. District of Columbia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gibbs v. District of Columbia, 180 A.2d 891, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 301 (D.C. 1962).

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Opinion

MYERS, Associate Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of judgment on jury verdicts against him in favor of the District of Columbia for damages to a police vehicle and upon his counterclaim for damages to his automobile in a collision between the two vehicles in question.

It clearly appears from the record that the trial judge, in granting prayers for in *892 structions to the jury and in his subsequent charge to the jury, retroactively applied provisions of the District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act 1 which provides, among other things, for waiver of governmental immunity and makes the District of Columbia liable, in the case of an emergency vehicle, only for gross negligence. This statute was enacted some five months after the accident, and we hold its provisions inapplicable to the instant case on the rationale of Barrick v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 173 A.2d 372, affirmed April 27, 1962, D.C.Cir., 302 F.2d 927.

In view of the substantial error in charging the jury, the judgment below must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial based upon the applicable law at the time of the accident in February, 1960.

Reversed with directions to grant a new-trial.

1

. Code (1961) § 1-921 et seq.

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MYERS, Associate Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of judgment on jury verdicts against him in favor of the District of Columbia for damages to a police vehicle and upon his counterclaim for damages to his automobile in a collision between the two vehicles in question.

It clearly appears from the record that the trial judge, in granting prayers for in *892 structions to the jury and in his subsequent charge to the jury, retroactively applied provisions of the District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act 1 which provides, among other things, for waiver of governmental immunity and makes the District of Columbia liable, in the case of an emergency vehicle, only for gross negligence. This statute was enacted some five months after the accident, and we hold its provisions inapplicable to the instant case on the rationale of Barrick v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 173 A.2d 372, affirmed April 27, 1962, D.C.Cir., 302 F.2d 927.

In view of the substantial error in charging the jury, the judgment below must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial based upon the applicable law at the time of the accident in February, 1960.

Reversed with directions to grant a new-trial.

1

. Code (1961) § 1-921 et seq.

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180 A.2d 891, 1962 D.C. App. LEXIS 301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibbs-v-district-of-columbia-dc-1962.

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