Germo Manufacturing Co. v. Combs

240 S.W. 872, 209 Mo. App. 651, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 137
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 6, 1922
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 240 S.W. 872 (Germo Manufacturing Co. v. Combs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Germo Manufacturing Co. v. Combs, 240 S.W. 872, 209 Mo. App. 651, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinion

TRIMBLE, P. J.

Plaintiff is a Missouri corporation organized in 1903 for the purpose of, among other things, owing and controlling formulas and more especially of manufacturing and distributing a compound known as “Cholorine,” a preparation for poultry. And ever since that time, it has been engaged in the preparation and sale of said poultry remedy, and formula for which it claimed and now claims, to own and control.

Defendants are partners doing business under the name of the “Milkoline Manufacturing Company,” which partnership was formed August 13, 1914; and ever since has been engaged in the manufacture- and sale of a poultry compound called “Milkoline.”

This suit was instituted by plaintiff in April, 1917, to enjoin defendants from making use of the alleged secret formula owned and used by plaintiff in compounding its remedy “Cholorine” and to restrain defendants from engaging in unfair competition with plaintiff whereby the latter is deprived of the full ownership of said formula and of the full benefit and results of its business.

The case was tried by the chancellor, and a decree was entered dismissing plaintiff’s bill. Whereupon *655 plaintiff appealed to this court where the case was submitted at the March term, 1919. It was transferred to the Supreme Court in order to set at rest the question of whether or not jurisdiction was with us. We entertained the view that even if the petition did not pray for damages in excess of $7500, yet as the pleadings and evidence clearly showed that if plaintiff’s claims were upheld and defendants were enjoined from the further prosecution of their business of selling “Milkoline,” the loss accnring to defendants would far exceed the limit of our jurisdiction, therefore the right to adjudicate and pass upon the case was in the Supreme Court. The principal relief sought by-the bill was to deprive the defendants of their right to manufacture and sell “Milkoline.” The Supreme Court had held that if the monetary value of the “right lost” was within the jurisdiction of that court then jurisdiction was there. [State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 256 Mo. 710, 718.] And we accordingly order it transferred. We thought that the mere fact that plaintiff’s petition contained a prayer for damages in an amount within our jurisdiction was not decisive of the matter, in a case where the monetary value of the right so%ight to he taken from the defendant was a sum vástly in excess of our jurisdiction. The Supreme Court evidently thought otherwise, however, for it ordered the case retransferred to us, although it did not expressly pass upon the particular feature of the question hereinabove mentioned. [See Germo Mfg. Co. v. Combs, 229 S. W. 1072.]

The petition charges that for many years plaintiff has been engaged in the manufacture and sale of a poultry remedy called “Cholorine” made according to a secret formula exclusively owned and controlled by it; that said remedy has been extensively advertised by it as a valuable remedy in the treatment of diseases of fowls -and as a tonic for hogs, and an extensive and valuable business has been built up, in which more than $10,000 a year is expended in maintaining a force of *656 traveling salesmen in all parts of the country to sell the same to merchants, shippers, feeders and dealers in poultry; that it has strictly guarded and kept as an inviolate secret the names and quantities of the ingredients entering into “Cholorine” as well as the-proportions and methods of compounding the same; that plaintiff’s uniform policy has been to impose on all its officers and employees, in any way connected with the business, the duty to preserve said secret and not divulg’e the same, and it became their duty to do so after they ceased employment with said company; that the officers and employees well knew they had neither legal nor equitable right to themselves compound the same or a like preparation by the use of any one or all of the essential ingredients forming a necessary or essential part of said formula.

The petition further alleged that said secret formula for the manufacture of “Cholorine” and the exclusive right to use and compound the same by the use of any and all ingredients entering therein, were by said corporation purchased for a valuable consideration from the defendant Combs, who claimed to be the originator and exclusive owner thereof, and that thereafter all the interest of said Combs and the exclusive right to the use of said formula vested in the plaintiff corporation, and the same was and is a valuable asset and property right exclusively owned and controlled by plaintiff; that at the time plaintiff purchased said formula of the defendant Combs he, the said Combs, was a large stockholder in said company, one of the chief promoters and organizers thereof, and that thereafter defendant Combs retained hi's connection with said company and for a number of years acted as chief or associate manager and as president thereof; that while connected with said company Combs at all times jealously guarded said formula as a strict company secret and valuable corporate asset as it was his duty and legal obligation to do; that by reason of Combs’ confidential relations with said company, and *657 by reason, of his having sold and conveyed said formula to said plaintiff company, while claiming to be the original compounder, discoverer and exclusive owner thereof, “said Combs was doubtly bound, not only not to use and employ said formula himself, in order to engage and to enter into competition with the plaintiff company by compounding the same, or like preparation to be used for like or similar purposes as that for which ‘Cholorine’ was manufactured and sold, but it, moreover, became his highest legal and moral obligation and duty to the plaintiff company to use his utmost endeavor to preserve inviolate the name of any and all ingredients, agents and compounds used in said formula, and to protect and preserve to said plaintiff company its property rights in the exclusive ownership thereof, so as to guard and protect it from any competition arising from any other person, firm or corporation who sought to gain a knowledge of the secret ingredients entering into the same.”

The petition further alleged that among other means recommended and prescribed by it for administering “Cholorine” to poultry as a preventive of disease and health-preserving remedy, and as a body-builder, egg-producer and curative agency, one was “to mix it in connection with water with dry food stuff, to be fed to said fowls, but the same was particularly recommended by plaintiff to be used by all poultrvmen by introducing it into buttermilk, and other liquid food, in addition to administering it to poultry in drinking water.”

The petition further alleged that said preparation' when so administered in buttermilk and other liquid, foods, according to directions, constituted a very valuable preventive, remedial and useful agent for all purposes for which it, was advertised, and is and has been extensively used throughout the country by admininstering it in prescribed quantities in buttermilk and other liquid foods, but preferable by introducing it into butter *658

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Bluebook (online)
240 S.W. 872, 209 Mo. App. 651, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/germo-manufacturing-co-v-combs-moctapp-1922.