George D. Prather and Mable E. Prather v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

322 F.2d 931, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5588, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 16, 1963
Docket17559
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 322 F.2d 931 (George D. Prather and Mable E. Prather v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
George D. Prather and Mable E. Prather v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 322 F.2d 931, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5588, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225 (9th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge.

The Prathers have horrible income tax trouble. Economically, they did not make in their pump business a lot of money in 1954, but the commissioner and the Director of Internal Revenue have bunched into 1954 what was really the fruits of an individual business enterprise which began in 1942 and continued into 1955.

Apparently during the years of the enterprise the Prathers’ net worth was going steadily, slowly and surely upward. But they were showing on their returns comparatively little taxable income from their business. This they accomplished from 1942 to 1953 by reporting on the cash receipts and disbursements method. No suggestion is made of any immorality or wrongfulness in so doing. In 1953, taxpayers switched their accounting from a cash basis to an accrual basis, but on their 1953 return they made adjustments to show their income on the old cash basis.

On January 1, 1954, the Prathers on the new accrual basis showed net assets of $303,397.63 and liabilities to others of $100,991.90. For 1954, the return showed net taxable income on an accrual basis of $9,410.52. The director has added over $200,000 of net taxable income to the 1954 return and asserts a deficiency of about $160,000 in taxes. We do not have to go outside of the record to surmise that the director’s (now the commissioner’s) position, if upheld, about ruins the Prathers and takes the fruits of a business they built up for over 13 years. The tax court has upheld the commissioner.

We assume that the business started when inventory and receivables were small factors, or that at the outset it may have been that capital represented *933 in the inventory and receivables was offset by borrowed capital. Anyway, they went on and on reporting on a cash basis, which obviously did not reflect their financial betterment somewhere between 1942 and 1953. For some of the returns for pre-1954 years, there were discussions with field agents about a change from cash to accrual reporting — but nothing happened. Neither the taxpayers nor the tax gatherer insisted on a change, and it is not clear that either wanted it.

In 1954 a new Internal Revenue Code was adopted with the following provision:

“§ 481. Adjustments required by changes in method of accounting
“(a) General rule. — In computing the taxpayer’s taxable income for any taxable year (referred to in this section as the ‘year of the change’)—
“(1) if such computation is under a method of accounting different from the method under which the taxpayer’s taxable income for the preceding taxable year was computed, then
“(2) there shall be taken into account those adjustments which are determined to be necessary solely by reason of the change in order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted, except there shall not be taken into account any adjustment in respect of any taxable year to which this section does not apply.” (Emphasis supplied.) Enacted August 16. 1954.

In pertinent part, Section 446 (and its predecessor) has provided for a long time as follows:

“General rule for methods of accounting
“(a) General rule. — Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
“(b) Exceptions. — If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income. ******
“(e) Requirement respecting change of accounting method. — Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, a taxpayer who changes the method of accounting on the basis of which he regularly computes his income in keeping his books shall, before computing his taxable income under the new method, secure the consent of the Secretary or his delegate.”

If taxpayer could successfully change his accounting and reporting method for the year 1954, Section 481, on August 16, 1954, gave him an escape to avoid the bunching of income in the year in which he made his shift of accounting basis. But Section 446(b) at least presented a problem — approval of change of method by the “Secretary or his delegate.”

Promptly after the August 16, 1954, enactment the commissioner started one of his most successful “sit downs” in the history of American tax law. Not approving of Section 481 as enacted, he declined consistently to approve under 446(b) accounting method changes, until after the Congress on September 2, 1958, adopted the Technical Amendments Act, Section 29 of which amended Section 481(a) (2) to read as follows:

“Sec. 481. Adjustments required by changes in method of accounting “ (a) General Rule. — In computing the taxpayer’s taxable income for any taxable year (referred to in this section as the ‘year of the change’)— ******
“(2) there shall be taken into account those adjustments which are determined to be necessary solely by reason of the change in order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted, except there shall not be *934 taken into account any adjustment in respect of any taxable year to which this section does not apply unless the adjustment is attributable to a change in the method of accounting initiated by the taxpayer.”

With this change, the taxpayers, who already had their 1954 tax case in the tax court, were in real trouble. While the parties disagree as to the effect of non-approval of the change in accounting and repoxhiing, 1 both would agree that the commissioner has never expressly approved the change.

Taxpayer’s first point is that Section 481(a) (2) as amended in 1958, “unless the adjustment is attributable to a change in the method of accounting initiated by the taxpayer,” is unconstitutional. This claim was not pleaded before the tax court. It could not have beeix pleaded, of course, before enactment. But there was plenty of time after enactment and before decision to x’aise the point. The tax court apparently received extensive briefs on the constitutionality and heard arguments thereon. In announcing the decision, the tax coui*t held the issue not before it, but said, if it were, the court would decide in favor of the commissioner.

While we agree that cases should be kept to the basic pleadings, yet the tax court let the parties fight out before it the issue. We thus conclude the issue was before it for decision.

After study of the question, we hold the statute constitutional. Equitably the terrible penalty of the income bunching here leaves one disturbed, but we cannot yet find unconstitutionality. Of course, the possibilities of the 1954 Section 481, permitting a taxpayer to escape taxes that another just like him had paid, did not present an attractive picture. Thus, the commissioner was able to get the law changed four years later.

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Bluebook (online)
322 F.2d 931, 12 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5588, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/george-d-prather-and-mable-e-prather-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca9-1963.