German v. Lopez

146 F. Supp. 3d 392, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156646, 2015 WL 7303533
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedNovember 19, 2015
DocketCIVIL ACTION NO. 15-13413-RGS
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 146 F. Supp. 3d 392 (German v. Lopez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
German v. Lopez, 146 F. Supp. 3d 392, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156646, 2015 WL 7303533 (D. Mass. 2015).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING A HAGUE CONVENTION PETITION

STEARNS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is before the court on a petition brought by Victor German (Victor) pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) and the Interna[395]*395tional Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S.C. § 9003. Victor1 seeks the return to the Dominican Republic of his two minor daughters, D, age 4, and K, age 3, who were taken to the United States, allegedly without his permission, by their mother, Victor’s then wife, respondent Yalersi Gomez Lopez (Yalersi).2 Procedural Background

The procedural background is brief. On November 11, 2014, Victor submitted a Request for Return of his children to the Central Authority of the Dominican Republic, the National Council for the Childhood and Adolescence (CONANI).3 On December 2, 2014, CONANI forwarded the request to the U.S. Department of State. On March 23, 2015, an official at the Department of State wrote to Yalersi notifying her of the request and of the duty of the United States under Article 7(f) of the Hague Convention to facilitate, if necessary, the initiation of judicial proceedings. On September 22, 20Í5, Victor filed a Petition for Return in the District of Massachusetts, the jurisdiction where Yalersi and the two girls how reside. On October 5, 2015, the Department of State made a formal request that the court act expeditiously on the petition.

On October 20, 2015, the court appointed Janice Bassil, Esq., to represent the interests of the children and scheduled an initial appearance for November 3, 2015. On October 23, 2015, the court issued an order requiring Yalersi to appear at the November 3, 2015 hearing, and enjoining her from removing the children from the jurisdiction of the court. The order was served on Yalersi by a U.S. Marshal that same day.

At the- hearing, Elizabeth Abimola Thomas, Esq., entered a pro bono appearance for Yalersi. With the parties’ agreement, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 10, 2015. At the hearing, the court heard the testimony of Yalersi, and through the video conferencing auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, that of Victor.4 Family members also testified. ■

Legal Background

The Hague Convention requires the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully taken' from the State in which they habitually reside. Chafin v. Chafin, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 1021, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013). The resolution of a Hague Convention petition “begin[s] and end[s] with the question of [a child’s] habitual residence at the time of removal.” Mendez v. May, 778 F.3d 337, 344 (1st Cir.2015). If the State from which a child is taken is not his or her habitual residence, there is no -remedy under the Hague' Convention. The determination of a child’s place of “habitual residence” also decides the State whose courts have jurisdiction to make custody ' decisions regarding the child.5

In the First Circuit, a district court presented with a Hague Convention petition is to look first “to the shared intent or settled purpose of the persons [396]*396entitled to determine the child’s permanent home; as a secondary factor, [the court] may consider the child’s acclimatization to his or her current place of residence.”6 Mendez, 778 F.3d at 344. In parsing the parents’ settled purpose, a court is to “ ‘look specifically to the last moment of the parents’ shared intent.’” Id.,.,quoting Mauvais, 772 F.3d at 12. A petitioner seeking the return of a child under the Hague Convention must establish by a preponderance of the evidence “that he or she (1) seeks to return the child to the child’s country of habitual residence, (2) had custody rights immediately prior to the child’s removal, and (3) was exercising those rights.” Mendez, 778 F.3d at 343.

Custody decisions are often difficult. Judges must strive always to avoid a common tendency to prefer their own society and culture, a tendency that ought not interfere with objective consideration of all the factors that should be weighed in determining the best interests of the child. This judicial neutrality is presumed from the mandate of the Convention, which affirms that the contracting states are “[fjirmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody.” Convention Preamble, Treaty Doc., at 7. International law serves a high purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to rely upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by legitimate, and fair proceedings. To interpret the Convention. to permit an abducting parent to avoid a return remedy ... would run counter to the Convention’s purpose of deterring child abductions by parents who attempt to find a friendlier forum for deciding custodial disputes.

Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 176 L.Ed.2d 789 (2010).

There are exceptions. One is Article 13(b) of the Convention: “[A] court is not bound to order the return of the child if there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in'an intolerable situation.” The respondent must show a grave risk of potential harm by clear and convincing evidence.7 22 U:S.C. § '9003(e)(2)(A). In weighing the risk of harm, district courts “are not to engage in a custody determination, so ‘[it] is not relevant ... who is the better parent in the long run, or whether [the absconding parent] had good reason to leave her home ... and terminate her marriage.’ ” Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir.2000), quoting Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.1995).

Stipulated Facts

The following facts are stipulated by the parties.

1." The Petitioner lives in Santiago, Dominican Republic, and is a citizen of the Dominican Republic.

[397]*3972. The Respondent lives in Methuen, Massachusetts.

3. The Petitioner' and the Respondent were married on May 9, 2009, in the Dominican Republic.

4. The Petitioner and.the Respondent are the parents of two children: D born in 2011, age 4, and K born -in 2012, age 3.

5. The Respondent gave birth to Petitioner and Respondent’s first child D in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 2011.

6., The Respondent gave birth to Petitioner and Respondent’s second child K in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 2012.

7. Both children are under the age of sixteen.

8. On October 15, 2014, the Respondent traveled with both children from the Dominican Republic to Massachusetts.

9. Petitioner and Respondent were divorced in the Dominican Republic on April 22,2015.

10.

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Bluebook (online)
146 F. Supp. 3d 392, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156646, 2015 WL 7303533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/german-v-lopez-mad-2015.