George Morgan v. Louisiana State Trooper, Taylor Scrantz

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 1, 2020
• Docket: CA-0019-0741
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-741

GEORGE MORGAN

VERSUS

LOUISIANA STATE TROOPER, TAYLOR SCRANTZ, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 76626-B HONORABLE CHUCK R. WEST, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE

Court composed of John E. Conery, D. Kent Savoie, and Jonathan W. Perry, Judges.

AFFIRMED. George Morgan In Proper Person Post Ofice Box 396 Melville, Louisiana 71353 (337) 623-3116 PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: George Morgan

Jeannie C. Prudhomme Appeal Counsel Daniel Charles Palmintier Trial Counsel Louisiana Department of Justice 556 Jefferson Street, 4th Floor Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 262-1700 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: State of Louisiana, thru Department of Public Safety & Correction Taylor Scrantz, Louisiana State Trooper

William David Coffey Appeal Counsel Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice 1450 Poydras Street, Suite 900 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 (504) 599-1200 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: State of Louisiana, thru Department of Public Safety & Correction Taylor Scrantz, Louisiana State Trooper CONERY, Judge.

Plaintiff, George Morgan, appeals the trial court’s granting of summary

judgment in favor of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,

d/b/a the Louisiana State Police (DPSC), and Louisiana State Trooper Taylor

Scrantz, dismissing with prejudice Mr. Morgan’s petition for damages wherein he

alleges he suffered following a January 5, 2016 arrest by Trooper Scrantz. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Morgan was arrested by Trooper Scrantz on January 5, 2016 on the

charges of improper lane usage, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, and

resisting an officer. On October 10, 2017, Mr. Morgan pled guilty to the charges

of resisting an officer and improper lane usage. He was sentenced to fifteen days

in the Evangeline Parish Jail, suspended, ninety days active supervised probation,

and was ordered to pay various fines and court costs. The State moved to nolle

pros the charge of failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, and the trial court so

ordered.

Prior to his plea in October of 2017, on January 4, 2017, Mr. Morgan filed a

timely pro se lawsuit, naming as defendants the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz.

Plaintiff alleged false arrest and excessive force claims against Trooper Scrantz

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Plaintiff contended that the arrest and

excessive force caused injuries to his back, head, and neck. Mr. Morgan further

alleged a violation of his constitutional rights based on the Fifth Amendment and

advanced a claim based on the negligence of the DPSC for its failure to train and

supervise Trooper Scrantz. Mr. Morgan was ultimately able to retain counsel in May 2018, who responded to outstanding discovery requests from the DPSC and

Trooper Scrantz.

On March 15, 2019, both the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss Mr. Morgan’s claims under § 1983 and the

Fifth Amendment as well as his claims for negligent training and supervision of

Trooper Scrantz. On July 31, 2019, counsel for Mr. Morgan filed his opposition to

the motion for summary judgment. The DPSC and Trooper Scrantz filed a reply

brief on August 22, 2019.

The trial court heard the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz’s motion for summary

judgment on August 26, 2019 and ruled from the bench, granting the motion for

summary judgment in its entirety. It dismissed all claims asserted by Mr. Morgan

against the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz with prejudice.

Shortly after the judgment was issued by the trial court, on September 10,

2019, counsel for Mr. Morgan requested and was granted leave by the trial court to

withdraw as counsel of record for Mr. Morgan. Mr. Morgan then timely filed his

pro se appeal of the trial court’s judgment dismissing his case with prejudice.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Mr. Morgan’s pro se brief consists of five pages of complaints about the trial

court’s ruling granting the summary judgment in favor of the DPSC and Trooper

Scrantz and his treatment at the hands of the Evangeline Parish District Court

System.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The standard of appellate review for a trial court’s determination to grant a

motion for summary judgment is de novo. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08),

2 977 So.2d 880. The appellate court uses the identical criteria that governed the

trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment should be entered. Id.

Summary Judgment - Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966

Summary judgment “is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action … [T]he procedure is favored and shall be construed

to accomplish these ends.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). After “adequate

discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to

material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

“A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a

litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of a legal dispute.” Smith v.

Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc. 93-2512, p. 27 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751.

“A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if

reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on

that issue and summary judgment is appropriate.” Hines v. Garrett, 04-806 (La.

6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765-66.

“The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the

motion are the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions.”

La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(4).

Nonetheless, “the burden of proof rests with the mover.” La.Code Civ.P. art.

966(D)(1). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(D)(1) further provides

in pertinent part:

Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court … the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse

3 party’s claim … but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim…[T]he burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 967(B) also requires:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided above, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided above, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983, which allows a civil action for deprivation of rights, provides

Every person, who under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

The United States Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114

S.Ct. 2364 (1994) held that:

[T]o recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

At trial, Mr. Morgan’s counsel conceded that the holding in Heck was

controlling and agreed with the trial court “that in light of the guilty plea [for

resisting an officer] the false arrest claims would fail.” Accordingly, the trial court

4 granted summary judgment on behalf of the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz dismissing

Mr. Morgan’s claim for false arrest.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim - Excessive Force

In the case of Williams v. Dohm, 14-102 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/14/14), 153

So.3d 542, a panel of our sister circuit summarized the burden of proof required to

maintain a claim for excessive force based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a

“federal constitutional claim that is analyzed via Fourth Amendment constitutional

standards. Penn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Office, 02-0893, p. 4 (La.App. 1st

Cir. 4/2/03), 843 So.2d 1157, 1159.”

“In order to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Constitution,

a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the

use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which

was (3) objectively unreasonable.” Richard v. City of Harahan, 6 F.Supp.2d 565,

573 (E.D. La. 1998). Further “the plaintiff is [ ] required to show a significant

injury that resulted from the use of objectively unreasonable force that was clearly

excessive of the need.” Penn, 843 So.2d at 1160 (emphasis added.)

At the beginning of the discussion with the trial court on the issue of Mr.

Morgan’s claim for excessive force, counsel for the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz

urged the application of the case of Williams v. Harding, 12-1595 (La.App. 1 Cir.

4/26/13), 117 So.3d 187. Counsel argued that Williams v. Harding stands for the

proposition that Heck also applied to Mr. Morgan’s excessive force claim based on

Mr. Morgan’s plea to the charge of resisting an officer. Therefore, counsel

contended that Mr. Morgan’s excessive force claims were also barred by Heck.

Rice v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 770 F.3d. 1122, 1135 (5th Cir. 2014)

5 In Williams v. Harding, the plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to

aggravated battery of a police officer, which would prevent a plaintiff from

asserting an excessive force claim because “a finding that the officer used

excessive force would necessarily mean that the plaintiff was somehow justified in

the battery which would undermine the conviction.” Arnold v. Town of Slaughter,

100 Fed.Appx. 321, 323 (5th Cir 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 966, 125 S.Ct. 429

(2004). Nonetheless, a determination of whether Heck applies and bars a § 1983

plaintiff from bringing a claim “depends on the nature of the offense and of the

claim.” Arnold, 100 Fed.Appx. at 323. See also Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 869,

873 (5th Cir. 1996).

Counsel for Mr. Morgan argued that Heck was not controlling and would not

bar Mr. Morgan’s claim for excessive force, based on the cases of Arnold, and

Hudson. Counsel stated, “Heck doesn’t follow all excessive force claims.” The

trial court responded, “I agree with that. It does not.” Counsel for Mr. Morgan

further argued that, “I believe it comes down to a question for the trier of fact in

this case which would be the jury, as to whether or not the force used in the

circumstances was reasonable.”

In Mr. Morgan’s case, the nature of the offense was resisting an officer, to

which he pled guilty. His corresponding claim was for false arrest. However, Mr.

Morgan argued that he was not resisting an officer, and did nothing wrong except

to drive to a lighted spot before he stopped his vehicle, claiming he was afraid to

stop on a dark road as he believed Trooper Scrantz was acting “erratically.” Mr.

Morgan insists he made a 911 call to convey this information, but, after a pre-trial

conference, both attorneys agreed that there was no record of a 911 call to either St.

Landry Parish Communications, District E, 911 or the Evangeline Parish 911 Call

6 Centers by Mr. Morgan on the date of his January 5, 2016 arrest. Importantly, Mr.

Morgan offered no evidence into the record and failed to submit any

documentation such as medical records or affidavits in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment.

In contrast, Trooper Scrantz offered in support of the motion for summary

judgment his March 18, 2019 affidavit, which gave a detailed account of his

encounter and arrest of Mr. Morgan. Nevertheless, the trial court found that based

on the record, which did not contain any of the circumstances surrounding the

arrest, any video footage or a deposition, that no determination could be made from

“this motion for summary judgment” of whether Heck would bar the proceeding.

DPSC and Trooper Scrantz argued that regardless of the application of Heck

to a § 1983 claim, La.Code Crim.P. art. 220 is relevant in its requirement that “[a]

person shall submit peaceably to a lawful arrest,” and in its provision that “[t]he

person making a lawful arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and

detention, and also to overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the

person being arrested or detained.” Defendants further referenced La.R.S.

14:108(A), which states that “[r]esisting an officer is the intentional interference

with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his

official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest[.]”

In this case, Trooper Scrantz was authorized by law to make a lawful arrest,

and Mr. Morgan pled guilty to resisting arrest. There is no evidence indicating that

the force alleged to have been used on Mr. Morgan was not in response to his

resisting arrest and thus a component of the charge of resisting an officer. In

addition, counsel reminded the trial court that the movants for the motion for

7 summary judgment, the DPSC and Trooper Scrantz, did not have the burden of

proof at trial on this issue.

The trial court responded that counsel needed only point out the lack of

support for one of the elements necessary for Mr. Morgan to prevail at trial on an

excessive force claim. Counsel pointed to the element of “significant injury.” See

Williams v. Dohm, 153 So. 3d at 547.

As for this element, and after our de novo review, it is undisputed that Mr.

Morgan did not submit any evidence that he suffered an injury, let alone

“significant injury,” as the result of the alleged excessive force used in the subject

arrest. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 967(B) clearly states that, “an

adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but

his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided above, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” If the adverse party fails to do

so, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.” Id.

In its reasons for ruling, the trial court found that Mr. Morgan was required

to “prove a significant injury” and that “[h]e would have to prove that the force

was excessive … that the injuries were caused by the use of … objectively

unreasonable force … to effectuate the arrest” by Trooper Scrantz. The trial court

found “nothing in the record that shows any significant injury that was attached …

I don’t believe he can meet that burden of showing a significant injury.” And,

finally, the trial court explained that, “I have nothing in the record that shows the

officer’s actions were unreasonable [or] excessive.”

The trial court then once again cited the lack of “body cam footage” and the

possible issue for a jury as a question of fact surrounding the actual arrest and the

allegations made by Mr. Morgan versus the affidavit of Trooper Scrantz. However,

8 the trial court subsequently found that the issue of significant injury “is not a

credibility call and that can be established through medical records.” Accordingly,

the trial court found that “Mr. Morgan has a lack of proof of one of the elements

required to succeed at trial” on his § 1983 claim for excessive force and also the

State action claiming excessive force as well. We agree, and find no error of law

in the trial court’s ruling dismissing both of Mr. Morgan’s claims for excessive

force under both federal and state law.

Fifth Amendment Claim

Although there was some confusion over whether Mr. Morgan pled a

violation of the Fifth Amendment, in his pleadings under the heading “Allegation

No. 5,” Mr. Morgan does broadly claim a violation of his Fifth Amendment Rights

by claiming that Officer Scrantz failed “to employ the standard and customary

procedures … in executing an alleged arrest for violations of traffic and/or driving

privileges … in violation of Plaintiff’s State and United States Constitutional

Rights under the 4th and 5th Amendments.”

The record is clear that Mr. Morgan failed to introduce any evidence in

support of his generally advanced claim. The trial court therefore correctly

included Mr. Morgan’s Fifth Amendment claim in its dismissal of this matter.

Negligent Training and Supervision

Finally, Mr. Morgan also filed a claim for negligent training and supervision

against the DPSC for “failure to properly train and supervise” Trooper Scrantz.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Coulon v. Endurance Risk Partners, Inc. 16-1146,

p. 8 (La. 3/15/17), 221 So.3d 809, 813-14, clearly explained the burden of proof in

a claim against an employer based on the actions of an employee and stated, “With

regard to imputed fault, the foundation of liability under respondeat superior is the

9 employee’s tort. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.,

LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 13.02 (2d ed. 2016). See also La.Civ.Code art.

2320.”1 “In order for liability to attach to the employer under this doctrine, there

must be some fault on the part of the employee.” Coulon, 221 So.3d at 814.

The trial court did not specifically dismiss Mr. Morgan’s claims against

DPSC for negligent training and supervision of Trooper Scrantz. However, the

necessity of a ruling on this claim was rendered moot by the trial court’s prior

rulings finding Trooper Scrantz was not at fault and its dismissal of Mr. Morgan’s

claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.

Additionally, the trial court’s judgment signed at the close of the hearing on

August 26, 2019, was prepared by defense counsel prior to the hearing, and did not

specifically list all of Mr. Morgan’s individual claims. Mr. Morgan’s counsel

reviewed the judgment, and approved its contents on the record. The judgment

dismissed with prejudice, and at Mr. George Morgan’s “sole cost,” all claims made

against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections d/b/a Louisiana

State Police and Louisiana State Trooper Taylor Scrantz.

1 Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320 provides, “Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.”

10 DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in its

entirety in favor of Louisiana State Trooper Taylor Scrantz and the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections d/b/a Louisiana State Police, and

against George Morgan. Mr. Morgan is to bear the costs of this appeal.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules⸺Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3