George Swenson v. George P. Barrick and Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company

D.C. Circuit

George Swenson v. George P. Barrick and Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company

302 F.2d 927, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 342, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 5268

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedApril 27, 1962

Docket16587_1

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 302 F.2d 927 (George Swenson v. George P. Barrick and Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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George Swenson v. George P. Barrick and Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 302 F.2d 927, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 342, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 5268 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Barrick, the owner of a parked car-struck by an ambulance owned by the District of Columbia, sued Swenson, the driver of the ambulance, in the Municipal Court to recover for the damage done. The District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act, 1 which was adopted some 18 months after the accident but before trial, exempts employees from personal liability for negligent operation of a District-owned vehicle and, waiving governmental immunity, makes the District of Columbia liable—but, in the case of an emergency vehicle, only for gross negligence. The Act also provides that any judicial proceeding pending at its effective date shall be dismissed as to the employee and shall continue with the District as the sole defendant.

On Swenson’s motion, he was dismissed and the District of Columbia was substituted as defendant. At the trial a verdict for the District was directed because Barrick had not shown gross negligence. On appeal, the Municipal Court of Appeals held the Act unconstitutional as thus retroactively applied, and reversed. Although we allowed an appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Municipal Court of Appeals on the basis of Judge Hood’s opinion. 2

Affirmed.

1

. Section 1-921, D.C.Code (1961); Act of July 14,1960, 74 Stat. 519.

2

. Barrick v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 173 A.2d 372 (1961),

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PER CURIAM.

Barrick, the owner of a parked car-struck by an ambulance owned by the District of Columbia, sued Swenson, the driver of the ambulance, in the Municipal Court to recover for the damage done. The District of Columbia Employee Non-Liability Act, 1 which was adopted some 18 months after the accident but before trial, exempts employees from personal liability for negligent operation of a District-owned vehicle and, waiving governmental immunity, makes the District of Columbia liable—but, in the case of an emergency vehicle, only for gross negligence. The Act also provides that any judicial proceeding pending at its effective date shall be dismissed as to the employee and shall continue with the District as the sole defendant.

On Swenson’s motion, he was dismissed and the District of Columbia was substituted as defendant. At the trial a verdict for the District was directed because Barrick had not shown gross negligence. On appeal, the Municipal Court of Appeals held the Act unconstitutional as thus retroactively applied, and reversed. Although we allowed an appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Municipal Court of Appeals on the basis of Judge Hood’s opinion. 2

Affirmed.

1

. Section 1-921, D.C.Code (1961); Act of July 14,1960, 74 Stat. 519.

2

. Barrick v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 173 A.2d 372 (1961),

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302 F.2d 927, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 342, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 5268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-swenson-v-george-p-barrick-and-allied-american-mutual-fire-cadc-1962.

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