Gerard Bell, V. City Of Tacoma & William Feldt

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: February 8, 2022
• Docket: 55284-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

February 8, 2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II GERARD BELL and LAPRITA HAMILTON, No. 55284-1-II

Appellants,

v.

CITY OF TACOMA, WILLIAM R. FELDT, UNPUBLISHED OPINION (D.B.A.) YOUNG FELDT,

Respondents.

GLASGOW, A.C.J. — After Gerard Bell alerted the City of Tacoma to uninhabitable

conditions in the rental unit that he was renting from William Feldt, the City intervened, forcing

Bell to move. The City required Feldt, to pay Bell $2,000 in relocation assistance. Bell then brought

various civil claims against the City and Feldt.

Bell moved for default multiple times, but the trial court ultimately denied default because

both parties answered the complaint. The City requested a continuance due to the COVID-19

pandemic that the court granted. The court also granted the City’s motion for summary judgment,

dismissing all of Bell’s claims against the City. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the

remainder of Bell’s claims against Feldt.

Bell appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not entering default judgment, by granting

the City’s motion for summary judgment, by delaying Bell’s trial, and by dismissing the claims

against Feldt. We disagree and affirm. No. 55284-1-II

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Bell was living at a rental property owned by Feldt when Bell filed a complaint with the

City, alleging that his residence had flooded due to a broken water heater. Bell asked the City to

inspect the residence. Despite the City’s warning that Bell might need to vacate the residence after

the inspection, Bell confirmed he wanted an inspection. The inspector concluded that the hot water

tank had failed, flooding the residence. There was mold and mildew in the residence, and,

according to Bell, there had been no running water for some time. The residence was deemed too

unsafe to be occupied.

The City arranged for the relocation assistance that Feldt was required to pay Bell under

RCW 59.18.085. RCW 59.18.085(3) provides, with limited exceptions, that a landlord is required

to pay relocation assistance to displaced tenants if the City has notified the landlord that the

residence cannot be lawfully occupied due to conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes,

ordinances, or regulations, and the landlord knew or should have known that the conditions existed.

The relocation assistance is $2,000 or “three times the monthly rent,” whichever amount is higher.

RCW 59.18.05(3)(b). Bell acknowledged, in writing, that the City had notified him that he was

entitled to relocation assistance. Bell also acknowledged in writing that Feldt paid him $2,000 in

relocation assistance.

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II. LAWSUIT

A. Bell’s Complaint

In July 2019, Bell filed suit against the City and Feldt, alleging negligence, breach of

contract, discrimination, conversion of chattels, and failure to provide notice. It is not entirely clear

from Bell’s complaint which claims were against the City and which were against Feldt, or whether

Bell brought each claim against both defendants.

Bell asserted that he notified Feldt about the broken water heater and damage to Bell’s

possessions but Feldt failed to respond, and as a result, Bell had to undergo medical treatment due

to exposure to the mold that grew in the residence. Bell also alleged that Feldt withheld Bell’s

security deposit. Bell asserted that there was an agreement to allow Bell to keep his personal

possessions in the residence until the end of the month, but that the locks were changed before the

month was up and some of Bell’s personal possessions were missing. Finally, Bell alleged that his

insurance claims for the missing and damaged property were denied because Feldt failed to

respond to the insurance company.

Regarding the City, Bell alleged that he was entitled to $2,100 in relocation assistance and

that he was “ ‘coerced’ [in]to sign[ing] a document” and accepting only $2,000. Clerk’s Papers

(CP) at 18. Bell also claimed that the City “discriminated against [Bell] in administrating a note or

instrument that binds all parties.” Id. at 22.1

1 Bell also listed Laprita Hamilton, whose vehicle was towed from Bell’s residence, as a plaintiff in this suit, but Hamilton did not sign the complaint. Further, Bell, as a nonlawyer, cannot represent another party. RCW 2.48.170.

3 No. 55284-1-II

B. Motions for Default

By November 2019, Bell moved for an order of default because neither defendant had filed

an answer and only the City had appeared in the case. The court declined to consider default

because Bell failed to note the motion for the docket and he failed to provide the City with notice.

The City filed its answer approximately a month later. The following day, Bell filed a document

titled “Summary Judgement” in which it appears he asked again for an order of default. Id. at 119

(capitalization omitted). The record does not reflect that Bell noted that motion for the docket or

otherwise took any steps to ensure it would be heard.

A few months later, Feldt had still not appeared or answered the complaint, and Bell filed

another motion for default. The day before the hearing on this motion, Feldt submitted a notice of

appearance and answer. The court denied Bell’s motion for default. Later in the proceedings, Bell

filed yet another motion for default that the court again denied because by then, both defendants

had answered the complaint.

C. The City’s Motions

The City requested a continuance because the City’s attorney needed to prioritize tasks that

arose due to the COVID-19 pandemic concerning “critical city services.” Id. at 233. The court

granted the City’s motion.

The City later moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bell never filed the necessary

paperwork to bring tort claims against the City and there was no evidence to support Bell’s

discrimination claims. The City also argued that $2,000 was the appropriate amount and provided

evidence that Feldt charged $700 per month in rent, but the Tacoma Housing Authority paid $568

of that amount, and Bell’s rent was $132 per month. It is not clear from the record whether Bell

4 No. 55284-1-II

responded to the City’s motion. After a summary judgment hearing, the court granted the City’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against the City.

D. BENCH TRIAL

The case proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining claims against Feldt. At trial, the court

first addressed Bell’s negligence claim, which the court believed was based on the defective water

heater. The court explained that Bell needed to provide some evidence of damage caused by

defective the water heater, but Bell failed to provide the court with any evidence. Instead, Bell

asked the court to consider documents that he had already filed. The court asked Bell where it

could find the necessary evidence in Bell’s filings, but the documents Bell identified for the court

did not contain the necessary evidence.

At the bench trial, Bell continually interrupted the court and “became increasingly agitated

as the proceedings went forward.” Id. at 678. Bell walked out of the courtroom and “abandoned

the trial.” Id. at 679. The court concluded that because Bell failed to present any evidence of

damages, his negligence claim against Feldt failed. The court dismissed the remainder of the Bell’s

claims. Bell then sought reconsideration, which the trial court denied.

Bell appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Bell argues that the trial court erred in declining to enter default judgment because neither

defendant responded to his complaint within 20 days. We disagree.

We review the trial court’s decision on a motion for default for abuse of discretion. Morin

v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 753, 161 P.3d 956 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its

5 No. 55284-1-II

decision is manifestly unreasonable or it is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State

v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). A decision is based on an untenable reason if

the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. Id.

Bell fails to provide any legal authority supporting his argument that the trial court must

enter default judgment when a defendant did not respond within 20 days of being served. This

reasoning conflicts with the plain language of CR 55, which allows parties to appear and defend

after the deadline for filing an answer and gives a trial court discretion to allow a party to appear

and respond to a motion for default even if the party has not yet appeared. CR 55(a)(2).

It appears that Bell failed to properly note for hearing two motions for default. And when

he later properly noted motions for default, the court denied them because the parties had appeared

and answered. See CR 55. Bell provides no argument establishing that the trial court abused its

discretion.

Accordingly, Bell fails to show that the trial court erred when it declined to enter default

against either the City or Feldt. To the extent that Bell is raising any other arguments regarding

default judgment, we decline to consider them because Bell fails to provide us with the necessary

reasoned argument, legal authority, or necessary citations to the record to support any such

argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998)

(noting “[p]assing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument” does not merit our

consideration). Nor has he articulated any argument that warrants reversal of the trial court’s orders

denying his default motions.

6 No. 55284-1-II

II. AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE CITY

Bell argues that the court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City. Bell

maintains that had the trial court combed through all of Bell’s filings, the court would have found

sufficient evidence to defeat the City’s motion for summary judgment. The City argues that there

was no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment in favor of the City was appropriate, noting

Bell failed to file the necessary form to bring any tort claims as required by RCW 4.96.020 and

Bell has provided no evidence that the City discriminated against him. We agree with the City.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Vargas v. Inland Wash., LLC, 194

Wn.2d 720, 728, 452 P.3d 1205 (2019). If the defendant files a motion for summary judgment that

demonstrates there is insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s case, the burden then shifts to

the plaintiff to identify specific facts that demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225 n.1, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). When the

pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions in the record demonstrate that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

then summary judgment is appropriate. CR 56(c).

Bell provides no legal authority to support his contention that the trial court is required to

comb through all of the plaintiff’s filings from the inception of a case in order to find a reason to

deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Bell appears to believe that exceptions should

be made in his favor because he is representing himself. However, Washington law is clear that

courts are to hold litigants who represent themselves to the same standards that apply for attorneys.

In re Estate of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274 n.4, 444 P.3d 23 (2019); Edwards v. Le Duc, 157

Wn. App. 455, 460, 238 P.3d 1187 (2010).

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Also, Bell fails to show that summary judgment was improperly granted. Regarding the

tort claims, the record does not reflect, nor does Bell even allege, that he filed the necessary tort

claim form under RCW 4.96.020 to bring a tort claim against the City. Regarding the

discrimination claims, Bell failed to provide any evidence that the City at any time treated him

differently than any other tenant. It is unclear whether Bell is also alleging that the City breached

a contract, but to the extent that is also one of Bell’s claims against the City, Bell fails to identify

a contract between Bell and the City.

Also, to the extent that Bell is raising any other arguments related to dismissal of his claims

against the City, we decline to consider them because Bell fails to provide us with the necessary

reasoned argument, legal authority, or necessary citations to the record to support any additional

argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Holland, 90 Wn. App. at 538.

III. DELAY

Bell argues that the trial court unreasonably delayed his trial in light of COVID-19 because

the trial court could have taken steps to prevent any unnecessary risk to litigants. We disagree.

Bell fails to provide any citation to the record that supports his claim that the trial court

delayed Bell’s trial because it was concerned about risks to the litigants from COVID-19. Rather,

the record reflects that the case schedule in Bell’s case was only amended once in response to the

City’s motion for a continuance because the City’s attorney was busy addressing “critical city

services.” CP at 233. Continuances are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Doyle v. Lee, 166 Wn.

App. 397, 404, 272 P.3d 256 (2012). And Bell has not argued or shown that the trial court abused

its discretion in granting the City’s request for a continuance on this basis.

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IV. DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST FELDT

Bell finally challenges the dismissal of his claims against Feldt. He contends that he

provided sufficient proof for the trial court to have awarded damages. But Bell failed to present

evidence of damages at the bench trial. Bell seems to argue that evidence of his damages existed

in the record, but he fails to provide citations or a discussion about where that evidence is located.

He also fails to provide any legal authority to support the contention that a trial court must comb

through the record to find and evaluate evidence to support the plaintiff’s claims. To the extent

that Bell raises any other arguments regarding the trial court’s dismissal of his claims against Feldt,

we decline to consider them because Bell fails to provide us with the necessary reasoned argument,

legal authority, or necessary citations to the record to support any such argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6);

Holland, 90 Wn. App. at 538.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

GLASGOW, A.C.J. We concur:

WORSWICK, J.

MAXA, J.

9 No. 55284-1-II