Gerald Vidal v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 12, 2004
• Docket: 13-03-00464-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-03-464-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

GERALD VIDAL,                                                                         Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                     Appellee.

On appeal from the 23rd District Court of Matagorda County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Yañez, Rodriguez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza

          Appellant, Gerald Vidal, was convicted of possessing marihuana within a drug-free zone and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Appellant claims that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress because the State failed to justify its no-knock entry into his home. Having determined that no violation of the knock and announce rule occurred in this case, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

          In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, but we decide legal questions de novo. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Where, as here, the trial court does not file findings of fact, we assume the court made implicit findings that support its ruling, so long as those implied findings are supported by the record. See Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

          The Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police officers knock and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry into a dwelling. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997). The Supreme Court, however, has not decided whether or to what extent the exclusionary rule should be used as a remedy for knock and announce violations. Broussard v. State, 68 S.W.3d 197, 199 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). Thus, even if a knock and announce violation were established, that alone would not necessarily require the trial court to grant the motion to suppress. See id. Because there is no evidence that a knock and announce violation occurred in this case, we limit our holding and do not address the exclusionary rule’s applicability to violations of the knock and announce rule.

          At trial, the uncontradicted testimony established that the officers announced “search warrant, sheriff’s department” several times before entering appellant’s home. Based on this testimony, the trial court could have found that the officers announced their presence and purpose before entering appellant’s home. Thus, the court could have concluded that no knock and announce violation occurred. Its ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress was therefore not erroneous.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.                                   _______________________

                                                                                      DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,

                                                                                      Justice

Do not publish.

Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)

Memorandum Opinion delivered

and filed this the 12^th day of August, 2004.