Gerardo Farias-Contreras v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 21, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-05892
StatusUnknown

This text of Gerardo Farias-Contreras v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island (Gerardo Farias-Contreras v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gerardo Farias-Contreras v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-05892-AH-MAR Date: July 21, 2025 Title: Present: The Honorable: MARGO A. ROCCONI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE VALERIE VELASCO N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Defendants: N/A N/A Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

I. BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2020, Gerardo Farias-Contreras (“Petitioner”) pled guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846) in the Eastern District of Washington. United States v. Farias-Contreras, 104 F.4th 22, 25 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1316 (2025). On March 18, 2019, Petitioner was sentenced to 188 months imprisonment. Id. at 27. Petitioner appealed his sentence and on February 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit found that the government had breached its plea agreement and vacated Petitioner’s sentence. See United States v. Farias-Contreras, 60 F.4th 534, 548 (9th Cir. 2023). On June 3, 2024, and en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and affirmed the district court. Id.

On June 10, 2025, Petitioner constructively1 filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to U.S.C. § 2241 (“section 2241”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. The Petition alleges prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level. Id. at 6–7.

The Court cannot locate any direct appeal or other post-conviction petitions. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// ///

1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). Because petitioner did not date the instant Petition when he signed it, the Court cannot determine the constructive filing date in that manner. However, the envelope in which the Petition was mailed was postmarked on September 20, 2021, so the Court uses that as the constructive filing date. CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-05892-AH-MAR Date: July 21, 2025 Title:

II. DISCUSSION

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION

1. Applicable law

A petitioner challenging “the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution” must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 in the custodial court. Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, section 2255 “provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal prisoner may test the legality of detention.” Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000). A petitioner challenging “the legality of his sentence” must file a motion to vacate his sentence under section 2255 and “§ 2255 motions must be heard in the sentencing court.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000).

There is, however, an exception to this general rule that a section 2255 challenge to the legality of detention must be filed in the sentencing court. Under the “escape hatch” of section 2255, a federal prisoner may challenge the legality of detention in the custodial court if, and only if, the remedy under section 2255 in the sentencing court is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner may file under section 2255’s escape hatch in the custodial court “when the prisoner: ‘(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.’ ” Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898).

With respect to the first prong of section 2255’s escape hatch, an actual innocence claim requires a petitioner to “demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614(1998)). With respect to the second prong of section 2255’s escape hatch, whether the petitioner has not had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting his actual innocence claim, the Court must consider: “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Analysis

Here, Petitioner does not challenge “the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution.” See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956. Rather, Petitioner appears to challenge the legality of his CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-05892-AH-MAR Date: July 21, 2025 Title: 2019 sentence. See Dkt. 1 at 6–7. Thus, Petitioner cannot proceed in this Court, the custodial court, unless section 2255’s “escape hatch” provision applies. See Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 953.

First, it is not clear that Petitioner is alleging “actual innocence.” Petitioner argues that the prosecutor made prejudicial statements about his ethnicity and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the statements. Pet. at 6–7. However, Petitioner does not appear to allege he is actually innocent of the conduct he pled guilty to.

Furthermore, Petitioner fails to establish he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim, and therefore does not appear to meet the second prong of the section 2255 escape hatch. See Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047. Petitioner does not appear to have filed a 2255 motion in the sentencing court, nor does Plaintiff explain why he has failed to do so. See United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding “a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under section 2255 may not petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to section 2241 ‘if it appears the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’ ”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Tripati v.

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Related

Bousley v. United States
523 U.S. 614 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Roberts v. Marshall
627 F.3d 768 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Alaimalo v. United States
645 F.3d 1042 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Anant Kumar Tripati v. Gary L. Henman
843 F.2d 1160 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Edwin Marrero v. Richard Ives
682 F.3d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Harrison v. Ollison
519 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Hernandez v. Campbell
204 F.3d 861 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
United States v. Gerardo Farias-Contreras
60 F.4th 534 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)
United States v. Gerardo Farias-Contreras
104 F.4th 22 (Ninth Circuit, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
Gerardo Farias-Contreras v. Warden, FCI Terminal Island, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gerardo-farias-contreras-v-warden-fci-terminal-island-cacd-2025.