Gesualdi v. Bestech Transport LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMarch 23, 2022
Docket2:14-cv-01110
StatusUnknown

This text of Gesualdi v. Bestech Transport LLC (Gesualdi v. Bestech Transport LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gesualdi v. Bestech Transport LLC, (E.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------X THOMAS GESUALDI; LOUIS BISIGNANO; ANTHONY D’AQUILA; MICHAEL O’TOOLE; BENNY UMBRA; JOSEPH A. FERRARA, SR.; FRANK H. FINKEL; MARC HERBST; DENISE RICHARDSON; and THOMAS F. CORBETT, as Trustees and fiduciaries of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund,

Plaintiffs,

-against- MEMORANDUM & ORDER 14-CV-1110(JS)(ARL) BESTECH TRANSPORT, LLC,

Defendant. ----------------------------------X Appearances:

For Plaintiffs: Arthur J. Muller, III, Esq. Trivella & Forte LLP 1311 Mamaroneck Avenue White Plains, New York 10605

For Non-Party Martha Mancheno: Scott S. Markowitz, Esq. Tarter, Krinsky & Drogin 1350 Broadway New York, New York 10018

SEYBERT, District Judge: Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ renewed request for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of their multi-year efforts to have non-party Martha Mancheno (“Mancheno”) attend a deposition in compliance with a Rule 45 subpoena (hereafter, the “Fee Application”). (See ECF No. 76.) Mancheno has not responded to the Fee Application. (See Case Docket, in toto.) For the reasons that follow, the Fee Application is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs are awarded $6,131.75 in attorneys’ fees and $39.25 in costs.

BACKGROUND The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the relevant history giving rise the Fee Application. (See, e.g., Jan. 8, 2021 Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), ECF No. 70.) In sum, Plaintiffs sought post-judgment discovery in an effort to collect on their judgment, including issuing a Rule 45 subpoena upon Mancheno. However, Mancheno failed to appear for her deposition. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to compel Mancheno’s appearance, which motion the Magistrate Judge granted. (See Compel Order, ECF No. 40.) When Mancheno failed to comply with the Compel Order, Plaintiffs then sought to hold Mancheno in contempt (see Contempt Motion, ECF No. 44), which led to extensive and protracted efforts

to secure that result. (See, e.g., OSC; see generally Case Docket.) Ultimately, on January 27, 2021, Mancheno appeared at a show cause hearing during which she agreed to sit for a deposition on January 29, 2021, which occurred. (See Min. Entry, ECF No. 74; Status Report, ECF No. 75.) Of relevance here, since at least October 18, 2019, Mancheno was on notice that she may be subject to sanctions for failing to appear for her deposition. (See Oct. 18, 2019 Elec. Order Adopting R&R; see also Nov. 7, 2019 OSC, ECF No. 56, at 2 (“[T]he Court may impose sanctions, including but not limited to monetary fines for every day that [Mancheno] fails to comply with the Rule 45 Subpoena and the Court’s Orders[,] as well as for

attorneys’ fees and costs.”).) Moreover, the record establishes that Plaintiffs have always sought attorneys’ fees and costs they incurred because of Mancheno’s noncompliance with Court orders. (See, e.g., Jan. 20, 2020 Status Report, ECF No. 62; see also Dec. 14, 2020 Status Report, ECF No. 69 (requesting the rescheduling of an earlier contempt hearing “with leave for Plaintiffs to file supplemental documentation related to their claims for attorneys’ fees and costs”).) In their final Status Report, informing the Court that Mancheno finally complied with the Court’s orders to appear for her deposition, Plaintiffs further stated they: seek to be made whole for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred due to Ms. Mancheno’s continued non-compliance with the [Court’s numerous] directives –- not complied with until last week. Same resulted in Plaintiffs’ [sic] incurring nearly $8,000.00 in attorneys’ fees from the drafting of the initial motion to compel, and just over $5,000.00 in service fees to comply [with] the mandates of the Local Rules and Your Honor’s Orders.

(Feb. 4, 2021 Status Report, ECF No. 75, at 2 (noting that these fees did not include expenses related to Mancheno’s deposition itself).) After subsequent efforts to resolve the attorneys’ fees and costs issue proved unsuccessful (id. at 3), the instant Fee Application followed four months later; as stated supra, Mancheno did not respond to it. DISCUSSION I. Attorneys’ Fees A. Applicable Standard

As a general matter, when determining attorney’s fees, the “starting point” for calculating a “presumptively reasonable fee” is “the lodestar –- the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar –- the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case –- creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’”) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d

Cir. 2008)). The Supreme Court has held that “the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010) (emphasis in original). “[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Id. at 553 (citation omitted); see also Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190-91 (holding that a court determines a “presumptively reasonable fee” by considering case-specific factors in order to establish a reasonable hourly rate that a “reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay,” and then

multiplying that rate by the number of reasonable hours). This assessment is undertaken “bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. “District courts have broad discretion to determine both the reasonable number of compensable hours and the reasonable hourly rate.” Gesualdi v. Dove Mason Supply Co., Inc., No. 19-CV-1181, 2020 WL 1538746, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2020) (quoting Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 157, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1536408 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020). “The party applying for fees must support the hourly rates it claims with, for example, evidence of counsel’s expertise and

prevailing market rates.” Id. (citing Riley v. City of N.Y., No. 10-CV-2513, 2015 WL 9592518, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2015)). The reasonableness of hourly rates is guided by the market rate “[p]revailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984), and the relevant community is generally the “district in which the court sits.” Polk v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union— N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund v. D & A Bus Co., 270 F. Supp. 3d 593, 617–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“To determine reasonable hourly rates, the Court considers this Circuit’s adherence to the forum rule, which

states that a district court should generally use the prevailing hourly rates in the district where it sits.”).

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