IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana George Lee Hall, FILED Appellant-Defendant Feb 19 2025, 9:03 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
February 19, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-537 Appeal from the Benton Circuit Court The Honorable John Wright, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 04C01-2308-F2-283
Opinion by Judge May Judges Brown and Pyle concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 1 of 20 [1] George Lee Hall appeals his convictions of Level 2 felony attempted burglary
with a deadly weapon 1 and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a
Schedule I or II controlled substance in his blood. 2 Hall raises four issues,
which we revise and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a toxicology report from a blood sample that was collected outside the three-hour window required by Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2;
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury about the definition of a deadly weapon;
3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Hall of attempted burglary with a deadly weapon; and
4. Whether Hall’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In late July 2023, Hall, his long-term girlfriend Margaret Molencupp, and their
friend Paul Farmer began discussing the possibility of robbing a property in a
rural area of Benton County that contained a house, a large barn, and “a lot of
1 Ind. Code §§ 35-43-2-1 (burglary) & 35-43-2-1(3)(A) (attempt). 2 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 2 of 20 abandoned cars and semi-trailers[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 100.) People who work in
the area refer to the property in question as “[t]he junk house” because there are
forty or fifty cars around the house. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 176.) Hall and Molencupp
drove by the junk house every day to conduct surveillance. They believed the
house was vacant, and they devised a plan whereby they would enter the house
during the day and remove items at night. In preparation, Hall gathered night
vision goggles, a flashlight, bolt cutters, a pry bar, a black bag, and a machete
and placed those items into a black backpack.
[3] On the morning of August 2, 2023, Hall and Molencupp snorted
methamphetamine and climbed into Hall’s white Pontiac G6 with Hall’s black
backpack of tools. Molencupp slept in the backseat while Hall drove to pick up
Farmer. Farmer brought a bag and a flashlight. Hall then drove the three of
them to the vicinity of the junk house. Around 8:00 a.m., Hall drove his car
into a corn field so that it could not be seen from the road. Hall used his
machete to cut down stalks of corn that he put over the car to make it less
visible. The three then separated with the expectation that they would
rendezvous at the junk house, and they maintained contact with one another by
messaging on cell phones.
[4] Later that morning, a farm worker, Marty Lewis, was loading a sprayer to
spray corn fields around the junk house. Lewis saw a man, later identified as
Hall, who was wearing long black pants and a long-sleeve black shirt, exit a
cornfield with a machete and black backpack, cross the road, and enter the
cornfield on the north side of the road. As Lewis drove toward the field he was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 3 of 20 to spray, he noticed a gap in the corn rows and, when he investigated, he saw
Hall’s car parked in the field. Lewis called his coworkers and asked them to
come to the scene. Lewis’s boss, Megan, 3 arrived and Lewis told her what he
had seen. As they talked, Hall again crossed the road with his machete and
backpack, and he re-entered the field on the south side of the road, so Lewis
called 911 and requested that officers be dispatched to the area.
[5] Soon thereafter, Hall exited the field on the south side of the road and began to
walk toward Lewis and Megan. En route to them, he “pitched” his backpack
and machete into the corn field. (Id. at 184.) Then, a woman, later identified
as Molencupp, exited the field on the north side of the road and walked to meet
Hall. The two of them walked toward Lewis and Megan. Lewis walked down
the road to meet them and ask what was happening. Hall claimed “he had a
friend that had issues and took his car, and they were out hunting for him[.]”
(Id. at 186.) Hall then turned to walk to his car. When Lewis followed him,
Hall pulled a knife out of his pocket and turned toward Lewis. Lewis asked
Hall to put the knife away and told Hall that police were already on the way.
Hall put the knife away.
[6] When police arrived, Hall reported a friend “Paul Smith started going crazy[,]”
got out of the car, and ran into the field. (Id. at 206.) Hall claimed he and
Molencupp were looking for “Smith” in the field when they heard “Smith”
3 We were unable to find a full legal name for “Megan” in the Record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 4 of 20 drive the car into the field. Hall also claimed the Pontiac G6 belonged to
“Smith,” but when Deputy Brayden Ely ran the plate, the report indicated the
car was registered to Hall. Police recovered Hall’s machete and black
backpack, which contained headlamps, a cordless drill, bolt cutters, a pry bar,
and rechargeable batteries. The machete had a green stain on it, which
indicated it had been “used to cut down corn[.]” (Id. at 200.) Police found a
camouflage ski mask on a nearby property, where tree branches had been
recently broken when someone walked through an area that the property owner
denied entering. Another farm worker found a second backpack in the field
that contained flashlights, a hatchet, and gloves. Police inventoried Hall’s
Pontiac before impounding it and discovered night vision binoculars, regular
binoculars, a walkie-talkie, a thirty-five-millimeter camera, socket sets, a
propane torch, and assorted other tools.
[7] Benton County Sheriff John Cox also responded to the dispatch. He
coordinated with the Newton County Sheriff’s Office to use drones to search
the fields for Hall’s missing friend. When the drone operators could not find
anyone in the field, Sheriff Cox began to suspect the story about “Smith” was
false, and Sheriff Cox decided to detain both Hall and Molencupp until the
investigation could be concluded. Sheriff Cox transported Hall to the county
jail. Because Sheriff Cox believed Hall was under the influence of a controlled
substance, he assigned Deputy Paden Clements, who was a certified drug
recognition expert, to interview Hall at the jail.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 5 of 20 [8] When Deputy Clements interviewed Hall, Hall admitted he drove his car into
the field and “said he did not use any drugs or alcohol since he had left the
car[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 54.) Hall provided a “[c]onfusing” story about why he
and Molencupp were in the field that day. (Id. at 55.) As Deputy Clements
conducted the interview, he was trying to determine whether Hall was impaired
and, if so, whether the impairment was due to drugs or a medical condition.
Hall displayed at least three indicators of impairment: rapid speech,
incoherence of story, and paranoia. Deputy Clements applied for a search
warrant to draw Hall’s blood for a screening. A judge signed the search
warrant at 5:44 p.m. on August 2, 2023. Deputy Clements drew Hall’s blood at
6:06 p.m. and sent it to be tested for methamphetamine.
[9] On August 3, 2023, the State charged Hall with Level 2 felony attempted
burglary with a deadly weapon, Level 5 felony attempted burglary, 4 Class B
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 5 and Class C misdemeanor operating a
vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance or metabolite in the blood.
Forensic testing determined Hall’s blood contained methamphetamine.
Forensic testing of cell phones belonging to Hall and Molencupp uncovered
texts exchanged during the time when Hall, Molencupp, and Farmer were in
the field in which Molencupp told Hall to “Abort” because “Some one is
here[.]” (Ex. Vol. at 56.) Hall texted Molencupp to “[h]ead to road and dump
4 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1. 5 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 6 of 20 disguise[.]” (Id. at 72.) Molencupp texted Farmer: “And we need to take u to
hospital so come out screaming or something[.]” (Id. at 60) (errors in original).
[10] Hall’s trial began on December 19, 2023. After the State’s presentation of
evidence, Hall moved for, and the trial court granted, a directed verdict on the
count involving marijuana. Hall proffered a jury instruction about the meaning
of “deadly weapon” and the trial court refused to give that instruction. A jury
found Hall guilty of the three remaining charges. The trial court entered
convictions of Level 2 felony attempted burglary with a deadly weapon and
Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the
blood.
[11] Following preparation of a presentence investigation report, the court held a
sentencing hearing at which neither party presented evidence. The court found
no mitigating circumstances and three aggravating circumstances: (1) Hall’s
criminal history, which includes murder, assault and battery with intent to kill,
and “Failure to Stop for Blue Light” (App. Vol. 2 at 79); (2) Hall’s commission
of the instant crimes while on parole for murder; and (3) Hall’s involvement of
Molencupp in the crimes. The court also noted Hall’s risk of committing
additional crimes is “Very High” according to the Indiana Risk Assessment
Tool. (Id. at 87.) The court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years for
attempted burglary and sixty days for operating a vehicle with a controlled
substance in the blood.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 7 of 20 Discussion and Decision 1. Admission of Evidence [12] Hall argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the toxicology
report that demonstrated Hall had methamphetamine in his blood. “‘The
admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and we review for an abuse of discretion.’” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d
829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012)),
cert. denied --- S. Ct. ----, 2024 WL 4529860 (2024). Reversal is warranted “only
if the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” McCoy v. State,
193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).
[13] Hall claims the chemical test was inadmissible because it was not conducted
within the time frame required by Indiana Code section 9-30-6-2, which in
necessary part states:
(a) A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense under this chapter, IC 9- 30-5, or IC 9-30-9, or a violation under IC 9-30-15 shall offer the person the opportunity to submit to a chemical test.
*****
(c) A test administered under this chapter must be administered within three (3) hours after the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe the person committed . . . a violation under 9-30-15.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 8 of 20 Although the State does not disagree with Hall’s assertion that police failed to
collect his blood sample within the three-hour window prescribed by Section 9-
30-6-2, we cannot agree that failure renders the result of his test inadmissible.
[14] When a sample is collected within the three hours provided by Section 9-30-6-2,
Indiana Code section 9-30-6-15 creates a presumption that the amount of
alcohol in the person’s blood at the time of the test represents the amount of
alcohol in the person’s blood when they operated the vehicle. 6 See Ind. Code §
9-30-6-15 (“the trier of fact shall presume…”). When a test is conducted more
than three hours after driving, that impacts “the rebuttable presumption, not the
admissibility of the chemical test.” Mannix v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1002, 1009 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016) (quoting State v. Stamm, 616 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993)). Therefore, the test result was admissible despite being performed more
than three hours after law enforcement first encountered Hall, see Stamm, 616
N.E.2d at 380 (holding results of blood test collected outside three-hour
window were admissible), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting that evidence. Cf. id. (holding trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the evidence).
6 We acknowledge the presumption created by Section 9-30-6-15 is relevant only for charges involving impairment by alcohol – whereas Hall was alleged to have been impaired by methamphetamine – such that the presumption created by that statute is irrelevant for Hall’s circumstances. Nevertheless, we reference the presumption as its existence is relevant to the caselaw’s discussion of why the chemical test remains admissible when collected after the three-hour window.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 9 of 20 2. Proposed Jury Instructions Hall next argues the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting his proposed
jury instruction on the definition of “deadly weapon.” A trial court’s provision
of jury instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dunn v. State, 230
N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). This review includes “‘(1) whether the instruction
correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support
the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered
instruction is covered by other instructions that are given.’” Owen v. State, 210
N.E.3d 256, 267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Chambers v. State, 734 N.E.2d 578, 580
(Ind. 2000), reh’g denied), reh’g denied. “[E]rror in a particular instruction will
not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the law
in the case.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1284-85 (Ind. 2014) (quoting
Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 2001)), cert. denied 574 U.S. 1091
(2015). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it denies a request for an
instruction that would mislead or confuse the jury. Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 268.
[15] Our legislature provided the following definition of “deadly weapon”:
(1) A loaded or unloaded firearm
(2) A destructive device, weapon, device, taser (as defined in IC 35-47-8-3) or electronic stun weapon (as defined in IC 35-47-8-1), equipment, chemical substance, or other material that in the manner it:
(A) is used;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 10 of 20 (B) could ordinarily be used; or
(C) is intended to be used;
is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.
(3) An animal (as defined in IC 35-46-3-3) that is:
(A) readily capable of causing serious bodily injury; and
(B) used in the commission or attempted commission of a crime.
(4) A biological disease, virus, or organism that is capable of causing serious bodily injury.
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-86(a). The legislature also defined “serious bodily
injury”: “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1)
serious permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4)
permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member
or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-292.
[16] The trial court gave the jury the pattern jury instruction definition of “deadly
weapon,” which explains:
The term “deadly weapon” is defined by law as meaning: a weapon that in the manner it is used, or could ordinarily be used, is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 11 of 20 (App. Vol. 2 at 39) (paragraph formatting modified). The trial court also gave
the pattern jury instruction definition of serious bodily injury, which provides:
The term “serious bodily injury” is defined by law as meaning bodily injury that creates: a substantial risk of death; or bodily injury that causes: serious permanent disfigurement, unconsciousness, extreme pain, permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of the bodily member or organ, or loss of a fetus.
(Id.) (paragraph formatting modified).
[17] Hall acknowledges that the pattern jury instruction included the statutory
definition of “deadly weapon” but, according to Hall, that definition, “without
any context, [could] mislead the jury.” (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) Hall proposed
that the trial court instead give the following instruction:
The question of whether a weapon is “deadly” is determined from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the circumstances of the case. Whether an object is a deadly weapon based on these factors is a question of fact. The original purpose of the object is not considered. Rather, the manner in which the defendant actually used the object is examined. Also, it does not matter if actual injuries were sustained by the crime victim, provided the defendant had the apparent ability to injure the victim seriously through his use of the object during the crime.
(App. Vol. 2 at 48.) The trial court declined to give Hall’s instruction because
the pattern jury instructions were sufficient.
[18] Hall’s proposed instruction came from Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), where our court considered whether brass knuckles Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 12 of 20 qualified as a deadly weapon for a battery conviction. The other cases Hall
cites - Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. 1994) (plastic flashlight), and Burgh
v. State, 79 N.E.3d 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (paved parking lot) - similarly
addressed whether specific objects could constitute deadly weapons. However,
our Supreme Court has “long held” that language from appellate opinions,
particularly from sufficiency-of-evidence cases, does not necessarily belong in
jury instructions. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 563 (Ind. 2019). This
principle is especially relevant here, because Hall’s proposed instruction drew
from cases analyzing evidence sufficiency rather than approving jury
instructions. Id.
[19] Additionally, the cases Hall relies on involved everyday objects - a flashlight
and parking lot surface - that had an obvious other “original purpose”
completely divorced from damaging person or property. Gleason, 965 N.E.2d at
708. A machete, in contrast, is designed specifically to cut through biological
matter, including humans.
See https://www.dictionary.com/browse/machete (“a large heavy knife used
especially in Latin American countries in cutting sugarcane and clearing
underbrush and as a weapon”) [https://perma.cc/7PAG-LK7A]. Instructing a
jury to ignore a machete’s original purpose when deciding if it qualifies as a
deadly weapon could cause confusion. The pattern instruction properly stated
the law defining deadly weapons without risk of confusing the jury. Therefore,
the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to give Hall’s proposed
instruction. Cf. Batchelor, 119 N.E.3d at 563 (trial court should have given only
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 13 of 20 the pattern jury instruction, rather than also giving instruction comprised of
appellate language from a sufficiency-of-evidence case).
3. Sufficiency of Evidence [20] Hall argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his
conviction of Level 2 felony attempted burglary with a deadly weapon. When
evaluating insufficient evidence claims, we must consider only evidence that
supports the verdict and any reasonable inferences from that favorable
evidence. Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). Evaluating witness
credibility and deciding the weight of the evidence is left to the fact-finder.
Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). A conviction will be affirmed
unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022)
(quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)).
[21] “A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person,
with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary . . . a Level 2
felony if it: (A) is committed while armed with a deadly weapon[.]” Ind. Code
§ 35-43-2-1. “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the
culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct
that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” Ind. Code
§ 35-41-5-1(a). Hall claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence that
Hall’s conduct constituted a substantial step toward the commission of
burglary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 14 of 20 [22] Whether Hall’s conduct “‘constituted a substantial step is a question of fact for
the jury.’” Saavedra v. State, 186 N.E.3d 134, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting
Cowans v. State, 412 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ind. 1980)), trans. denied. While the
defendant’s act must go “beyond mere preparation,” a substantial step can be
minimal, “often defined as any ‘overt act’ in furtherance of the crime.” B.T.E.
v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 327 (Ind. 2018) (quoting State v. Van Cleave, 674
N.E.2d 1293, 1304 (Ind. 1996)). While there is no bright-line rule for what
constitutes a substantial step, there are several factors that we can balance: “(1)
whether the defendant’s acts strongly corroborate his criminal intent; (2) the
severity of the charged crime; (3) proximity to the underlying crime; (4) the
examples listed in Model Penal Code section 5.01(2); and (5) whether the
defendant’s multiple acts, viewed together, indicate he attempted a crime.” Id.
at 328. Examples of conduct that suggest a substantial step in the Model Penal
Code include: (a) lying in wait or searching for a victim; (b) enticing a victim to
the scene of the planned crime; (c) conducting surveillance of the proposed
crime location; (d) unlawful entry of premises; (e) possession of the materials
for the crime without another lawful use; (f) possession of the materials for the
crime near the location for commission of the crime; and (g) soliciting an
innocent third party to perform an element of the crime. Model Penal Code §
5.01(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2018). The emphasis “is on what the defendant has
already done toward committing the crime and not on what remains to be
done.” Saavedra, 186 N.E.3d at 141 (quoting Zickefoose v. State, 388 N.E.2d 507,
510 (Ind. 1979)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 15 of 20 [23] Relevant to the first factor from BTE, Hall argues “it is impossible to ascertain
whether Hall had criminal intent” on the day in question. (Br. of Appellant at
15.) In support, he claims the “only evidence of criminal intent” came from the
“self-serving testimony of” Molencupp. (Id.) Intent is a mental state “‘and,
absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the
reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence.’” A.W.
v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d
758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). We therefore infer whether a
defendant had intent from his “conduct and the natural and usual sequence to
which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id. at 1065. In addition
to Molencupp’s testimony, the jury heard evidence that Hall was found in the
vicinity of the junk house with a backpack full of tools commonly used to
commit burglary. Hall provided no other plausible explanation for why he was
carrying a backpack full of tools for committing burglary through Indiana corn
fields while wearing long dark clothing on an August morning. Text messages
between Hall, Molencupp, and Farmer during the time they were in the field
also support an inference that the trio was there to accomplish a plan together
that needed to be aborted because others were in the area and would discover
them. Hall’s argument regarding his intent fails.
[24] Hall also argues he cannot have taken a substantial step when “there is no
evidence of any . . . forced entry, or that Hall even entered on to any properties
housing a structure or dwelling on August 2, 2023.” (Br. of Appellant at 15.)
However, unlawful entry of a structure is only one of the examples of a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 16 of 20 substantial step listed in the Model Penal Code, and Hall took many other steps
toward his attempted crime. Hall, Molencupp, and Farmer met and devised a
plan to rob the junk house. Hall and Molencupp drove past the junk house
multiple days to conduct surveillance. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(c)
(“reconnoitering the place”). Hall collected a backpack of tools necessary to
burglarize a house. See id. § 5.01(2)(e) (possession of materials for unlawful
use). On the morning of August 2, 2024, Hall and Molencupp picked up
Farmer and drove to the vicinity of the junk house. See B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at
329 (geographic proximity to intended crime). Hall pulled his car into a field of
corn and cut down corn to camouflage his car. He took the backpack of tools
and separated from his co-conspirators, to effectuate their plan of arriving
separately at the junk house. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)(f) (possessing
items for crime near proposed crime location). While the trio aborted their plan
because farm workers were preparing to spray the fields where the car and co-
conspirators were hidden, Hall’s “conduct in the aggregate” – planning the
burglary, arriving at the field, hiding the car, and taking the necessary tools
toward the junk house – is more than sufficient to constitute a substantial step
toward burglary. See, e.g., B.T.E., 108 N.E.3d at 334 (holding aggregate
conduct amounted to a substantial step toward commission of aggravated
battery). The evidence supports Hall’s conviction of attempted burglary with a
deadly weapon.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 17 of 20 4. Inappropriate Sentence [25] Hall argues his sentence of twenty years is inappropriate. Under Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), a sentence may be revised if, “after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Sentencing
is a function of the trial court, whose judgment “should receive ‘considerable
deference.’” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.3d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). This deference can only
be “‘overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature
of the offense’ and ‘the defendant’s character.’” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119,
122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1267). Appellate review of
a sentence is “to leaven outliers, . . . but not to achieve the perceived ‘correct’
result in each case.” Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), trans. denied. The burden of
proving a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant. Littlefield v. State, 215
N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
[26] Due to his significant criminal history and the fact that these events occurred
while Hall was on parole for murder, Hall does not argue that his sentence is
inappropriate based on his character. (Appellant’s Br. at 22.) Instead, he
argues only that a sentence of twenty years is inappropriate for his offense. The
two prongs of Appellate Rule 7(B) are separate inquiries and revision of a
sentence “may be warranted” when one prong weighs heavily in the appellant’s
favor. Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 126. “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 18 of 20 militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger
to justify relief.” Id. at 127.
[27] Turning to the nature of Hall’s offense, we note the sentencing range for a Level
2 felony is ten to thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen-and-one-
half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. The trial court imposed a sentence of
twenty years, which is slightly above the advisory but exactly mid-way between
the minimum and maximum sentences. Hall argues his sentence is
inappropriate based on the nature of the offense because his crime did not result
in damage to any property. While neither burglary nor attempted burglary
requires evidence of property damage, see Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (listing
elements of crime), the lack of damage to property in this case is more likely
due to the fact that Hall’s plan was interrupted by the presence of others in the
area. When discovered, Hall tried to dispose of incriminating evidence by
throwing his backpack and machete into a nearby field, and he brandished a
knife at a field worker. Hall created a false story about searching for a friend
with a serious mental health condition, which caused both the Newton County
Sherriff’s Department and the Benton County Sheriff's Department to
unnecessarily expend time and resources. Hall also had methamphetamine and
amphetamine in his system during the attempted burglary. In short, Hall has
not provided “compelling evidence” to support a sentence revision. Lane, 232
N.E.3d at 122. We therefore hold Hall’s sentence is not inappropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 19 of 20 Conclusion [28] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the toxicology report
into evidence. It similarly did not abuse its discretion by denying Hall’s
proposed jury instruction. The State presented sufficient evidence to support
Hall’s conviction of attempted burglary with a deadly weapon, and Hall’s
sentence of twenty years is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
[29] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jacob A. Ahler The Law Office of Riley and Ahler, P.C. Rensselaer, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 20 of 20