Gerald Eugene Stano v. Robert A. Butterworth, Harry K. Singletary

51 F.3d 942
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedApril 20, 1995
Docket92-2812, 92-3052 and 93-3269
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 51 F.3d 942 (Gerald Eugene Stano v. Robert A. Butterworth, Harry K. Singletary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gerald Eugene Stano v. Robert A. Butterworth, Harry K. Singletary, 51 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Gerald Eugene Stano was convicted and sentenced to death in 1983 for the 1974 murder of Cathy Scharf. The lengthy factual and procedural history of this case is set out in our previous en banc and panel opinions. See Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898 (11th Cir.1990) (en banc); Stano v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 900 (11th Cir.1989). In that en banc opinion, we remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on specified issues. The district court conducted a hearing that lasted ten days. We are indebted to that court for the thoroughness with which it explored the relevant factual issues and for *944 its meticulous findings of fact. A copy of the district court’s order, containing its factfind-ings, is reproduced as Appendix A hereto.

After the district court had issued its order on remand but before the case had been briefed to this Court, Stano filed a Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion raising additional but related issues. The district court’s order denying that motion is reproduced as Appendix B hereto.

Stano appeals from the district court’s adverse rulings on the issues we remanded to it, and he also appeals from the court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. We consolidated the two appeals, and for the reasons that follow we affirm the denial of relief in each.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Initially, we address Stano’s assertion that the clearly erroneous standard of review does not apply to the district court’s findings of fact. In support of his contention, Stano cites a portion of our opinion in Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 & 1014, 101 S.Ct. 1709 & 1724, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 & 214 (1981), in which we state, “In passing on the ultimate issue of voluntariness, we may substitute our own judgment even in the absence of a conclusion that the district court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.” Id. at 932. Stano misreads our precedent and misapprehends the limited nature of our review of factfindings. It is clear from the statement itself and certainly from the context of the discussion in Jurek that the statement Stano relies upon was referring to the “ultimate” determination of the voluntariness of a confession, a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to de novo review. See id. Indeed, just before the sentence quoted by Stano, we stated that “We will not disregard or overturn findings of fact made by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id.

The Supreme Court subsequently clarified the meaning of the clearly erroneous standard of review of a district court’s findings of fact in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), where it held:

If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. at 1511; see also Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 911, 130 L.Ed.2d 793 (1995).

Stano also cites the Jurek opinion for the proposition that we will not defer to the district court’s factfindings based on documentary evidence where those findings do not rest upon credibility evaluations of live witnesses. That is what we held in Jurek, 623 F.2d at 932, but it is no longer good law. Five years after Jurek, the Supreme Court in Anderson squarely held that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies “even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.” 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511-12; see also Spaziano, 36 F.3d at 1032.

Accordingly, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the district court’s factfindings — whether those findings are based on witness testimony or on documentary evidence. Moreover, as mandated by the Supreme Court, we will give even “greater deference” to factfindings of the district court that are based on determinations of the credibility of witnesses, as is largely the case here. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1512.

As to the denial of Stano’s Rule 60(b) motion, this Court “will overturn a district court’s denial of a motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) only if the district court has abused its discretion.” Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1545 n. 21 (11th Cir.1991).

*945 II. DISCUSSION

We will first address Stano’s appeal from the district court’s denial of habeas relief following its evidentiary hearing on the issues remanded by this Court’s en bane opinion. Then we will discuss his appeal from the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.

A. THE REMAND ISSUES

The en banc opinion of this Court remanded four issues to the district court, each of which we will address in turn.

1. The Brady Claim

As stated in the en banc opinion, “Stano has alleged that the prosecution suppressed evidence that there was collusion between [Sergeant Paul] Crow, the police investigator; Donald Jacobson, Stano’s defense attorney during the investigative stage; and Dr. Ann McMillan, the defense psychologist during the investigative stage. The alleged purpose of this collusion was to exploit Stano’s mental vulnerabilities in order to coerce murder confessions, including confessions to the Seharf killing.” 901 F.2d at 899.

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Bluebook (online)
51 F.3d 942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gerald-eugene-stano-v-robert-a-butterworth-harry-k-singletary-ca11-1995.