George v. Commissioner
This text of 26 T.C. 396 (George v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
The question is whether the conceded gain of $308,783.48 should be recognized under the general rule stated in section 112 (a) of the Internal Eevenue Code of 1939 or whether no part of the gain should be recognized under the exception stated in section 112 (b) (3).1
Petitioners contend that both W. H. George, Inc., and Louisiana Corporation were parties to a reorganization; that petitioner exchanged stock in W. H. George, Inc., solely for stock in Louisiana Corporation; that the exchange was in pursuance of the plan of reorganization and that, therefore, no gain should be recognized.
First, we must determine whether there was a “reorganization” within the meaning of that term as defined in section 112 (g) (1) of the 1939 Code. (See footnote 1, supra.) Petitioners rely principally upon clause (A) of the definition but they also contend that the facts support a reorganization under either clause (C) or (D) of the 1939 Code.
Congress inserted the word “statutory” in clause (A) for the first time when it enacted the Eevenue Act of 1934, at which time it eliminated the parenthetical phrase.2 Although this change was intended somewhat as a restriction of the definition of “reorganization,” the evil that Congress intended to correct was the practice of casting taxable “sales” into the form of nontaxable reorganizations. See H. Rept. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1939-1 C. B. (Part 2) 554, 564.3 Care was taken, however, to preserve in the definition as much uniformity among the 48 States as possible. See S. Eept. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1939-1 C. B. (Part 2) 586, 598.4 So, in enacting the Eevenue Act of 1934, Congress included in the definition of the term “reorganization” clause (B) substantially as it was stated in the Senate Report, the only change being that instead of the words “in exchange solely for its voting stock” Congress enacted the words “in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock.” Later, by section 213 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1939, Congress amended the definition to read as set out in footnote 1 above, by taking out of clause (B) the phrase “substantially all the properties of another corporation” and placing it in a separate clause, namely, clause (C).
It would appear from the above brief history of the reorganization provision that Congress never intended the gain or loss in a transaction such as the one now before us to be recognized. The two old corporations and the stockholders thereof fully and clearly intended to effectuate a consolidation of the two old corporations into a new corporation and in fact this was accomplished. The new Louisiana corporation continued the operation of the consolidated business in Jackson, Mississippi, and its right to do so was not questioned by the State of Mississippi. There was no taxable sale involved in the consolidation. Instead there was present the continuity of interest and business purpose tests which are prerequisites in every legitimate reorganization. Cf. Pinellas Ice & Gold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462; LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415; Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F. 2d 937; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465; Erie County United Bank, 21 T. C. 636, 645; Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U. S. 378; and Helvering v. Leary, 93 F. 2d 826.
The respondent, however, contends that notwithstanding all that occurred there could be no “statutory * * * consolidation” under clause (A) for the reason that under the Louisiana law5 a domestic corporation and a foreign corporation could be consolidated only if the law of the government under which the foreign corporation was formed authorized such a consolidation, and that “It will suffice to say that the Mississippi Corporation was not authorized by the laws of Mississippi to effect a consolidation.” Cf. 39 Col. L. Eev. 933, 948. We need not, however, decide whether there was a reorganization under clause (A) if under one of the other clauses a reorganization occurred. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., supra.
We think there was a reorganization within clause (C). Respondent concedes that as far as the transfer of all the assets and liabilities of Mississippi Corporation to Louisiana Corporation in consideration for 3,572 shares of stock of the latter is concerned, there was clearly a reorganization between those two companies within clause (C). He contends, however, that the same result does not follow as far as the transfer of assets and liabilities of W. H. George, Inc., to Louisiana Corporation is concerned. His reasons for this contention are that since W. H. George, Inc., did not transfer to Louisiana Corporation the 250 shares it held in Mississippi Corporation, it cannot be said that W. H. George, Inc., transferred “substantially all” of its properties as is required under clause (C). The respondent points out that the 250 shares represented on December 30,1942, a value of $221,641.87 (one-half the value of the net assets of Mississippi Corporation) and that the net assets actually transferred by W. H. George, Inc., amounted to only $177,101.67 or about 44 per cent of the total. We do not agree with this contention. Both of the old corporations transferred 100 per cent of all the business assets and liabilities held between them. These net assets amounted to $620,385.40 for which Louisiana Corporation issued 5,000 shares of its capital stock having a par value of $500,000. This was all in accordance with the plan of reorganization and the December 30, 1942, agreement among the three corporations, which agreement provided in part:
Excepted from the assets to be transferred, etc., by the Old Corporations is the capital stock owned by W. H. George, Inc., evidencing its equity in the net worth of the Old Mississippi Corporation. [Italics supplied.]
This equity was in fact transferred to the new corporation in exchange for a separate certificate of 1,786 shares of the new corporation’s stock, which certificate was immediately delivered to W. H. George, Inc., in surrender of the 250 shares it held in the old Mississippi Corporation. We hold, therefore, that both of the old corporations transferred all of their properties to the new corporation in exchange solely for its voting stock and that there was a reorganization under clause (C) of section 112 (g) (1) of the 1939 Code.
Both W. H. George, Inc., and Louisiana Corporation are clearly included within the term “a party to a reorganization” under the express language of section 112 (g) (2), supra. It is also clear that under the integrated plan of reorganization the purpose was that instead of the two old corporations there would be one new corporation. The plan was fully executed by the old corporations transferring all their net assets to the new for the latter’s stock and then distributing the stock of the new corporation to the stockholders of the old corporations.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
26 T.C. 396, 1956 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-v-commissioner-tax-1956.